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Open a random newspaper and you are likely to find several articles on 
environmental topics. On the one hand, you might find stories about attempts to save 
nearly-extinct species, increases in sales of organic products, and protests against the 
sale of polluting substances. Such stories suggest that individuals are strongly 
motivated to engage in action to protect or promote the quality of the environment. 
Indeed, many individuals seem strongly concerned about environmental issues 
(EcoAmerica, 2011; Eurobarometer, 2011) and most seem to agree that human 
behavior should change in order to alleviate these issues (Leiserowitz, Kates, & Parris, 
2006; Poortinga, Steg, & Vlek, 2002). However, other newspaper articles may be 
about man-made environmental problems such as plastic ‘soup’ in the world’s 
oceans, deforestation, and global climate change. Such stories paint quite a different 
picture, suggesting that individuals are failing to act to resolve these issues. This 
raises the question why individuals are motivated to act upon pro-environmental 
beliefs in some situations, but not in others. Which psychological processes lead 
individuals to choose to act pro-environmentally in one situation, but not in the next? 
This dissertations aims to answer these questions by examining when, and to what 
extent, individuals translate pro-environmental beliefs into pro-environmental 
action. 
 These when and to-which-extent questions are important because although 
pro-environmental beliefs encourage individuals to engage in pro-environmental 
behavior from within, contextual and situational barriers (that increase personal 
costs of pro-environmental actions) represent external factors that may prevent 
individuals from translating their pro-environmental beliefs into action. Thus, 
individuals may face a conflict between their normative considerations (which I1 
define as ‘considerations in which the welfare of others/the environment, not oneself, 
are the central motivating aspect) and other, often rather selfish considerations, such 
as the desire to avoid financial costs or effort when deciding whether to act pro-
environmentally or not (e.g. Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Hence, in many situations 
individuals have to weigh their desire to act upon their normative considerations 
against their desire to avoid the costs of doing so (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; 
Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 1977). Throughout this dissertation, I will refer 
                                                          
1 I have used ‘I’ for the author throughout the introduction and discussion sections. However, 
the research presented here is the product of a collaboration between me and my promoters 
Linda Steg and Martijn van Zomeren, which is reflected in the use of ‘we’ for the authors in 
the empirical chapters. 
to this weighing process as balancing. I propose that the outcome of the balancing 
process depends upon the strength and accessibility of individuals’ normative 
considerations as well as the perceived strength of external barriers (which affect the 
perceived costliness of behavior). By assessing the predictive power of normative 
considerations under different levels of behavioral costs and systematically varying 
the extent to which normative considerations are supported situationally, I aim to 
find out under which circumstances normative considerations (such as 
environmental beliefs) result in the motivation to act pro-environmentally. 
 In order to gain broad and convergent support for this balancing process, I 
examine the predictive power of different indicators of normative considerations on 
different types of pro-environmental behaviors. Two broad types of normative 
considerations can be identified: behavior-specific considerations, which reflect 
concern for the environmental impact of specific behaviors, and general 
considerations, which reflect concern for the overall quality of the environment. I first 
examine the balancing process with regard to behavioral-specific normative 
considerations. An example of specific normative considerations is the extent to 
which an individual feels morally obliged to engage in particular action to support the 
environment (i.e., someone’s personal norms to engage in this behavior; Schwartz, 
1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981). However, while these behavior-specific normative 
considerations promote pro-environmental behavior from within, external barriers 
may prevent individuals from acting in line with these considerations. An important 
barrier that has been proposed to prevent individuals from acting upon their specific 
normative considerations are the costs of engaging in specific behavior (in terms of 
for example money, time, & effort; e.g. Diekmann & Preisendörfer 2003, Guagnano, 
Stern, & Dietz, 1995; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Steg & Vlek, 2009). High behavioral 
costs of a given action are thought to inhibit pro-environmental behavior because 
individuals’ desire to avoid high costs is likely to outweigh their desire to act upon 
their normative considerations.  
  The former line of thought is typically referred to as the low-cost hypothesis 
(Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003). More specifically, this hypothesis states that 
individuals are more likely to translate normative considerations into action when 
doing so is associated with relatively lower costs. A number of studies have attempted 
to test this hypothesis, but findings are mixed, making the resulting picture confusing 
(Best, 2010). On the one hand, some findings appear to support the low-cost 
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hypothesis (e.g. personal norms being more predictive of low-cost recycling behavior 
than of more costly recycling; Derksen & Gartrell, 1993; for other examples, see 
Diekmann & Preisendörfer 1998, 2003). On the other hand, other studies report no 
support (e.g. environmental concern predicting adoption of pro-environmental 
farming practices irrespective of the associated costs; Best, 2010; for other examples, 
see Anderson & Von Borgstede, 2010; Best & Kneip, 2011; Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 
1995). These different results may be due in part to differences in the 
conceptualization of behavioral costs (Best, 2010), a problem I will discuss in greater 
detail later in this introduction chapter. Such conceptual differences make it difficult 
to assess the level of support for the low-cost hypothesis. In Chapter 2-4, I test the 
low-cost hypothesis using a multi-method, multi-sample approach and explicit 
measures of behavioral costs to find convergent evidence for the influence of 
behavioral costs on the predictive power of specific normative considerations on pro-
environmental behavior2. 
 Moreover, in this dissertation I study the balancing mechanism with regard to 
general normative considerations. An example of such general considerations are 
biospheric values, which reflect how important environmental issues are as a guiding 
principle in one’s life and whether enhancing environmental quality is an important 
goal to an individual (De Groot & Steg, 2008). Because of the general nature of 
biospheric values, these values may not always be immediately accessible in every 
situation that offers an opportunity to act upon one’s values and to engage in pro-
environmental behavior, and for this reason individuals may fail to translate their 
values into behavior (Maio, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Steg, Keizer, 
Bolderdijk, & Perlavicuite, 2014). For example, individuals may have strong 
biospheric values, but these values may not be active when buying groceries, meaning 
that they may fail to purchase pro-environmental items even though doing so would 
enable them to act upon their strong biospheric values (Maio, 2010; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002). This means that a lack of situational activation of general normative 
considerations can represent an important psychological barrier to their translation 
into actual pro-environmental behavior. In Chapter 5, I examine to which extent 
situational activation of individuals’ general normative considerations affects the 
extent to which these considerations explain pro-environmental behavior. This study 
                                                          
2 I used self-reported behaviors, behavioral intentions, and motivation to act pro-
environmentally as outcome variables in the studies presented in this dissertation. To aid 
readability, I refer to these measures as ‘behavior’ in this chapter. 
provides another test of the balancing mechanism, as it examines how changes in the 
activation of normative considerations, with situational and contextual barriers held 
constant, influence individuals’ willingness to act upon these considerations and 
hence to act pro-environmentally.  
 In sum, the central aim of this dissertation is to further our understanding of 
when and to what extent normative considerations predict pro-environmental 
behavior, and to do so in a broad and convergent sense. More specifically, it does so 
by systematically examining the extent to which specific (Chapter 2-4) and general 
(Chapter 5) normative considerations predict different pro-environmental behaviors 
(e.g., car use reductions, support for an environmental NGO) under different levels of 
behavioral costs (Chapter 2-4) and situational activation (Chapter 5). Answering this 
question is interesting theoretically because it provides deeper insight into the 
circumstances under which normative considerations explain pro-environmental 
behavior. At the same time, it is also practically relevant because it provides insight 
into the potential success of behavior change strategies targeting normative 
considerations as well as the need for reducing barriers for action. Importantly, most 
of the research conducted in this thesis included samples from different European 
countries, which enables an assessment of the generalizability of (aspects of) the 
balancing mechanism. In the remainder of this introduction, I will first discuss how 
behavioral costs affect the predictive power of normative considerations, followed by 
a discussion of situational activation of normative considerations and a road map for 
the four empirical chapters to come. 
 
Balancing specific normative considerations and behavioral costs 
Many individuals feel strongly about the need to engage in specific behavior in order 
to enhance the quality of the environment. For example, many individuals are 
concerned about the negative environmental impact of private cars and therefore feel 
obliged to reduce their own car use (Anable, 2005; Hagman, 2003; Steg & Sievers, 
2000). The norm-activation model (NAM) (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 
1981; Steg & De Groot, 2010) explains how such specific normative considerations are 
activated. Although this model was originally developed to explain pro-social 
behavior such as helping (e.g. Schwartz, 1973; Schwartz & Ben David, 1976; Schwartz 
& Clausen, 1970; Schwartz & Fleishman, 1982) and volunteering (e.g. Schwartz, 
1974), it has often been researched and tested to explain environmental behaviors, 
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such as recycling (Hopper & Nielsen, 1991; Vinning & Ebreo, 1992), reducing car use 
(Abrahamse, Steg, Gifford, & Vlek, 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Hunecke, 
Blöbaum, Matthies, & Höger, 2001; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; Wall, Devine-Wright, 
& Mill, 2007), consumer behavior (Thogersen, 1999) and policy acceptability (Steg, 
Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005).  
  The central motivating factor in the NAM is personal norms, which are 
defined as ‘feelings of moral obligation to perform or refrain from specific actions’ 
(Schwartz & Howard, 1981, p. 191). The NAM states that the activation of personal 
norms depends on two key factors. First, individuals must be aware of (potential) 
negative consequences of the relevant behavior for others or the environment 
(awareness of consequences). Second, they must feel responsible for and feel they can 
help to reduce these negative consequences by enacting the relevant behavior 
(outcome efficacy; Abrahamse, Steg, Gifford, & Vlek, 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 
2003; De Groot & Steg, 2009; Steg & De Groot, 2010; Thogersen, 1999). For example, 
when applied to reductions in private car use, this means that when people are aware 
of environmental problems caused by the use of private cars, and they feel that they 
can help reduce these negative consequences by reducing their car use, they will feel a 
stronger moral obligation to reduce their car use which motivates them to engage in 
action. I will use this notion of personal norms as the main indicator of specific 
normative considerations in Chapters 2-4 of this dissertation. 
 The predictive power of the NAM differs strongly across various studies. 
Specifically, the NAM appears to be more predictive of low-cost environmental 
behaviors and ‘good intentions’ (e.g., willingness to change, willingness to sacrifice, 
policy acceptability; e.g., Harland, Staats, & WIlke, 2007; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; 
Steg et al., 2005; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999; Wall et al., 2007), 
while it appears to have less explanatory power in contexts where behavioral 
enactment is relatively costly in terms of effort, inconvenience, money, or time, such 
as reducing car use (e.g., Abrahamse et al., 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; 
Hunecke et al., 2001). This finding fits the balancing process I outlined before 
because it is in line with the idea that individuals weigh the benefits of acting upon 
their personal norms against the costs of doing so, leading them to act upon their 
personal norms when behavioral costs are relatively low but to refrain from doing so 
when costs are higher. At the same time, some initial evidence suggests that the NAM 
may also be less predictive of behaviors that require very little personal costs (e.g. 
Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995) than of behaviors that are somewhat more 
personally costly. Although this finding may seem counter-intuitive, it actually fits the 
idea that individuals balance personal costs against the benefits of acting in line with 
their normative considerations. This is because in the absence of reasons to refrain 
from normative action, individuals are likely to engage in pro-environmental 
behavior irrespective of the strength of their personal norms. Hence, the NAM should 
not be strongly predictive of very low-cost behavior either. 
 In sum, the balancing mechanism suggests that specific normative 
considerations as operationalized in the NAM (i.e., personal norms) are likely to be 
less predictive of environmental behavior when it is associated with very low 
personal costs than with somewhat higher costs to an individual. Moreover, these 
same normative considerations should be less predictive of environmental behavior 
when it is highly personally costly than when costs are lower (but not very low). For 
example, when individuals in the Netherlands, across the board, perceive using 
renewable energy as relatively low-cost behavior whereas those in France perceive it 
as highly costly, normative considerations should be more predictive of the use of 
renewable energy in the Netherlands than in France. Figure 1.1 illustrates this line of 
thought. Whereas results from previous studies on the NAM appear to support this 
line of thought, no studies have been conducted in which the predictive power of the 
NAM under different levels of behavioral costs was systematically tested. In Chapters 
2-4, I aim to fill this gap by systematically studying the extent to which key variables 
from the NAM predict specific environmental behaviors (i.e. car use, use of renewable 
energy sources, and acceptability of policy measures) under different levels of 
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behavioral costs on other factors within that design. Second, an explicit measure of 
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whether one behavior is indeed more costly than another, allowing for more valid 
conclusions regarding the effect of differences in behavioral costs on the predictive 
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Unfortunately, research that attempted to examine the extent to which 
normative considerations predicted behavior under different levels of behavioral 
costs used very different operationalizations and measures, or failed to include such 
measures, making their results difficult to compare (Best, 2010). For example, Stern 
and colleagues (1995) and Derksen and Gartrell (1993) both tested whether the 
introduction of a curbside pick-up system, which makes recycling less costly, changed 
the predictive power of normative considerations on recycling behavior. The two 




































power when recycling facilities were provided while Derksen & Gartrell report an 
increase), but neither study included a comparable measure of behavioral costs, 
meaning that it is difficult to conclude much about why these results differ. Equally 
unclear is the approach chosen by Diekmann and Preisendörfer (1998), who tested 
the low-cost hypothesis by comparing the predictive power of normative 
considerations on two different behaviors (recycling and transport mode choice) 
based on the untested assumption that recycling is less costly behavior than changing 
one’s mode of transport. This assumption may very well be correct, but we need to 
explicitly test such assumptions. 
 I aim to provide a comprehensive test of the low-cost hypotheses by 
employing a clear conceptualization of behavioral costs as well as an explicit measure 
to validate assumed differences in behavioral costs between behaviors and situations. 
More specifically, I will directly compare the predictive power of normative 
considerations under different levels of behavioral costs within the same study 
design, including the same explicit measure of behavioral costs for each relevant 
behavior and situation to validate assumed differences in behavioral costs between 
these behaviors and situations. For example, In Chapter 3 I compare the predictive 
power of normative considerations on the use of renewable energy sources in 
different countries. For this purpose, I include a measure of behavioral costs of using 
renewable energy sources to examine whether these costs indeed differ in the 
expected direction across countries. The inclusion of this measure provides me with a 
comprehensive test of whether the predictive power of normative considerations to 
explain the use of renewable energy sources depends on the costs of using renewable 
energy in different countries.  
I conceptualize the costs of engaging in specific pro-environmental behavior as 
the total perceived negative individual consequences of engaging in this behavior 
instead of engaging in alternative (environmentally unfriendly) behavior. It is 
important to note that I focus on the extent to which individuals perceive engaging in 
particular behavior to be costly as an indicator of behavioral costs, rather than on an 
objective measure of costs. After all, it is the perception of potential costs, and not the 
actual costs in terms of money, time, comfort, or pleasure, which potentially deters 
individuals from engaging in actions. Obviously, the perception of increased costs 
may follow from increased objective costs, but not necessarily so (e.g., increased 
objective monetary costs may not be perceived as psychologically costly when one 
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feels it is worth it, when one is able to afford it, or when one simply does not notice 
it). Similarly, objective decreases in behavioral costs (e.g., such as reductions in travel 
time by public transport due to improvements) may not translate in perceived 
reductions in the cost of using public transport when individuals are not aware of 
them. Hence, a direct measure of perceived costs is likely to be more informative than 
a measure of objective behavioral costs, which is why Chapters 2, 3, and 4 test the 
extent to which normative considerations predict pro-environmental behaviors under 
different levels of perceived behavioral costs. 
 
Shifting the balance: Situational activation of general normative 
considerations to promote pro-environmental motivation 
Many individuals are not only motivated to act pro-environmentally by specific 
environmental issues, but also by their general concern for the quality of the 
environment (see for example EcoAmerica, 2011; Eurobarometer; 2011). Research 
has shown that biospheric values (De Groot & Steg, 2007; 2008) are a powerful 
indicator for such general normative beliefs that are related to a variety of 
environmental beliefs, norms, and behaviors (Steg, De Groot, Dreijerink, Abrahamse, 
& Siero, 2011; Steg & De Groot, 2012). A value is defined as “a desirable 
transsituational goal varying in importance, which serves as a guiding principle in the 
life of a person or other social entity” (Schwartz, 1992; p. 21). Biospheric values thus 
reflect how important environmental issues are as a guiding principle in one’s life and 
whether enhancing environmental quality is an important goal to an individual (De 
Groot & Steg, 2008). In other words, individuals with strong biospheric values 
perceive environmental issues as important, and they are more likely to be motivated 
to engage in behavior in order to enhance the quality of the environment.  
 Indeed, research shows that biospheric values are predictive of the strength of 
beliefs and norms regarding pro-environmental behaviors (Jakovcevic & Steg, 2013; 
Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; 2003; Steg et al., 2005; Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern et al., 
1999; Stern, 2000). For example, individuals with strong biospheric values are more 
likely to feel obliged to act pro-environmentally (Nordlund & Garvill, 2002), to feel 
obliged to reduce their car use (De Groot, Steg, Keizer, Farsang, & Watt, 2012; 
Nordlund & Garvill 2003), and to be aware of negative consequences caused by 
private car use (Eriksson, Nordlund, & Garvill, 2006) than individuals with weaker 
biospheric values. However, research also shows that biospheric values are not 
consistently positively related to actual pro-environmental behavior and pro-
environmental intentions. For example, Nilsson, Von Borgstede, and Biel (2004) 
report that biospheric values are predictive of pro-environmental intentions and 
behaviors, Honkanen and Verplanken (2004), Steg, Perlavicuite, Van der Werff, and 
Lurvink (2014), and Stern and Dietz (1994) find that values both directly and 
indirectly predict motivation and behavior, while De Groot, Steg, and Dicke (2008) 
find no direct relationships between values and behaviors. In conclusion, a direct 
positive link between values and behavior is not as consistently found as one might 
expect. 
 Besides behavioral costs, which are likely to affect the predictive power of 
biospheric values in a similar way in which they affect the predictive power of 
behavior-specific normative considerations, another reason for this inconsistent 
translation of biospheric values into pro-environmental action may be that biospheric 
values are not always central to individuals’ thinking within a specific situation in 
which they can act pro-environmentally (Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Maio, Olson, 
Allen, & Bernard, 2001; Steg, Bolderdijk, Keizer, & Perlavicuite, 2014). Indeed, 
Verplanken and Holland (2002) showed that value activation was an important 
precondition for value-congruent behavior: Individuals with strong biospheric values 
were more likely to act upon these values when these values were activated 
situationally. These findings suggest that a lack of situational activation can be a 
barrier for translating biospheric values into actual pro-environmental behavior. I 
will study to what extent this barrier prevents individuals from acting upon their 
biospheric values in Chapter 5. Specifically, I will test whether situationally activating 
environmental norms, which can serve as an intermediary between general 
biospheric values and specific pro-environmental behaviors, will lead to  an increase 
in pro-environmental behavior. 
 Value-congruent behavior can be promoted in various ways. For instance, 
Verplanken and Holland (2002) showed that a value activation manipulation resulted 
in increased value-congruent behavior: individuals with strong biospheric values 
were more likely to engage in pro-environmental actions when the concept 
‘environment’ was directly activated. The novel possibility of activating norms rather 
than values that I will explore here is based upon value-belief-norm or VBN theory 
(Stern, 2000; Stern et al., 1999), which is an extension of the NAM. VBN theory 
states that although values may not necessarily be strongly predictive of behavior, 
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they are important and often necessary antecedents of behavior-specific beliefs and 
norms (that make up the NAM), which in turn predict behavior. While values are by 
definition general and transcend situations, VBN theory conceptualizes norms on a 
more specific level, providing the step from a general value (environmental quality is 
important) to a situational norm (I ought to engage in a specific pro-environmental 
act), which motivates individuals to engage in value-congruent behavior. In other 
words, abstract, general values may influence motivation and behavior indirectly 
through more specific situational norms (e.g. De Groot et al., 2008; Jakovcevic & 
Steg, 2013; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; 2003; Steg et al., 2005; Stern et al., 1999). 
 This means that for biospheric values to be predictive of behavior, individuals 
need to translate them into situational norms, which in turn affect their motivation to 
act pro-environmentally. The activation of such specific norms should lead 
individuals with moderate to strong biospheric values to be more strongly motivated 
to engage in pro-environmental behavior, as these norms resonate with their general 
pro-environmental beliefs and specific pro-environmental behaviors. For individuals 
with weak biospheric values, however, such an increase in pro-environmental 
motivation is unlikely, because they do not strongly care about the quality of the 
environment and are therefore less likely to act pro-environmentally in the first place, 
irrespective of whether norms related to these weak biospheric values are 
situationally activated or not. In Chapter 5, I test this idea by examining whether 
situationally activating environmental norms (specifically, requesting individuals to 
self-generate and write down environmental norms) results in increased pro-
environmental behavior. Moreover, I extend this line of thought by also testing 
whether the activation of broad, societal norms (that suggest ‘doing the right thing’, 
such as ‘be honest’) may also encourage pro-environmental motivation. I assume that 
these societal norms may also translate into more specific situational 
(environmental) norms that apply to one’s current situation, such as ‘do not litter’. 
However, this translation of broad societal norms into more specific environmental 
norms is most likely among those who perceive pro-environmental behavior as ‘the 
right thing to do’ (i.e., those with strong biospheric values), because it requires 
individuals to perceive pro-environmental action as an opportunity to translate these 
activated general norms into action. Put differently, this means that activating broad 
societal norms may result in increased pro-environmental motivation among 
individuals who perceive environmental issues as important (those with moderate to 
strong biospheric values), while it is unlikely to do so among those who do not 
perceive these issues as important. 
 
This dissertation 
In this dissertation, I examine when and to what extent normative considerations 
predict pro-environmental motivation and behavior. I study this question in a broad 
and convergent way by systematically testing the extent to which specific (Chapters 2-
4) and general (Chapter 5) normative considerations predict various proxies for pro-
environmental behavior. Specifically, the chapters concern reductions in reported car 
use (Chapter 2), use of renewable energy sources (Chapter 3), acceptability of car use 
reduction measures (Chapter 4), and intention to support an environmental NGO 
(Chapter 5). Furthermore, Chapters 2-4 provide hypothesis tests across and within a 
number of European countries, based on data from two vast pan-European surveys 
on energy-related behaviors and potential antecedents of these behaviors. These 
features imply that I not only gain insight into when and to what extent normative 
considerations predict the specific behaviors included in those studies, but also in the 
extent to which the findings generalize across different types of pro-environmental 
behavior and across different countries.  
 Chapter 2 tests the low-cost hypothesis by examining to what extent specific 
normative considerations are predictive of pro-environmental behaviors that differ in 
behavioral costs. Specifically, the chapter studies the predictive power of the NAM on 
short-distance car use and overall car use. Because short-distance car use can be 
reduced at lower costs than overall car use, I hypothesize that normative 
considerations regarding car use reductions (as measured by the NAM) will be more 
predictive of short-distance car use than of overall car use. Importantly, I include an 
explicit measure of perceived behavioral costs to validate the assumption that short-
distance car use is less costly to reduce than overall car use. Furthermore, by 
conducting this study in seven European countries, I also test the generalizability of 
the results across different contexts. 
 Chapter 3 provides a different test of the low-cost hypothesis. Instead of 
comparing the predictive power of the NAM in explaining two separate behaviors that 
vary in behavioral costs, I compare to what extent the NAM predicts one pro-
environmental behavior in contexts that differ in the degree to which the behavior is 
perceived as costly. Specifically, I test to what extent the NAM is predictive of the use 
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renewable energy sources in six European countries. To validate that the perceived 
costs of using renewable energy sources do indeed differ between these countries, I 
include an explicit measure of the perceived costs of using it. Based on the low-cost 
hypothesis, I expect that the NAM will be more predictive of the use of renewable 
energy sources in countries in which the perceived costs of using it are relatively low 
than in countries in which using it is perceived as more costly. 
 Chapter 4 examines the extent to which personal norms, the central motivating 
factor in the NAM, predict the acceptability of policy measures to reduce car use that 
differ in the extent to which they are perceived to be costly. This chapter provides a 
novel application of the low-cost hypothesis, as the hypothesis was not previously 
applied to the field of policy acceptability. Furthermore, this chapter extends the 
work in the previous two chapters by not only comparing behaviors that are perceived 
to be relatively low-cost and behaviors that are perceived to be more costly, but also 
containing a test of the predictive power of personal norms on behavior perceived to 
be associated with very low cost. I argued that personal norms are likely to be more 
predictive of acceptability of policy measures that are perceived to be relatively low-
cost than of policy measures that are perceived as very low cost or high cost. In this 
Chapter, I examine whether this is indeed the case, and test the generalizability of the 
results across different contexts by conducting the study in seven European 
countries.  
In Chapter 5, I test the balancing mechanism by assessing whether external 
factors can be used to increase the predictive power of normative considerations on 
pro-environmental behavior when the strength of contextual barriers is held 
constant. While the previous chapters focused on behavior-specific normative 
considerations, this chapter focuses on the predictive power of general normative 
considerations on pro-environmental behavior. Specifically, it examines whether the 
predictive power of biospheric values on the motivation to support an environmental 
NGO is stronger after activating situational norms, causing this motivation to 
increase. I argued that situational norm activation is likely to lead to a stronger 
motivation to act pro-environmentally among individuals with moderate to strong 
biospheric values, while it is unlikely to do so for individuals with weaker biospheric 
values, and that this holds true for both the activation of environmental norms and 
broader, societal norms.  
Finally, In Chapter 6 I discuss the main findings from the four empirical 
chapters and their theoretical and practical implications. More specifically, I will 
address the central question of this dissertation: ‘when and to what extent do 
individuals translate their normative considerations regarding the environment into 
pro-environmental motivation and behavior’? In addition, I elaborate on the 
theoretical and practical implications of the results of the empirical studies, paying 
specific attention to their implications for policy decisions. Moreover, I will outline 
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increase. I argued that situational norm activation is likely to lead to a stronger 
motivation to act pro-environmentally among individuals with moderate to strong 
biospheric values, while it is unlikely to do so for individuals with weaker biospheric 
values, and that this holds true for both the activation of environmental norms and 
broader, societal norms.  
Finally, In Chapter 6 I discuss the main findings from the four empirical 
chapters and their theoretical and practical implications. More specifically, I will 
address the central question of this dissertation: ‘when and to what extent do 
individuals translate their normative considerations regarding the environment into 
pro-environmental motivation and behavior’? In addition, I elaborate on the 
theoretical and practical implications of the results of the empirical studies, paying 
specific attention to their implications for policy decisions. Moreover, I will outline 
important issues for future research. 
  
   
   
CHAPTER  2
To drive or not to drive? 
The predictive power of normative 
considerations on two types of car use 
across seven European countries.  
Chapter 2 is based on:
 Keizer, M., Steg, L., & Van Zomeren, M. (2014). The role of normative 
considerations in overall and short-distance car use in seven European 
countries (manuscript submitted for publication).
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Imagine that you value environmental issues, and that, every day, you need to travel 
to work. You normally travel by car, which is convenient but bad for the environment. 
You could reduce your car use by travelling by public transport instead, which is 
better for the environment but less convenient. Now, if you had to travel for 40 km, 
which would take half an hour by car but almost an hour by public transport, would 
you consider traveling by public transport to benefit the environment? And would 
you consider this if you would only have to travel for 4 km, for which traveling by 
public transport would take about the same time as traveling by car? Put differently, 
would you ‘do the right thing’ when the costs (e.g., time, effort) become higher? 
In this chapter, we examine whether normative considerations with respect to 
the environment (e.g., the belief that one should act pro-environmentally to protect 
the environment) are more predictive of relatively low-cost behaviors than of high-
cost behaviors. When acting normatively is associated with higher costs, people face a 
conflict between normative considerations (e.g., to protect the environment) and 
individual interests (e.g., the costliness of behavior). In such situations, concerns 
about individual costs are likely to be prioritized over normative considerations 
(Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 1977; 
Schwartz & Howard, 1981). However, the existing evidence for this so-called low-cost 
hypothesis is mixed. Furthermore, research has not always conceptualized costs 
explicitly and consistently, which raises doubts about the status of the low-cost 
hypothesis. We aim to provide a conceptually sound and novel test of the low-cost 
hypothesis by comparing the extent to which normative considerations predict two 
types of car use. We conduct this study in seven European countries to test the 
generalizability of our findings. 
 
Normative considerations and pro-environmental behavior 
Many pro-environmental behaviors involve a conflict between individual and 
collective interests. Acting pro-environmentally benefits the environment and society, 
but is often relatively costly for individuals, at least in the short run (Gardner & Stern, 
2002). This conflict constitutes a classic social dilemma. The need to sacrifice 
personal benefits to benefit society makes pro-environmental behavior essentially 
pro-social behavior. Because of this pro-social nature of environmental behavior, the 
norm-activation model (NAM; Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981) provides a 
relevant frame of reference to explain it (Steg & De Groot, 2010). Although this model 
was originally developed to explain pro-social behavior (such as helping (e.g. 
Schwartz, 1973; Schwartz & Ben David, 1976; Schwartz & Clausen, 1970; Schwartz & 
Fleishman, 1982) and volunteering (e.g. Schwartz, 1974), it has often been researched 
and tested to explain pro-environmental behavior (see for example Abrahamse, Steg, 
Gifford, & Vlek, 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Harland, Staats, & WIlke, 2007; 
Hopper & Nielsen, 1991; Hunecke, Blöbaum, Matthies, & Höger, 2001; Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2003; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & 
Kalof, 1999; Thogersen, 1999; Wall, Devine-Wright, & Mill, 2007).  
  Specifically, the NAM states that people engage in normative behavior when 
they feel a moral obligation (called personal norm) to do so: If individuals feel a 
strong moral obligation to act pro-environmentally, they feel they ought to act 
accordingly, and are thus more likely to do so. According to the NAM, the activation 
of a personal norm depends on two key factors. First, individuals must be aware of 
(potential) negative consequences of the relevant behavior for others or the 
environment (awareness of consequences). Second, they must feel responsible for 
and feel they can help to reduce these negative consequences by enacting the relevant 
behavior (outcome efficacy; Abrahamse et al., 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; De 
Groot & Steg, 2009; Steg & De Groot, 2010).  
  Empirically, the NAM has proven to be successful in explaining low-cost 
environmental behaviors and ‘good intentions’ (e.g., willingness to change, 
willingness to sacrifice, policy acceptability; e.g., Harland et al., 2007; Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2003; Steg et al., 2005; Stern et al., 1999; Wall et al., 2007). At the same 
time, however, it appears to have less explanatory power in contexts where behavioral 
enactment is relatively costly in terms of effort, inconvenience, money, or time, such 
as reducing car use (e.g., Abrahamse et al., 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; 
Hunecke et al., 2001). These findings are in line with the so-called low-cost 
hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003), which predicts that normative 
considerations are less predictive of high-cost pro-environmental behavior than of 
low-cost behavior because normative considerations are easily pushed into the 
background in case of high costs (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Lindenberg & 
Steg, 2007). In such situations, people will balance the benefits of ‘doing the right 
thing’ against the costs of doing so (Matthies, & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwarz, 1977; 
Schwarz & Howard, 1981). If the outcome of this balancing process is that the 
perceived costs of acting in line with normative considerations are not very high, 
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individuals are likely to act upon their normative considerations, while in cases in 
which the costs are too high, individuals are less likely to act on their normative 
considerations. As a result, normative considerations are likely to be more predictive 
of behavior in low-cost situations because in these situations the costs of normative 
actions are not likely to outweigh normative considerations. In relatively high-cost 
situations, however, concerns about individual costs are likely to outweigh normative 
considerations (Matthies, & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwarz, 1977; Schwarz & Howard, 
1981), in which case normative considerations will hardly be predictive of behavior. 
  Unfortunately, however, the few studies that tested the low-cost hypothesis in 
the environmental domain provide limited empirical support for it (Best, 2010). 
Some findings appear to support the low-cost hypothesis (e.g. Derksen & Gartrell, 
1993; Diekmann & Preisendörfer 1998, 2003), while other studies report opposite 
effects (e.g. Anderson & Von Borgstede, 2010; Best, 2010; Best & Kneip, 2011; 
Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995). These different results may be due in part to 
differences in the conceptualization of the costs of behavior (Best, 2010). Some 
studies that found no support for the low-cost hypothesis appear to examine very 
low-cost behaviors (e.g. making recycling very low-cost behavior by providing bins 
and a curbside pickup system, Guagnano et al., 1995). Normative considerations may 
be less relevant here because there is little variability in enacting very low-cost 
behavior (see Guagnano et al., 1995). Other studies that seem to provide support for 
the low-cost hypothesis lacked a clear conceptualization of behavioral costliness (e.g. 
a comparison between recycling and transportation in Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 
1998), making it difficult to assess whether they contain a valid test of the hypothesis. 
Because of this, a clear conceptualization of the costliness of behavior is vital for a fair 
test of the low-cost hypothesis. We conceptualize the costs of engaging in pro-
environmental behavior as the total perceived negative individual consequences of 
engaging in this behavior instead of engaging in alternative (environmentally 
unfriendly) behavior. Based on this conceptualization, we operationalize costs as the 
perceived costliness of engaging in pro-environmental rather than environmentally 
damaging action. Before we turn to the study, however, we discuss how our ideas fit 




Normative considerations and different types of car use 
The choice whether or not to drive a car is a typical example of a conflict between 
individual and societal interests (e.g. Nordlund & Gärvill, 2003; Van Vugt, Meertens, 
& Van Lange, 1995). Even though many individuals are aware of the negative 
(environmental) consequences of car use (e.g. Flash Eurobarometer 206b, 2007; UK 
Department for Transport, 2010) and believe that individuals should reduce their car 
use in order to reduce these problems (Anable, 2005; Hagman, 2003; Steg & Sievers, 
2000), these normative considerations are not consistently translated into significant 
reductions in car use. Indeed, studies reveal that normative considerations (as 
reflected in the NAM) are relatively strongly predictive of intentions to reduce car use 
(Harland et al., 2007; Wall et al., 2007), but far less predictive of actual car use 
(Abrahamse et al., 2009; Hunecke et al., 2001). An important reason why people may 
not act upon their normative considerations is that reducing car use generally 
requires individuals to give up personal benefits of driving for the sake of the 
environment (Abrahamse et al., 2009), such as comfort, efficiency, privacy, and 
pleasure (Jensen, 1999; Steg, 2003). 
However, this is not to say that normative considerations will be hardly 
predictive of any type of car use. According to the low-cost hypothesis, normative 
considerations should be relatively less predictive of higher-cost car use than of 
lower-costs car use. Car use for short-distance trips is a particular example of a type 
of car use that might be relatively less costly to reduce. Because short-distance trips 
take relatively little time, the potential costs (e.g., time or convenience) of reducing 
car use on short trips are limited. Another reason why reducing short-distance car 
use may be less costly than reducing overall car use is the availability of a wider range 
of feasible modes of transport to replace short-distance car trips. In particular, short 
trips can be made with slow means of transport such as cycling or walking, which 
travelers regard as rather attractive in terms of flexibility and health benefits (Anable 
& Gatersleben, 2005). In contrast, people have to rely on public transport to reduce 
their longer-distance trips, which is generally perceived as unattractive (Anable & 
Gatersleben, 2005, Steg, 2003). The combination of little time loss and the 
availability of alternatives should make reducing short-distance car use a relatively 
low-cost act, whereas reducing overall car use is likely to be a relatively high-cost act. 
We use the difference in costliness between these two types of car use to test the low-
cost hypothesis in the car use domain. Specifically, we predict that normative 
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considerations should be more predictive of short-distance car use (that should not 





Two on-line questionnaire studies were conducted among two independent 
representative samples of the populations of Norway, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Hungary, and Greece. These countries were 
selected for this research project because they provide a representative picture of 
Europe, including countries from different regions. Participants for both 
questionnaire studies were selected from panels from Advanced Market Research 
(AMR), the company that collected the data. Participants were selected on the basis 
of a number of stratification criteria (i.e., gender, age, household income, education 
level, marital status, and household composition) to create samples that were 
representative for the populations of each country. Participants could only participate 
in one of the questionnaire studies. 
 The questionnaires contained items on various energy-related behaviors, 
potential antecedents of these behaviors, and socio-demographics3. The first 
questionnaire included items on overall car use, antecedents of car use based on the 
NAM, and perceived costliness of reducing car use. The second questionnaire 
contained the same items focusing on short-distance car use. This strategy has the 
benefit of assessing either type of car use without an explicit comparison to the other. 
All data were collected during the spring of 2009. 
 
Participants 
In total 15.414 participants completed one of the two questionnaires (approximately 
1100 participants per questionnaire in each country). Because car use is the variable 
of interest, we only included participants who held a driving license and had regular 
access to a car in the data analyses. To ensure the quality of the data, we also removed 
a number of participants from the data sets because of irregular answering patterns4. 
                                                          
3 See the BARenergy project website, www.barenergy.eu, for more information about the 
questionnaires. 
4 To filter out participants that were unsuitable for inclusion in the analysis, the following 
criteria were used: we removed participants who answered more than 2/3 of all questions 
The application of these limitations meant that a total of 4664 participants who 
completed the questions on overall car use were included in the data-analysis 
(Norway: 650; United Kingdom: 618; The Netherlands: 541; France: 769; 
Switzerland: 762; Hungary: 548; Greece: 776), while 4576 participants who 
completed questions on short-distance car use were included (Norway: 695; United 
Kingdom: 590; The Netherlands: 552; France: 683; Switzerland: 742; Hungary: 598; 
Greece: 716). This means that a total of 60% of all participants who took part in the 
online questionnaires were included in the data-analysis. Participants’ mean age was 
between 41 (Greece) and 49 (United Kingdom) years old, with ages ranging from 18 
to 90, and approximately equal numbers of males and females took part in each 
country. Distributions of age and gender did not differ between those included or 
excluded from the data-analysis. Both questionnaires were completed by highly 
similar samples of participants in each country. 
 
Measures 
Respondents first completed questions on the level of (short-distance or overall) car 
use. Next, they completed questions on antecedents of car use, including questions on 
the NAM variables and the perceived costliness of reducing their (short-distance) car 
use. Questions on the NAM variables and costliness were mixed and presented in 
random order. All questions on antecedents of car use were measured on seven-point 
Likert scales, ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’). We used 
similar measures for overall and short-distance car use and their antecedents to 
ensure that outcomes would be comparable. Below, we describe the measures 
focusing on overall car use, and indicate how the wording was changed for the short-
distance car use questions in brackets and italics. 
 
Car use. Participants indicated the extent to which they use a car in comparison to 
other modes of transport on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (‘I never travel (short-
distances) by car’) to 7 (‘I always travel (short-distances) by car’). The midpoint 
option of the scale was 4 (‘I travel (short-distances) by car and by alternative modes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
from one question battery identically as well as participants who filled out improbable 
answers in quality-control questions that requested participants to fill out a particular 
number. Most participants who were removed from the data set used identical answering 
patterns in several question batteries, indicating that they did not complete the questionnaire 
seriously. 
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number. Most participants who were removed from the data set used identical answering 




of transport equally often’). Because previous research has shown that participants 
tend to underreport short-distance trips (e.g. Stopher, FitzGerald, & Xu, 2007), we 
provided participants with a list of different means of transport they may use, 
including bus, tram, moped, airplane, bike, and on foot. Participants who completed 
the short-distance car use questions were provided with a definition of short-distance 
trips as ‘5 km in length or less’. Participants were told to consider both trips as a car 
driver and as a car passenger as car trips. 
 
Table 2.1 shows that participants used cars for a smaller proportion of their short-
distance trips than of their overall journeys. This difference was smallest in Norway 
and largest in the Netherlands and Hungary. Table 2.1 also indicates that participants 
in all countries used cars for more than half of all the trips they undertook, while only 
participants in Switzerland and Hungary used cars for less than half of their short-
distance trips. Participants from Switzerland and Hungary reported using cars 
slightly less often than participants from Norway, France, the United Kingdom, and 
the Netherlands. 
 
Table 2.1: Mean scores and standard deviations (in brackets) on overall and short-distance 
car use per country 
 
Overall car use  
M (SD) 
Short-distance car use 
M (SD) 
Norway 5.1 (1.30) 5.0 (1.66) 
United 
Kingdom 
5.2 (1.36) 4.8 (1.82) 
The 
Netherlands 
5.1 (1.55) 4.2 (1.80) 
France 5.2 (1.48) 4.6 (2.00) 
Switzerland 4.7 (1.46) 4.0 (1.75) 
Hungary 4.6 (1.55) 3.7 (1.90) 





Awareness of consequences was measured using the following items: ‘I am 
worried about the environmental problems caused by (short-distance) car trips,’ ‘I 
am concerned about global warming caused by the use of cars (for short trips),’ I 
think that the use of cars (for short-distance journeys) causes serious environmental 
problems.’ We computed mean scores on these items. The reliability of the resulting 
scales was high in all countries (ranging from .78 to .89; see Appendices 2.A and 2.B). 
Awareness of consequences of overall and short-distance car use was highly similar. 
Participants in France and Greece reported highest awareness, while it was lowest in 
Norway and the Netherlands. 
Outcome efficacy. Three items were used to measure outcome efficacy: ‘I can 
contribute to solving environmental problems by reducing my car use (for short 
trips),’ ‘Reducing the percentage of (short-distance) journeys I travel by car will 
enhance environmental quality,’ ‘Reducing my car use (for short trips) will enhance 
environmental quality.’ We computed mean scores on these items. The reliability of 
the resulting scales was high in all countries (ranging from .81 to .87; see Appendices 
2.A and 2.B). Outcome efficacy was higher for short-distance car use than for overall 
car use, with highest scores in Hungary and Greece and the lowest in Norway and the 
Netherlands. 
Personal norm was measured with the following items: ‘I feel morally obliged to 
reduce the percentage of (short-distance) trips I travel by car,’ ‘I would violate my 
principles if I would not try to reduce my car use (for short-distance trips),’ ‘I feel 
guilty if I do not try to reduce the percentage of (short-distance) journeys I travel by 
car.’ We computed mean scores on these items. The reliability of the resulting scales 
was high in all countries (ranging from .74 to .85; see Appendices 2.A and 2.B). 
Personal norm to reduce car use was stronger for short-distance car use than for 
overall car use. Participants in France and Greece reported the strongest personal 
norm, while those in Norway reported the weakest. 
 
Costliness of reducing car use 
Costliness was measured using two items: ‘It is possible for me to reduce my car use 
(for short trips) in the next year,’ ‘I could reduce my car use (for short trips) in the 
next year.’ We chose this indirect operationalization of costliness because we are 
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of transport equally often’). Because previous research has shown that participants 
tend to underreport short-distance trips (e.g. Stopher, FitzGerald, & Xu, 2007), we 
provided participants with a list of different means of transport they may use, 
including bus, tram, moped, airplane, bike, and on foot. Participants who completed 
the short-distance car use questions were provided with a definition of short-distance 
trips as ‘5 km in length or less’. Participants were told to consider both trips as a car 
driver and as a car passenger as car trips. 
 
Table 2.1 shows that participants used cars for a smaller proportion of their short-
distance trips than of their overall journeys. This difference was smallest in Norway 
and largest in the Netherlands and Hungary. Table 2.1 also indicates that participants 
in all countries used cars for more than half of all the trips they undertook, while only 
participants in Switzerland and Hungary used cars for less than half of their short-
distance trips. Participants from Switzerland and Hungary reported using cars 
slightly less often than participants from Norway, France, the United Kingdom, and 
the Netherlands. 
 
Table 2.1: Mean scores and standard deviations (in brackets) on overall and short-distance 
car use per country 
 
Overall car use  
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Short-distance car use 
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Norway 5.1 (1.30) 5.0 (1.66) 
United 
Kingdom 
5.2 (1.36) 4.8 (1.82) 
The 
Netherlands 
5.1 (1.55) 4.2 (1.80) 
France 5.2 (1.48) 4.6 (2.00) 
Switzerland 4.7 (1.46) 4.0 (1.75) 
Hungary 4.6 (1.55) 3.7 (1.90) 
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am concerned about global warming caused by the use of cars (for short trips),’ I 
think that the use of cars (for short-distance journeys) causes serious environmental 
problems.’ We computed mean scores on these items. The reliability of the resulting 
scales was high in all countries (ranging from .78 to .89; see Appendices 2.A and 2.B). 
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Outcome efficacy. Three items were used to measure outcome efficacy: ‘I can 
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trips),’ ‘Reducing the percentage of (short-distance) journeys I travel by car will 
enhance environmental quality,’ ‘Reducing my car use (for short trips) will enhance 
environmental quality.’ We computed mean scores on these items. The reliability of 
the resulting scales was high in all countries (ranging from .81 to .87; see Appendices 
2.A and 2.B). Outcome efficacy was higher for short-distance car use than for overall 
car use, with highest scores in Hungary and Greece and the lowest in Norway and the 
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Personal norm was measured with the following items: ‘I feel morally obliged to 
reduce the percentage of (short-distance) trips I travel by car,’ ‘I would violate my 
principles if I would not try to reduce my car use (for short-distance trips),’ ‘I feel 
guilty if I do not try to reduce the percentage of (short-distance) journeys I travel by 
car.’ We computed mean scores on these items. The reliability of the resulting scales 
was high in all countries (ranging from .74 to .85; see Appendices 2.A and 2.B). 
Personal norm to reduce car use was stronger for short-distance car use than for 
overall car use. Participants in France and Greece reported the strongest personal 
norm, while those in Norway reported the weakest. 
 
Costliness of reducing car use 
Costliness was measured using two items: ‘It is possible for me to reduce my car use 
(for short trips) in the next year,’ ‘I could reduce my car use (for short trips) in the 
next year.’ We chose this indirect operationalization of costliness because we are 
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interested in the extent to which reducing (short-distance) car use is perceived as 
costly, not in assessing the extent to which specific factors affect the costliness of 
(short distance) car use. A perceived inability to reduce car use suggests a perception 
of reducing car use as (too) costly: Individuals who indicate that they are not able to 
reduce their car use presumably perceive a reduction in car use as too costly to 
contemplate. We recoded the answers on these questions to ensure that higher scores 
on this scale indicate that reductions in car use are perceived as more costly. We 
computed mean scores on these items. The reliability of the resulting scales was high 
in all countries (ranging from .74 to .89). 
 
Analysis Strategy 
We ran two linear regression analyses on the data of each country: one using overall 
car use as the dependent variable, with NAM variables related to overall car use as 
predictors, and one using short-distance car use as the dependent variable with the 
NAM variables related to short-distance car use as predictors. All relevant NAM 
variables were entered simultaneously in the regression analyses as predictors. To 
test our hypothesis that the NAM is more predictive of short-distance car use than of 
overall car use in all seven countries, we compared the amount of variance (R2) that 
the NAM explains in short-distance car use with the explained variance in overall car 
use in each country. We calculated 95% confidence intervals around these R2 values 
(Lee, 1971, 1972; MS-DOS-Program provided by Steiger & Fouladi, 1992), and 
examined the extent to which these intervals overlap to establish whether differences 
between the explained variances in short-distance and overall car use were 
statistically significant. We consider the R2 values of the regression models to be 
significantly different when the confidence intervals around the squared multiple 
correlation of these regression models overlap no more than half of the distance of 
one side on a confidence interval (see Masson & Loftus, 2003)5. 
  
                                                          
5 We also applied an alternative method put forward by Payton, Greenstone, and Schenker 
(2003) for graphing and interpreting our results. This method is based on the use of 84% CIs 
rather than 95% CIs to infer whether differences between two parameters are statistically 
significant. Payton and colleagues show that for 84% CIs, non-overlapping CIs indicate that 
two population parameters differ at an error rate of α = 0.05. We calculated these intervals, 
finding results that lead to identical conclusions as the ones found when calculating 95% CIs 
and checking whether the overlap between CI is of less than 50% (as suggested by Masson & 
Loftus, 2003). We decided to report the results of the method suggested by Masson and 
Loftus in the main text, as this procedure is more commonly used in the literature. 
Results 
 
Costliness of reducing car use 
We assumed that reducing short-distance car use is perceived as relatively low-cost 
(but not very low-cost) behavior while reducing overall car use is perceived as 
relatively high-cost behavior. Table 2.2 supports this assumption. Individuals 
perceive reducing their short-distance car use as moderately costly, with scores 
ranging from 3.0 to 3.8 on seven-point scales. These answers indicate that reductions 
in short-distance car use are not perceived as very low-cost. Individuals perceive 
reducing their overall car use as more costly than reducing short-distance car use, 
with mean scores per country between 3.9 and 4.7.The differences in perceived 
costliness of reducing overall car use and short-distance car use varied between 0.6 in 
the United Kingdom and 1.1 in France (see Table 2.2). Results of one-sample t-tests 
indicate that reducing overall car use is perceived as significantly more costly than 
reducing short-distance car use in all seven countries. These findings support our 
argument that reducing overall car use is perceived as relatively high-cost behavior, 
while reducing short-distance car use is perceived as relatively low-cost behavior. 
 
Table 2.2: Cronbach’s alpha, mean scores, and standard deviations (in brackets) of perceived 
costliness of reducing overall and short-distance car use 
 Costliness of 
reducing overall car 
use 
Costliness of reducing 
short-distance car use 
Country alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) 
Norway .89 4.5 (1.73) a .81 3.8 (1.69) b 
United Kingdom .88 4.2 (1.75) a .81 3.6 (1.63) b 
Netherlands .86 4.7 (1.60) a .79 3.7 (1.51) b 
France .86 4.4 (1.75) a .74 3.3 (1.53) b 
Switzerland .86 4.1 (1.72) a .77 3.3 (1.62) b 
Hungary .86 4.2 (1.77) a .81 3.5 (1.64) b 
Greece .84 3.9 (1.68) a .81 3.0 (1.46) b 
Note: Different letters denote significant differences between the means in the rows (p 
<.01).  
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interested in the extent to which reducing (short-distance) car use is perceived as 
costly, not in assessing the extent to which specific factors affect the costliness of 
(short distance) car use. A perceived inability to reduce car use suggests a perception 
of reducing car use as (too) costly: Individuals who indicate that they are not able to 
reduce their car use presumably perceive a reduction in car use as too costly to 
contemplate. We recoded the answers on these questions to ensure that higher scores 
on this scale indicate that reductions in car use are perceived as more costly. We 
computed mean scores on these items. The reliability of the resulting scales was high 
in all countries (ranging from .74 to .89). 
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car use as the dependent variable, with NAM variables related to overall car use as 
predictors, and one using short-distance car use as the dependent variable with the 
NAM variables related to short-distance car use as predictors. All relevant NAM 
variables were entered simultaneously in the regression analyses as predictors. To 
test our hypothesis that the NAM is more predictive of short-distance car use than of 
overall car use in all seven countries, we compared the amount of variance (R2) that 
the NAM explains in short-distance car use with the explained variance in overall car 
use in each country. We calculated 95% confidence intervals around these R2 values 
(Lee, 1971, 1972; MS-DOS-Program provided by Steiger & Fouladi, 1992), and 
examined the extent to which these intervals overlap to establish whether differences 
between the explained variances in short-distance and overall car use were 
statistically significant. We consider the R2 values of the regression models to be 
significantly different when the confidence intervals around the squared multiple 
correlation of these regression models overlap no more than half of the distance of 
one side on a confidence interval (see Masson & Loftus, 2003)5. 
  
                                                          
5 We also applied an alternative method put forward by Payton, Greenstone, and Schenker 
(2003) for graphing and interpreting our results. This method is based on the use of 84% CIs 
rather than 95% CIs to infer whether differences between two parameters are statistically 
significant. Payton and colleagues show that for 84% CIs, non-overlapping CIs indicate that 
two population parameters differ at an error rate of α = 0.05. We calculated these intervals, 
finding results that lead to identical conclusions as the ones found when calculating 95% CIs 
and checking whether the overlap between CI is of less than 50% (as suggested by Masson & 
Loftus, 2003). We decided to report the results of the method suggested by Masson and 
Loftus in the main text, as this procedure is more commonly used in the literature. 
Results 
 
Costliness of reducing car use 
We assumed that reducing short-distance car use is perceived as relatively low-cost 
(but not very low-cost) behavior while reducing overall car use is perceived as 
relatively high-cost behavior. Table 2.2 supports this assumption. Individuals 
perceive reducing their short-distance car use as moderately costly, with scores 
ranging from 3.0 to 3.8 on seven-point scales. These answers indicate that reductions 
in short-distance car use are not perceived as very low-cost. Individuals perceive 
reducing their overall car use as more costly than reducing short-distance car use, 
with mean scores per country between 3.9 and 4.7.The differences in perceived 
costliness of reducing overall car use and short-distance car use varied between 0.6 in 
the United Kingdom and 1.1 in France (see Table 2.2). Results of one-sample t-tests 
indicate that reducing overall car use is perceived as significantly more costly than 
reducing short-distance car use in all seven countries. These findings support our 
argument that reducing overall car use is perceived as relatively high-cost behavior, 
while reducing short-distance car use is perceived as relatively low-cost behavior. 
 
Table 2.2: Cronbach’s alpha, mean scores, and standard deviations (in brackets) of perceived 
costliness of reducing overall and short-distance car use 
 Costliness of 
reducing overall car 
use 
Costliness of reducing 
short-distance car use 
Country alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) 
Norway .89 4.5 (1.73) a .81 3.8 (1.69) b 
United Kingdom .88 4.2 (1.75) a .81 3.6 (1.63) b 
Netherlands .86 4.7 (1.60) a .79 3.7 (1.51) b 
France .86 4.4 (1.75) a .74 3.3 (1.53) b 
Switzerland .86 4.1 (1.72) a .77 3.3 (1.62) b 
Hungary .86 4.2 (1.77) a .81 3.5 (1.64) b 
Greece .84 3.9 (1.68) a .81 3.0 (1.46) b 





Predicting overall and short-distance car use 
As hypothesized, we found that the NAM explained more variance in short-distance 
car use than in overall car use in all seven countries (see Figure 2.1). The 95% CIs 
indicate that the differences in explained variance between short distance car use and 
overall car use were significant in the United Kingdom (4.2%; 95% CI: 1.5-7.6 versus 
11.9%; 95% CI: 7.2-17.0), France (4.1%; 95% CI: 1.7-7.1 versus 14%; 95% CI: 9.4-18.9), 
Switzerland (4.6%; 95% CI: 2.0-7.8 versus 10.7%; 95% CI: 6.7-15.1), Hungary (4.6%; 
95% CI: 1.7-8.3 versus 11.6%; 95% CI: 7.0-16.6), and Greece (7.0%; 95% CI: 3.8-10.7 
versus 12.5%; 95% CI: 8.2-17.2). Although the pattern of results was similar in the 
Netherlands (3.9%; 95% CI: 1.2-7.5 versus 7.5%; 95% CI: 3.6-12.0), the difference in 
explained variance between the two types of car use is smaller and not statistically 
significant in this case. In Norway, the NAM variables explained neither type of car 
use well (overall car use: 4.0%; 95% CI: 1.4-7.3 versus short-distance car use: 4.8%; 
95% CI: 2.0-8.2), and the difference in explained variance between the two types of 
car use is not statistically significant. Thus, the NAM appeared to be a significantly 
better predictor of short-distance car use than of overall car use in most countries 
surveyed. This provides good support for the low-cost hypothesis in the domain of car 
use.  
 
Figure 1.1: Percentage of variance in overall or short-distance car use explained by norm-
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To further explore the results reported above and beyond a straightforward test of the 
low-cost hypothesis, we also tested which of the three NAM variables significantly 
contributed to the explanation of the two types of car use in each country. This is 
important because the NAM suggests that personal norm is typically the most 
important predictor of behavior. Indeed, because we expected the NAM to be a 
suitable model for predicting short-distance car use, individuals’ personal norm 
should be a consistent predictor of short-distance car use. Moreover, because the 
NAM should be less suited to predicting overall car use, individuals’ personal norm is 
likely to be less predictive of overall car use. The full regression output, including 
Beta coefficients, can be found in Appendix 2.C. All relationships are negative unless 
noted otherwise. Correlation tables indicating the relationships between the separate 
NAM variables and the dependent variables are available in Appendix 2.D. 
  In line with our expectations, personal norm was a significant predictor of 
short-distance car use in all seven countries. A stronger personal norm was 
associated with less frequent use of the car for short distances. Personal norm was the 
only significant predictor In the United Kingdom and Switzerland, while in France, 
outcome efficacy was an additional significant predictor: people less often drive their 
car for short distances when outcome efficacy was higher. In the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Hungary, personal norm as well as awareness of consequences 
predicted short distance car use significantly, and in Greece all three predictor 
variables were significantly predictive of short-distance car use. These results support 
the idea that personal norm is a consistent marker of normative considerations when 
it comes to predicting relatively low-cost behavior. 
  By contrast, results were much more mixed with respect to overall car use. On 
the one hand, we did find that personal norm was the only significant predictor of 
overall car use in the United Kingdom and France (i.e., the stronger one’s personal 
norm, the less often one drives). Moreover, in the Netherlands, all three NAM 
variables predicted car use. Overall, Dutch people drive less when they have a 
stronger personal norm towards reducing car use, are more aware of the negative 
consequences of driving, and, surprisingly, when they do not believe that they can 
make a difference by reducing their car use (the latter finding is likely to be a 
suppressor effect, as a regression model containing only outcome efficacy as a 
predictor of overall car use showed that this variable was negatively related to overall 
car use in the Netherlands; see Abrahamse et al., 2009, for a similar result). However, 
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Predicting overall and short-distance car use 
As hypothesized, we found that the NAM explained more variance in short-distance 
car use than in overall car use in all seven countries (see Figure 2.1). The 95% CIs 
indicate that the differences in explained variance between short distance car use and 
overall car use were significant in the United Kingdom (4.2%; 95% CI: 1.5-7.6 versus 
11.9%; 95% CI: 7.2-17.0), France (4.1%; 95% CI: 1.7-7.1 versus 14%; 95% CI: 9.4-18.9), 
Switzerland (4.6%; 95% CI: 2.0-7.8 versus 10.7%; 95% CI: 6.7-15.1), Hungary (4.6%; 
95% CI: 1.7-8.3 versus 11.6%; 95% CI: 7.0-16.6), and Greece (7.0%; 95% CI: 3.8-10.7 
versus 12.5%; 95% CI: 8.2-17.2). Although the pattern of results was similar in the 
Netherlands (3.9%; 95% CI: 1.2-7.5 versus 7.5%; 95% CI: 3.6-12.0), the difference in 
explained variance between the two types of car use is smaller and not statistically 
significant in this case. In Norway, the NAM variables explained neither type of car 
use well (overall car use: 4.0%; 95% CI: 1.4-7.3 versus short-distance car use: 4.8%; 
95% CI: 2.0-8.2), and the difference in explained variance between the two types of 
car use is not statistically significant. Thus, the NAM appeared to be a significantly 
better predictor of short-distance car use than of overall car use in most countries 
surveyed. This provides good support for the low-cost hypothesis in the domain of car 
use.  
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To further explore the results reported above and beyond a straightforward test of the 
low-cost hypothesis, we also tested which of the three NAM variables significantly 
contributed to the explanation of the two types of car use in each country. This is 
important because the NAM suggests that personal norm is typically the most 
important predictor of behavior. Indeed, because we expected the NAM to be a 
suitable model for predicting short-distance car use, individuals’ personal norm 
should be a consistent predictor of short-distance car use. Moreover, because the 
NAM should be less suited to predicting overall car use, individuals’ personal norm is 
likely to be less predictive of overall car use. The full regression output, including 
Beta coefficients, can be found in Appendix 2.C. All relationships are negative unless 
noted otherwise. Correlation tables indicating the relationships between the separate 
NAM variables and the dependent variables are available in Appendix 2.D. 
  In line with our expectations, personal norm was a significant predictor of 
short-distance car use in all seven countries. A stronger personal norm was 
associated with less frequent use of the car for short distances. Personal norm was the 
only significant predictor In the United Kingdom and Switzerland, while in France, 
outcome efficacy was an additional significant predictor: people less often drive their 
car for short distances when outcome efficacy was higher. In the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Hungary, personal norm as well as awareness of consequences 
predicted short distance car use significantly, and in Greece all three predictor 
variables were significantly predictive of short-distance car use. These results support 
the idea that personal norm is a consistent marker of normative considerations when 
it comes to predicting relatively low-cost behavior. 
  By contrast, results were much more mixed with respect to overall car use. On 
the one hand, we did find that personal norm was the only significant predictor of 
overall car use in the United Kingdom and France (i.e., the stronger one’s personal 
norm, the less often one drives). Moreover, in the Netherlands, all three NAM 
variables predicted car use. Overall, Dutch people drive less when they have a 
stronger personal norm towards reducing car use, are more aware of the negative 
consequences of driving, and, surprisingly, when they do not believe that they can 
make a difference by reducing their car use (the latter finding is likely to be a 
suppressor effect, as a regression model containing only outcome efficacy as a 
predictor of overall car use showed that this variable was negatively related to overall 
car use in the Netherlands; see Abrahamse et al., 2009, for a similar result). However, 
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on the other hand, personal norm did not predict overall car use in the other 
countries. In fact, awareness of consequences was the only significant predictor of 
overall car use in Norway, Switzerland, Hungary, and Greece: the more aware people 
are of the problems of car use, the less frequently they drive their car.  
Taken together, these additional analyses suggest more support for the low-
cost hypothesis. Across the board, personal norm was a consistent predictor of short-




The aim of this paper was to test the low-cost hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 
2003) by examining whether normative considerations as reflected in the NAM are 
more predictive of low-cost behavior than of high-cost behavior across samples of 
seven European countries. As an interesting case in point, we focused on short-
distance car use (presumably reflecting relatively low-cost behavior) and overall car 
use (presumably reflecting relatively high-cost behavior). In support of these 
assumptions, participants indicated that they were more able to reduce short-
distance car use than overall car use, which is in our view indicative of less versus 
more costly behavior. This set the stage for a first and valid test of the low-cost 
hypothesis in the car use domain. 
The results clearly supported the low-cost hypothesis: the NAM was 
significantly more predictive of short-distance car use than of overall car use. This 
was true for five of the seven countries included in our study (i.e., the United 
Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Hungary, and Greece). We found similar yet non-
significant differences in the Netherlands, while in Norway we did not find a clear 
difference in the predictive power of the NAM for overall and short-distance car use. 
Across the board, our study thus showed that normative considerations regarding the 
need to reduce car use (notably personal norms, problem awareness, and outcome 
efficacy) are less predictive of high-cost behavior, while if behavior is less costly, 
normative considerations are more predictive of behavior. In line with the NAM, 
personal norm seemed the most predictive of short-distance car use. 
 Importantly, we employed an explicit measure of costs to validate differences 
in relative costliness between short-distance and overall car use. The inclusion of 
such a measure of costliness provides us with a fair test of the low-cost hypothesis, 
because we showed that we did indeed compare a low-cost behavior and a high-cost 
behavior, as stipulated by Diekmann and Preisendörfer (2003). We used a broad 
operationalization of behavioral costliness. This operationalization allows us to 
conclude that individuals perceive reducing overall car use as more costly than 
reducing short-distance car use, but it does not provide information on the exact 
reasons why individuals perceive reducing overall car use as more costly than 
reducing short-distance car use. Future research could include additional, more 
detailed questions on why people perceive reducing specific types of car use as 
particularly costly, as this knowledge may have important implications for attempts 
to make reducing car use less costly. 
 Theoretically, we move beyond previous work by also explicitly testing the 
generalizability of the low-cost hypothesis (i.e., its external validity) through 
comparing survey data from seven European countries, allowing us to conclude that 
the low-cost hypothesis is supported in the car use domain across most of the 
countries we surveyed. This finding shows that the implications of this study are not 
limited to one specific situation, but that they are likely to be valid across countries 
and contexts. The only true exception, Norway, seems to be primarily due to the NAM 
explaining less variance in short-distance car use in Norway than in the other 
countries. This difference may be explained by the finding that participants in 
Norway perceived reducing their short-distance car use as more costly than 
participants from other countries, causing the NAM to be less predictive of short-
distance car use in Norway than elsewhere. The perceived costliness of reducing 
short-distance car use in Norway might be caused by the relatively limited Norwegian 
public transport network in combination with a climate and landscape that are not 
conducive to using slow means of transport. However, other factors may also play a 
role. Future research is needed to explore this further and to establish which factors 
caused the Norwegian results to differ from the highly similar results found in the 
other countries. 
In order to collect our extensive data set we used commercial opt-in panels. 
Some studies report that data collected using such panels may differ from data 
collected using traditional means of data collection (AAPOR executive task force, 
2010; Yeager, Krosnick, Chang, Javitz, Levendusky, Simpser, & Wang, 2011), while 
others show that these differences are small to non-existent (Ansolabehere & 
Schaffner, 2011; Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2007). For this study, the use 
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on the other hand, personal norm did not predict overall car use in the other 
countries. In fact, awareness of consequences was the only significant predictor of 
overall car use in Norway, Switzerland, Hungary, and Greece: the more aware people 
are of the problems of car use, the less frequently they drive their car.  
Taken together, these additional analyses suggest more support for the low-
cost hypothesis. Across the board, personal norm was a consistent predictor of short-
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Across the board, our study thus showed that normative considerations regarding the 
need to reduce car use (notably personal norms, problem awareness, and outcome 
efficacy) are less predictive of high-cost behavior, while if behavior is less costly, 
normative considerations are more predictive of behavior. In line with the NAM, 
personal norm seemed the most predictive of short-distance car use. 
 Importantly, we employed an explicit measure of costs to validate differences 
in relative costliness between short-distance and overall car use. The inclusion of 
such a measure of costliness provides us with a fair test of the low-cost hypothesis, 
because we showed that we did indeed compare a low-cost behavior and a high-cost 
behavior, as stipulated by Diekmann and Preisendörfer (2003). We used a broad 
operationalization of behavioral costliness. This operationalization allows us to 
conclude that individuals perceive reducing overall car use as more costly than 
reducing short-distance car use, but it does not provide information on the exact 
reasons why individuals perceive reducing overall car use as more costly than 
reducing short-distance car use. Future research could include additional, more 
detailed questions on why people perceive reducing specific types of car use as 
particularly costly, as this knowledge may have important implications for attempts 
to make reducing car use less costly. 
 Theoretically, we move beyond previous work by also explicitly testing the 
generalizability of the low-cost hypothesis (i.e., its external validity) through 
comparing survey data from seven European countries, allowing us to conclude that 
the low-cost hypothesis is supported in the car use domain across most of the 
countries we surveyed. This finding shows that the implications of this study are not 
limited to one specific situation, but that they are likely to be valid across countries 
and contexts. The only true exception, Norway, seems to be primarily due to the NAM 
explaining less variance in short-distance car use in Norway than in the other 
countries. This difference may be explained by the finding that participants in 
Norway perceived reducing their short-distance car use as more costly than 
participants from other countries, causing the NAM to be less predictive of short-
distance car use in Norway than elsewhere. The perceived costliness of reducing 
short-distance car use in Norway might be caused by the relatively limited Norwegian 
public transport network in combination with a climate and landscape that are not 
conducive to using slow means of transport. However, other factors may also play a 
role. Future research is needed to explore this further and to establish which factors 
caused the Norwegian results to differ from the highly similar results found in the 
other countries. 
In order to collect our extensive data set we used commercial opt-in panels. 
Some studies report that data collected using such panels may differ from data 
collected using traditional means of data collection (AAPOR executive task force, 
2010; Yeager, Krosnick, Chang, Javitz, Levendusky, Simpser, & Wang, 2011), while 
others show that these differences are small to non-existent (Ansolabehere & 
Schaffner, 2011; Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2007). For this study, the use 
Chapter 2
38
of opt-in web-based panels had clear advantages: It allowed us to reach a large 
number of participants in different countries, at relatively limited cost. We did 
encounter some problems with the accuracy of the data, but we were able to resolve 
these issues by adopting strict guidelines on who to include in the data analysis (as 
described in note 1). Although adopting these guidelines led us to discard a significant 
number of participants (40% of all participants who completed the online 
questionnaires were excluded from the data-analysis), no differences were found in 
the distribution of age and gender between included and discarded participants, 
indicating that the included participants form a correct representation, at least on 
those dimensions, of the total group of participants who completed the surveys. 
Furthermore, because our interest was primarily in relations between variables rather 
than the comparison of absolute numbers between groups, potential problems with 
non-representativeness of participants in the opt-in panel used here are less pressing 
than they would otherwise be (Schultz, Gouveia, Cameron, Tankha, Schmuck, & 
Franzek, 2005). 
The comparison between short-distance car use and overall car use means that 
the dependent measures overlap to some extent because the overall car use category 
also contains short-distance trips. This overlap may have affected our results to some 
extent because it may have partly obscured differences between the two types of car 
use. At the same time, however, this can be considered to constitute a more 
conservative test of the low-cost hypothesis because it a priori makes finding 
differences less likely. Indeed, given that we rather consistently found that the NAM 
is more predictive of short-distance car use than of overall car use, and that reducing 
short-distance car use is perceived as significantly less costly than reducing overall 
car use, it seems that these types of car use differ in the expected direction. Moreover, 
the finding that the NAM is hardly predictive of overall car use, while it is moderately 
predictive of short-distance car use, suggests that the non-overlapping part of overall 
car use is predicted really poorly by the NAM. This limitation of our study, therefore, 
seems to be unproblematic with an eye to interpreting our results. Future research 
should be conducted to establish to what extent the NAM predicts long-distance 
trips; our interpretation of our results suggests that the NAM should be poorly 
predictive of this type of trips. 
In practical terms, our findings can potentially contribute to alleviating 
problems caused by car use, because they provide a promising starting point for 
strategies for reducing short-distance car use. Identifying such strategies is 
important, as the majority of all car trips cover short-distances (see Mackett, 2003), 
and such short-distance trips are relatively more damaging to the environment than 
longer-distance trips. Our findings suggest that psychological strategies (or ‘soft’ 
travel demand management strategies; Pas, 1995, Kitamura, Fujii, & Pas, 1997; Steg 
& Vlek, 2009) targeting the variables from the NAM may be effective tools to reduce 
short-distance car use. The finding that the NAM significantly predicted short-
distance car use implies that interventions strengthening awareness of consequences, 
outcome efficacy, and/or personal norms are likely to result in a reduction in short-
distance car use. In practice, this means that interventions that increase peoples’ 
awareness of the environmental consequences of using a car for short-distances, the 
extent to which they evaluate their own contribution to the solution of these problems 
as worthwhile by reducing their short-distance car use, and/or their perceived moral 
obligations to reduce their short-distance car use may result in reductions in short-
distance car use. Future studies are needed to investigate which specific strategies to 
increase awareness of consequences, outcome efficacy, and/or personal norm 
concerning short-distance car use would be most effective in this respect.  
Appeals focusing on awareness of consequences, outcome efficacy, or personal 
norms can be described as ‘normative appeals’, as they aim to strengthen individuals’ 
normative considerations regarding specific behavior. Normative appeals may have 
important advantages over other types of measures to reduce car use, because they tie 
in with peoples’ intrinsic motivation to reduce their car use. This means that such 
measures do not require expensive external rewards, penalties, and supporting 
monitoring and enforcement systems to be effective. This is in contrast with 
measures that rely on external cues for their effectiveness, such as road pricing, 
increased car taxes, or congestion charging. However, the limitation for normative 
appeals is that they seem to be primarily suitable for promoting behavior associated 
with relatively low costs. For behavior with relatively high costs, such as reducing 
longer-distance car use or car use in general, a two-step strategy may be more 
effective (Steg & Vlek, 2009): the cost of engaging in the desired behavior probably 
need to be reduced first before a normative appeal is likely to be very effective. Some 
small-scale experiments that attempted to make reducing car use less costly suggest 
that reducing behavioral costs may indeed result in car use reductions. For example, 
a study by Bamberg and Schmidt (1999) revealed that providing commuters with 
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of opt-in web-based panels had clear advantages: It allowed us to reach a large 
number of participants in different countries, at relatively limited cost. We did 
encounter some problems with the accuracy of the data, but we were able to resolve 
these issues by adopting strict guidelines on who to include in the data analysis (as 
described in note 1). Although adopting these guidelines led us to discard a significant 
number of participants (40% of all participants who completed the online 
questionnaires were excluded from the data-analysis), no differences were found in 
the distribution of age and gender between included and discarded participants, 
indicating that the included participants form a correct representation, at least on 
those dimensions, of the total group of participants who completed the surveys. 
Furthermore, because our interest was primarily in relations between variables rather 
than the comparison of absolute numbers between groups, potential problems with 
non-representativeness of participants in the opt-in panel used here are less pressing 
than they would otherwise be (Schultz, Gouveia, Cameron, Tankha, Schmuck, & 
Franzek, 2005). 
The comparison between short-distance car use and overall car use means that 
the dependent measures overlap to some extent because the overall car use category 
also contains short-distance trips. This overlap may have affected our results to some 
extent because it may have partly obscured differences between the two types of car 
use. At the same time, however, this can be considered to constitute a more 
conservative test of the low-cost hypothesis because it a priori makes finding 
differences less likely. Indeed, given that we rather consistently found that the NAM 
is more predictive of short-distance car use than of overall car use, and that reducing 
short-distance car use is perceived as significantly less costly than reducing overall 
car use, it seems that these types of car use differ in the expected direction. Moreover, 
the finding that the NAM is hardly predictive of overall car use, while it is moderately 
predictive of short-distance car use, suggests that the non-overlapping part of overall 
car use is predicted really poorly by the NAM. This limitation of our study, therefore, 
seems to be unproblematic with an eye to interpreting our results. Future research 
should be conducted to establish to what extent the NAM predicts long-distance 
trips; our interpretation of our results suggests that the NAM should be poorly 
predictive of this type of trips. 
In practical terms, our findings can potentially contribute to alleviating 
problems caused by car use, because they provide a promising starting point for 
strategies for reducing short-distance car use. Identifying such strategies is 
important, as the majority of all car trips cover short-distances (see Mackett, 2003), 
and such short-distance trips are relatively more damaging to the environment than 
longer-distance trips. Our findings suggest that psychological strategies (or ‘soft’ 
travel demand management strategies; Pas, 1995, Kitamura, Fujii, & Pas, 1997; Steg 
& Vlek, 2009) targeting the variables from the NAM may be effective tools to reduce 
short-distance car use. The finding that the NAM significantly predicted short-
distance car use implies that interventions strengthening awareness of consequences, 
outcome efficacy, and/or personal norms are likely to result in a reduction in short-
distance car use. In practice, this means that interventions that increase peoples’ 
awareness of the environmental consequences of using a car for short-distances, the 
extent to which they evaluate their own contribution to the solution of these problems 
as worthwhile by reducing their short-distance car use, and/or their perceived moral 
obligations to reduce their short-distance car use may result in reductions in short-
distance car use. Future studies are needed to investigate which specific strategies to 
increase awareness of consequences, outcome efficacy, and/or personal norm 
concerning short-distance car use would be most effective in this respect.  
Appeals focusing on awareness of consequences, outcome efficacy, or personal 
norms can be described as ‘normative appeals’, as they aim to strengthen individuals’ 
normative considerations regarding specific behavior. Normative appeals may have 
important advantages over other types of measures to reduce car use, because they tie 
in with peoples’ intrinsic motivation to reduce their car use. This means that such 
measures do not require expensive external rewards, penalties, and supporting 
monitoring and enforcement systems to be effective. This is in contrast with 
measures that rely on external cues for their effectiveness, such as road pricing, 
increased car taxes, or congestion charging. However, the limitation for normative 
appeals is that they seem to be primarily suitable for promoting behavior associated 
with relatively low costs. For behavior with relatively high costs, such as reducing 
longer-distance car use or car use in general, a two-step strategy may be more 
effective (Steg & Vlek, 2009): the cost of engaging in the desired behavior probably 
need to be reduced first before a normative appeal is likely to be very effective. Some 
small-scale experiments that attempted to make reducing car use less costly suggest 
that reducing behavioral costs may indeed result in car use reductions. For example, 
a study by Bamberg and Schmidt (1999) revealed that providing commuters with 
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cheaper bus tickets (thus lowering the cost of reducing car use for this commute) 
resulted in a reduction in car use. However, whether the effectiveness of a normative 
intervention increases when it is combined with such a structural intervention, and 
whether it results in car use reductions over and beyond the effect of the structural 
intervention is a topic for future research.  
Although we conducted a test of the low-cost hypothesis in the domain of car 
use, we believe that our results have important implications outside the transport 
field as well. The conflict between societal benefits and personal costs that 
characterizes car use reductions is apparent in a variety of other behaviors. Consider 
for example reducing household energy use or using energy from sustainable sources. 
Normative appeals may stimulate people to engage in these behaviors, as long as 
these appeals target specific behaviors that are not very costly. Future research 
should shed more light on whether the results of our study can be generalized to 
other behaviors. One particular point for study should be to what extent costliness 
affects the predictive power of normative considerations for other behaviors (see 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation).  
Finally, we concur with the idea that ‘Behavior change strategies that focus on 
the moral aspects of car use decisions have the potential to make real differences’ 
(Nordlund & Garvill, 2003). However, we would add the following: ‘… particularly if 
they focus on types of car use that are not very costly to reduce’. More generally, our 
results suggest that normative appeals are particularly successful to promote 
relatively low-cost behaviors, and that such behaviors can be promoted by increasing 
people’s awareness of the negative consequences of their behavior, by enhancing their 
feelings of outcome efficacy, and by activating feelings of moral obligation to engage 




Appendix 2.A: Cronbach’s alpha, means, and standard deviations for NAM variables 
regarding overall car use 
 Awareness of 
Consequences 
Outcome Efficacy Personal Norm 
Country alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) 
Norway .89 4.1 (1.58) .87 3.8 (1.60) .83 3.1 (1.49) 
United Kingdom .88 4.2 (1.41) .84 4.1 (1.41) .82 3.4 (1.44) 
Netherlands .88 3.9 (1.44) .87 3.9 (1.46) .85 3.3 (1.42) 
France .84 5.1 (1.32) .83 4.7 (1.46) .81 4.0 (1.57) 
Switzerland .86 4.8 (1.49) .84 4.7 (1.54) .83 3.6 (1.62) 
Hungary .85 4.8 (1.47) .81 4.8 (1.52) .74 3.8 (1.77) 





Appendix 2.B: Cronbach’s alpha, means, and standard deviations (in brackets) for NAM 
variables regarding short-distance car use 
 Awareness of 
Consequences 
Outcome efficacy Personal norm 
Country alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) 
Norway .85 4.2 (1.49) .84 4.3 (1.51) .80 3.4 (1.50) 
United Kingdom .87 4.5 (1.42) .84 4.7 (1.38) .84 3.8 (1.48) 
Netherlands .83 4.4 (1.31) .77 4.5 (1.27) .80 3.9 (1.38) 
France .78 5.1 (1.29) .79 5.1 (1.33) .83 4.5 (1.46) 
Switzerland .83 4.8 (1.41) .83 5.1 (1.38) .88 4.1 (1.67) 
Hungary .82 4.9 (1.45) .83 5.2 (1.37) .81 4.0 (1.57) 
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cheaper bus tickets (thus lowering the cost of reducing car use for this commute) 
resulted in a reduction in car use. However, whether the effectiveness of a normative 
intervention increases when it is combined with such a structural intervention, and 
whether it results in car use reductions over and beyond the effect of the structural 
intervention is a topic for future research.  
Although we conducted a test of the low-cost hypothesis in the domain of car 
use, we believe that our results have important implications outside the transport 
field as well. The conflict between societal benefits and personal costs that 
characterizes car use reductions is apparent in a variety of other behaviors. Consider 
for example reducing household energy use or using energy from sustainable sources. 
Normative appeals may stimulate people to engage in these behaviors, as long as 
these appeals target specific behaviors that are not very costly. Future research 
should shed more light on whether the results of our study can be generalized to 
other behaviors. One particular point for study should be to what extent costliness 
affects the predictive power of normative considerations for other behaviors (see 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation).  
Finally, we concur with the idea that ‘Behavior change strategies that focus on 
the moral aspects of car use decisions have the potential to make real differences’ 
(Nordlund & Garvill, 2003). However, we would add the following: ‘… particularly if 
they focus on types of car use that are not very costly to reduce’. More generally, our 
results suggest that normative appeals are particularly successful to promote 
relatively low-cost behaviors, and that such behaviors can be promoted by increasing 
people’s awareness of the negative consequences of their behavior, by enhancing their 
feelings of outcome efficacy, and by activating feelings of moral obligation to engage 
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Norway .89 4.1 (1.58) .87 3.8 (1.60) .83 3.1 (1.49) 
United Kingdom .88 4.2 (1.41) .84 4.1 (1.41) .82 3.4 (1.44) 
Netherlands .88 3.9 (1.44) .87 3.9 (1.46) .85 3.3 (1.42) 
France .84 5.1 (1.32) .83 4.7 (1.46) .81 4.0 (1.57) 
Switzerland .86 4.8 (1.49) .84 4.7 (1.54) .83 3.6 (1.62) 
Hungary .85 4.8 (1.47) .81 4.8 (1.52) .74 3.8 (1.77) 





Appendix 2.B: Cronbach’s alpha, means, and standard deviations (in brackets) for NAM 
variables regarding short-distance car use 
 Awareness of 
Consequences 
Outcome efficacy Personal norm 
Country alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) 
Norway .85 4.2 (1.49) .84 4.3 (1.51) .80 3.4 (1.50) 
United Kingdom .87 4.5 (1.42) .84 4.7 (1.38) .84 3.8 (1.48) 
Netherlands .83 4.4 (1.31) .77 4.5 (1.27) .80 3.9 (1.38) 
France .78 5.1 (1.29) .79 5.1 (1.33) .83 4.5 (1.46) 
Switzerland .83 4.8 (1.41) .83 5.1 (1.38) .88 4.1 (1.67) 
Hungary .82 4.9 (1.45) .83 5.2 (1.37) .81 4.0 (1.57) 






Appendix 2.C: Results of regression models per type of car use per country (including R2) 
United Kingdom Short-distance car use (N= 590)  Overall car use (N = 618) 
 R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .12 0,01 0,1  .04 -0,04 -0,7 
Outcome efficacy  -0,09 -1,61   -0,06 -1,03 
Personal norm  -0,29 -5,16**   -0,12 -2,04* 
         
France  Short-distance car use (N = 683)  Overall car use (N = 769) 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .14 0,03 0,46  .04 -0,03 -0,52 
Outcome efficacy  -0,12 -2,16*   -0,05 -0,96 
Personal norm  -0,30 -5,56**   -0,15 -2,85** 
         
The Netherlands  Short-distance car use (N = 552)  Overall car use (N = 541) 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .08 -0,20 -3,52**  .04 -0,16 -2,64** 
Outcome efficacy  0,06 1,16   0,15 2,27* 
Personal norm  -0,15 -2,64**   -0,15 -2,36* 
         
Greece  Short-distance car use (N = 716)  Overall car use (N = 776) 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .13 -0,18 -3,23**  .07 -0,18 -3,53** 
Outcome efficacy  -0,13 -2,30*   -0,09 -1,81 
Personal norm  -0,09 -1,95*   -0,02 -0,43 
         
         
Switzerland  Short-distance car use (N = 742)  Overall car use (N = 762) 
   R2   t  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .11 -0,10 -1,74  .05 -0,21 -4,28** 
Outcome efficacy  -0,05 -1,03   0,00 0,01 




     
 
   
  
Norway  Short-distance car use (N = 695)  Overall car use (N = 650) 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .05 -0,15 -2,71**  .04 -0,22 -3,96** 
Outcome efficacy  0,10 1,92   0,02 0,37 
Personal norm  -0,15 -2,87**   0,01 0,08 
         
Hungary  Short-distance car use (N = 598)  Overall car use (N = 548) 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .12 -0,14 -2,12*  .05 -0,17 -3,09** 
Outcome efficacy  -0,05 -0,81   0,04 0,67 
Personal norm  -0,20 -3,5**   -0,10 -1,87 
Note: * p< .05, ** p<.01 
 
Appendix 2.D: Correlation tables of separate NAM variables per type of car use per country. 
United Kingdom     
 AC OE PN S-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,65 0,68 -0,28 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,62 -0,27 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,36 
Short-distance car use (S-Car)    1 
     
 AC OE PN O-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,69 0,66 -0,17 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0.72 -0,18 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,20 
Overall car use (O-Car)    1 
     
France     
 AC OE PN S-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,74 0,71 -0,27 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,68 -0,31 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,35 
Short-distance car use (S-Car)    1 
     
 AC OE PN O-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,64 0,62 -0,15 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,69 -0,17 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,20 
Overall car use (O-Car)    1 
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Appendix 2.C: Results of regression models per type of car use per country (including R2) 
United Kingdom Short-distance car use (N= 590)  Overall car use (N = 618) 
 R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .12 0,01 0,1  .04 -0,04 -0,7 
Outcome efficacy  -0,09 -1,61   -0,06 -1,03 
Personal norm  -0,29 -5,16**   -0,12 -2,04* 
         
France  Short-distance car use (N = 683)  Overall car use (N = 769) 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .14 0,03 0,46  .04 -0,03 -0,52 
Outcome efficacy  -0,12 -2,16*   -0,05 -0,96 
Personal norm  -0,30 -5,56**   -0,15 -2,85** 
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Awareness of cons. .08 -0,20 -3,52**  .04 -0,16 -2,64** 
Outcome efficacy  0,06 1,16   0,15 2,27* 
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Outcome efficacy  -0,13 -2,30*   -0,09 -1,81 
Personal norm  -0,09 -1,95*   -0,02 -0,43 
         
         
Switzerland  Short-distance car use (N = 742)  Overall car use (N = 762) 
   R2   t  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .11 -0,10 -1,74  .05 -0,21 -4,28** 
Outcome efficacy  -0,05 -1,03   0,00 0,01 




     
 
   
  
Norway  Short-distance car use (N = 695)  Overall car use (N = 650) 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .05 -0,15 -2,71**  .04 -0,22 -3,96** 
Outcome efficacy  0,10 1,92   0,02 0,37 
Personal norm  -0,15 -2,87**   0,01 0,08 
         
Hungary  Short-distance car use (N = 598)  Overall car use (N = 548) 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Awareness of cons. .12 -0,14 -2,12*  .05 -0,17 -3,09** 
Outcome efficacy  -0,05 -0,81   0,04 0,67 
Personal norm  -0,20 -3,5**   -0,10 -1,87 
Note: * p< .05, ** p<.01 
 
Appendix 2.D: Correlation tables of separate NAM variables per type of car use per country. 
United Kingdom     
 AC OE PN S-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,65 0,68 -0,28 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,62 -0,27 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,36 
Short-distance car use (S-Car)    1 
     
 AC OE PN O-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,69 0,66 -0,17 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0.72 -0,18 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,20 
Overall car use (O-Car)    1 
     
France     
 AC OE PN S-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,74 0,71 -0,27 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,68 -0,31 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,35 
Short-distance car use (S-Car)    1 
     
 AC OE PN O-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,64 0,62 -0,15 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,69 -0,17 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,20 





The Netherlands     
 AC OE PN S-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,57 0,62 -0,30 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,65 -0,18 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,28 
Short-distance car use (S-Car)    1 
     
 AC OE PN O-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,68 0,67 -0,16 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,72 -0,07 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,15 
Overall car use (O-Car)    1 
     
Greece     
 AC OE PN S-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,75 0,62 -0,33 
Outcome efficacy (OE)   0,61 -0,32 
Personal norm (PN)      -0,30 
Short-distance car use (S-Car)    1 
     
 AC OE PN O-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,67 0,63 -0,25 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,67 -0,22 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,20 
Overall car use (O-Car)    1 
     
Switzerland     
 AC OE PN S-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,70 0,70 -0,32 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,66 -0,28 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,34 
Short-distance car use (S-Car)    1 
     
 AC OE PN O-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,63 0,62 -0,21 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,62 -0,14 
Personal norm (PN)     1 -0,14 
Overall car use (O-Car)    1 
     
  
Norway     
 AC OE PN S-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,57 0,64 -0,24 
Outcome efficacy (OE)   0,60 0,00 
Personal norm (PN)      -0,15 
Short-distance car use (S-Car)    1 
     
 AC OE PN O-Car 
Awareness of cons. (AC) 1 0,66 0,66 -0,20 
Outcome efficacy (OE)  1 0,73 -0,12 
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Imagine two households. One lives in a country in which using energy from 
renewable sources (e.g. wind power, solar power, hydro power, power generated by 
burning biomass and waste) is no more expensive than using regular grey energy 
(generated by burning fossil fuels). The other household lives in a country in which 
using renewable energy is considerably more expensive than using grey energy and 
where changing one’s energy provider is an administrative nightmare. Both 
households equally value the potential environmental benefits of using renewable 
energy sources, and feel that they ought to use renewable energy sources. Which 
household would be most likely to translate their normative considerations about 
using renewable energy sources into action? 
  In this paper, we aim to test to what extent the costs of using renewable 
energy sources affect whether individuals translate their normative considerations 
about renewable energy sources into action. Based on two complementary theories, 
the norm-activation model (or NAM; Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1982) and 
the low-cost hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003), we expected that 
normative considerations regarding the use of renewable energy sources are more 
predictive of actual use of renewable energy sources in countries in which using it is 
perceived as lower-cost behavior than in countries in which it is perceived as more 
costly. The key reason for this is that concerns about personal costs are easily 
prioritized over normative considerations when the relevant behavior is associated 
with relatively high costs (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Lindenberg & Steg, 
2007; Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981). To test this hypothesis, we 
compare the extent to which normative considerations regarding the use of 
renewable energy sources predict its actual use in six European countries that differ 
in the extent to which their inhabitants perceive using renewable energy sources as 
costly. This set-up enables a unique test of the low-cost hypothesis by comparing the 
extent to which the same behavior (using renewable energy sources) is predicted by 
normative considerations in situations in which the perceived personal costs of 
engaging in that behavior differ. 
 
Normative considerations and perceived costs 
A majority of European consumers prefers energy generated from renewable sources 
over energy generated by burning fossil fuels or using nuclear power (Eurobarometer, 
2007; Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Lorenzoni, 2006; Spence, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & 
Lorenzoni, 2010). The main reason for this preference appears to be environmental: 
consumers indicate that they perceive the use of renewable sources for energy 
production as a way to reduce climate change problems (Poortinga et al., 2006; 
Spence et al., 2010). However, the same consumers who indicate that they care 
strongly about the potential environmental benefits of renewable energy use also 
indicate that the price of energy is an important factor driving their preferences for 
different types of energy generation (Eurobarometer, 2007). Indeed, the majority of 
individuals indicate that they are not willing to pay more for renewable energy 
sources than for conventional, grey energy (Eurobarometer, 2003; 2006; OECD, 
2010). Thus, it seems that many individuals would like to act pro-environmentally by 
using renewable energy sources, but it also seems that many are unwilling to accept 
some additional costs in order to do so.  
  In this paper, we aim to study when and to what extent normative 
considerations regarding the use of renewable energy sources, and more specifically 
considerations about the collective and environmental consequences of using it, 
predict actual use of renewable energy sources by households. We use the NAM 
(Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981) to assess the strength of individuals’ 
normative considerations regarding the use of renewable energy sources. The NAM 
states that people engage in normative behavior (such as using renewable energy 
sources) when they feel a moral obligation (called personal norm) to do so. Thus, 
when individuals feel a strong moral obligation to engage in specific behavior, they 
feel they ought to act accordingly, and are thus more likely to do so.  
  According to the NAM, the activation of a personal norm depends on two key 
factors. First, individuals must be aware of (potential) negative consequences of the 
relevant behavior for others or the environment (awareness of consequences). 
Second, they must feel responsible for and feel they can help to reduce these negative 
consequences by enacting the relevant behavior (outcome efficacy; Abrahamse, Steg, 
Gifford, & Vlek, 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; De Groot & Steg, 2009; Steg & De 
Groot, 2010). Applied to the use of renewable energy sources, this means that when 
people are aware of environmental problems caused by the use of fossil energy 
sources, and they feel that they can help reduce these negative consequences by using 
renewable energy sources, they will feel a stronger moral obligation to use renewable 
energy sources.  
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  The application of this line of thought to the domain of the use of renewable 
energy sources seems potentially fruitful because the NAM has been applied 
successfully to a variety of environmental behaviors, such as recycling (Hopper & 
Nielsen, 1991), reducing car use (Abrahamse et al., 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003;, 
Hunecke, Blöbaum, Matthies, & Höger, 2001; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; Wall, 
Devine-Wright, & Mill, 2007), policy acceptability (Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 
2005) volunteering for an environmental NGO (Harland, Staats, & WIlke, 2007), and 
consumer behavior and environmentalism (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 
1999). The typical outcome of these studies is that individuals with stronger personal 
norms regarding specific pro-environmental behavior are more likely to engage in 
this behavior. Interestingly, these studies all examined the extent to which the NAM 
was predictive of a particular behavior in one specific context. We aim to build upon 
and extend this line of thought by studying the extent to which the NAM predicts the 
use of one specific environmental behavior (using renewable energy sources) in 
different contexts. More specifically, we will examine the predictive power of the 
NAM on the use of renewable energy sources in six European countries in which the 
perceived costs of using renewable energy sources is likely to differ. 
 Research suggests that perceived costs are a potentially important factor 
influencing the predictive power of the NAM on pro-environmental behavior (Steg & 
Vlek, 2009). More specifically, the NAM has proven to be successful in explaining 
low-cost environmental behaviors and ‘good intentions’ (e.g., willingness to change, 
willingness to sacrifice, policy acceptability; e.g., Harland et al., 2007; Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2003; Steg et al., 2005; Stern et al., 1999; Wall et al., 2007). At the same 
time, however, it appears to have less explanatory power in contexts where behavioral 
enactment is relatively costly in terms of effort, inconvenience, money, or time, such 
as reducing car use (e.g., Abrahamse et al., 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; 
Hunecke et al., 2001). These findings are in line with the so-called low-cost 
hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003), which predicts that normative 
considerations are less predictive of high-cost pro-environmental behavior than of 
low-cost behavior. It is assumed that normative considerations are easily pushed into 
the background in case of high costs (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Lindenberg 
& Steg, 2007). When choosing whether to act normatively or not, individuals will 
balance the benefits of ‘doing the right thing’ against the costs of doing so (Matthies & 
Blöbaum, 2007; Schwarz, 1977; Schwarz & Howard, 1981). If the costs of acting in 
line with one’s personal norms are relatively low, individuals are likely to do so, while 
in cases in which the costs are high, individuals are less likely to act on them because 
the costs of acting in line with your personal norms are likely to outweigh the benefits 
of doing so. As a result, personal norms should be more predictive of relatively low-
cost behavior than of more costly behavior because for such costly behavior, the 
desire to avoid the costs of acting pro-environmentally is likely to outweigh the desire 
to act in line with one’s personal norms. 
However, the few studies that have tested the low-cost hypothesis in the 
environmental domain documented mixed results. Some studies appear to support 
the low-cost hypothesis by showing that normative considerations are more 
predictive of behavior that is relatively low-cost than of more costly behavior (e.g. 
Derksen & Gartrell, 1993; Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998; 2003), yet other studies 
report opposite results (e.g. Anderson & Von Borgstede, 2010; Best, 2010; Best & 
Kneip, 2011; Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995). These inconclusive findings may be 
due in part to differences in the operationalization of the costs of behavior (Best, 
2010). A clear operationalization of behavioral costs is essential in order to test 
whether the extent to which a behavior is perceived as ‘costly’ determines the extent 
to which the behavior will be predicted by individuals’ normative considerations, and 
therefore crucial for a fair test of the low-cost hypothesis.  
We propose that a measure of the extent to which individuals perceive 
engaging in particular behavior to be costly is particularly important, because it is 
this perception of potential costs, and not the actual costs in terms of money, time, 
comfort, or pleasure, which potentially deters individuals from engaging in action. 
Indeed, this perception may follow from increased objective costs, but not necessarily 
so (e.g., increased objective monetary costs may not be perceived as psychologically 
costly when one feels it is worth it and when one is able to afford it). Therefore, we 
include an explicit measure of the perceived costs of using renewable energy sources 
in this study (see also Chapter 2). Furthermore, and different from Chapter 2 and 
other previous studies, we examine the extent to which normative considerations 
predict the same behavior in different countries in which the perceived costs of 
engaging in the behavior are likely to differ. Doing so provides us with a relatively 
clean test of the low-cost hypothesis, which allows us to test to what extent 
differences in perceived costs of using renewable energy sources influence the 
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predictive power of normative considerations on the actual use of renewable energy 
sources. 
 
The current study 
To test the low-cost hypothesis, we will compare the extent to which normative 
considerations predict the use of renewable energy sources in six European countries: 
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Hungary, and Greece. 
Compared to Chapters 2 I omitted Norway because of fundamental differences 
between the Norwegian energy market (where renewable sources are the main source 
of energy for many households, International Energy Agency (IEA), 2011; Eurostat, 
2012) and the energy markets of the other six countries (where using energy from 
renewable sources generally required an active choice). There is good reason to 
assume that the perceived cost of using renewable energy sources differed between 
the six included countries at the time the data was collected (spring 2009). For 
instance, Bird, Wustenhagen, and Aabakken (2002) compare the availability, cost, 
and market share of renewable energy sources in European countries. They found 
that using renewable energy sources is less costly in the Netherlands, in which 
renewable energy has been marketed aggressively by energy companies at relatively 
low prices, than in other countries. Moreover, consultation that took place between 
energy experts on the project team responsible for the collection of the data for the 
current study revealed huge between-country differences in the extent to which using 
renewable energy sources was perceived as costly. For example, project members 
from the Netherlands indicated that renewable energy came at approximately the 
same price as regular energy in this country at the time of the study, whereas 
members from the other included EU countries indicated that this was not the case in 
their countries. The differences in perceived costliness that were reported in these 
consultations and by Bird and colleagues suggested that the perceived costs of using 
renewable energy sources likely differed sufficiently to ensure that a comparison of 
the extent to which normative considerations predict the use of renewable energy 
sources in these different European countries would provide a good test of the low-
cost hypothesis. 
To ensure that we used a valid measure of the perceived costs of using 
renewable energy sources, we included a measure of perceived costs of using 
renewable energy sources in the study. This measure forms the basis for the test of 
our hypothesis, because the extent to which using renewable energy sources is 
perceived to be costly in a country determines our expectation regarding the 
predictive power of normative considerations in that country. Specifically, the 
hypothesis we test is the following: Normative considerations will be more predictive 
of use of renewable energy sources in countries in which using renewable energy 





In total, 6,603 individuals from six European countries (United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Hungary, and Greece) completed an online 
questionnaire on energy-related behaviors and potential antecedents of these 
behaviors. Participants were drawn from panels from Advanced Market Research 
(AMR), the market research company that collected all data. Participants were 
selected on the basis of a number of stratification criteria (i.e., gender, age, household 
income, education level, marital status, and household composition) to create 
samples that were representative for the populations of each country. We applied 
strict guidelines to ensure the quality of the data6. The application of these guidelines 
meant that a total of 5,202 participants were included in the data analysis (United 
Kingdom 849; Netherlands 758; France 881; Switzerland 940; Hungary 856; Greece 
918). This means that a total of 79% of all participants who took part in the online 
survey were included in the data-analysis. Participants’ mean age was between 41 
(Greece) and 48 (United Kingdom) years old, and an approximately even number of 
males and females took part in each country. Distributions of age and gender did not 
differ between those included or excluded from the data-analysis.  
 
  
                                                          
6 To filter out questionnaires that were unsuitable for inclusion in the analysis, the following 
criteria were used: Participants who answered more than 2/3 of all questions from one 
question battery identically were removed and participants who filled out improbable 
answers in quality-control questions that requested participants to fill out a number were 
removed. Most participants were removed from the data set because they used identical 
answering patterns in several question batteries, indicating that they did not complete the 
questionnaire seriously. The chosen criteria were strict, which is reflected in the number of 
participants who are excluded from the analysis, but this ensured that the results were not 
affected by participants who did not answer the questions seriously. 
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predictive power of normative considerations on the actual use of renewable energy 
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question battery identically were removed and participants who filled out improbable 
answers in quality-control questions that requested participants to fill out a number were 
removed. Most participants were removed from the data set because they used identical 
answering patterns in several question batteries, indicating that they did not complete the 
questionnaire seriously. The chosen criteria were strict, which is reflected in the number of 
participants who are excluded from the analysis, but this ensured that the results were not 




Respondents first completed questions on the use of sustainable energy sources. 
Next, they completed questions on antecedents of sustainable energy use sources, 
which were based on the NAM, as well as questions on the perceived costliness of 
using renewable energy sources. Questions on the NAM variables and on costliness 
were mixed and presented in random order. All questions were measured on seven-
point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’).   
 
Use of sustainable energy sources 
Participants were asked whether they currently use renewable energy. We used such 
a general question in order to make sure answers would be comparable across 
countries. Three answering options were provided: Yes, fully; Yes, partly; No. 
Because very few participants reported only using renewable energy (by answering 
‘Yes, fully’), we decided to collapse the first two answering options into the category 
‘Yes’. In The Netherlands, more than half (58%) of all participants reported using 
renewable energy sources. In Switzerland (44%) and Greece (41%), a large minority 
of participants reported using renewable energy sources as well, while in France 
(24%), the United Kingdom (24%), and Hungary (22%), less than a quarter of 
participants reported using renewable energy sources.  
 
NAM variables 
Awareness of consequences. Participants rated to what extent they agreed with 
the following two items reflecting awareness of consequences of using energy from 
non-sustainable sources: ‘I think the use of energy from non-sustainable sources by 
households causes serious environmental problems’ and ‘I am concerned about 
climate change caused by the use energy from non-sustainable sources by 
households.’ The reliability of the resulting scales was sufficient in all countries 
(Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .58 to .77; see Appendix 3.A). Awareness of 
consequences of using energy from non-sustainable sources was generally high, with 
participants in Greece reporting the highest awareness, and those in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands the lowest. 
Outcome efficacy. Participants indicated to what extent agreed that they could 
contribute to reducing environmental problems by using more renewable energy 
sources. The following three items were used: ‘My household can help reduce 
environmental problems by using renewable energy’, ‘My household can contribute to 
solving environmental problems by using renewable energy sources’, and 
‘Environmental quality will be enhanced if my household uses more renewable 
energy sources’. The reliability of the resulting scales was sufficient in all countries 
(Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .64 to .82; see Appendix 3.A). Participants in 
Greece, Hungary, and Switzerland reported the highest outcome efficacy, while it was 
lowest in the United Kingdom. 
Personal norm. Participants rated their agreement with three items measuring to 
what extent they felt morally obliged to use renewable energy sources: ‘I would feel 
guilty if my household would use energy from non-sustainable sources while 
renewable energy is available’ ‘I feel morally obliged to use renewable energy sources 
rather than energy from non-sustainable sources in my household’, and ‘I would 
violate my principles if my household would use energy from non-sustainable sources 
while renewable energy is available’. The reliability of the resulting scales was good in 
all countries (Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .74 to .89; see Appendix 3.A). 
Participants in Greece reported the strongest personal norms, while those in the 
United Kingdom and France reported the weakest. 
 
Perceived costliness of using renewable energy sources 
Costliness was measured by asking participants to indicate their agreement with 
two items: ‘It is possible for my household to use renewable energy sources in the 
next year’, and ‘My household could use renewable energy sources in the next year.’ 
We chose this indirect measure of costliness to ensure that we capture participants 
overall perceptions of the costliness of using renewable energy sources (see also 
Chapter 2). A perceived inability to use renewable energy sources suggests a 
perception of using renewable energy sources as (too) costly. In other words, 
individuals who feel unable to use energy from renewable sources presumably 
perceive doing so as (very) costly. We recoded the answers on this scale to ensure that 
higher scores on this scale indicate that using energy from sustainable sources is 
perceived as more costly. The reliability of the resulting scales was good in all 
countries, ranging from .80 in the Netherlands to .88 in France. 
 
  
3Choosing between energy sources
55
Measures 
Respondents first completed questions on the use of sustainable energy sources. 
Next, they completed questions on antecedents of sustainable energy use sources, 
which were based on the NAM, as well as questions on the perceived costliness of 
using renewable energy sources. Questions on the NAM variables and on costliness 
were mixed and presented in random order. All questions were measured on seven-
point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’).   
 
Use of sustainable energy sources 
Participants were asked whether they currently use renewable energy. We used such 
a general question in order to make sure answers would be comparable across 
countries. Three answering options were provided: Yes, fully; Yes, partly; No. 
Because very few participants reported only using renewable energy (by answering 
‘Yes, fully’), we decided to collapse the first two answering options into the category 
‘Yes’. In The Netherlands, more than half (58%) of all participants reported using 
renewable energy sources. In Switzerland (44%) and Greece (41%), a large minority 
of participants reported using renewable energy sources as well, while in France 
(24%), the United Kingdom (24%), and Hungary (22%), less than a quarter of 
participants reported using renewable energy sources.  
 
NAM variables 
Awareness of consequences. Participants rated to what extent they agreed with 
the following two items reflecting awareness of consequences of using energy from 
non-sustainable sources: ‘I think the use of energy from non-sustainable sources by 
households causes serious environmental problems’ and ‘I am concerned about 
climate change caused by the use energy from non-sustainable sources by 
households.’ The reliability of the resulting scales was sufficient in all countries 
(Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .58 to .77; see Appendix 3.A). Awareness of 
consequences of using energy from non-sustainable sources was generally high, with 
participants in Greece reporting the highest awareness, and those in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands the lowest. 
Outcome efficacy. Participants indicated to what extent agreed that they could 
contribute to reducing environmental problems by using more renewable energy 
sources. The following three items were used: ‘My household can help reduce 
environmental problems by using renewable energy’, ‘My household can contribute to 
solving environmental problems by using renewable energy sources’, and 
‘Environmental quality will be enhanced if my household uses more renewable 
energy sources’. The reliability of the resulting scales was sufficient in all countries 
(Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .64 to .82; see Appendix 3.A). Participants in 
Greece, Hungary, and Switzerland reported the highest outcome efficacy, while it was 
lowest in the United Kingdom. 
Personal norm. Participants rated their agreement with three items measuring to 
what extent they felt morally obliged to use renewable energy sources: ‘I would feel 
guilty if my household would use energy from non-sustainable sources while 
renewable energy is available’ ‘I feel morally obliged to use renewable energy sources 
rather than energy from non-sustainable sources in my household’, and ‘I would 
violate my principles if my household would use energy from non-sustainable sources 
while renewable energy is available’. The reliability of the resulting scales was good in 
all countries (Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .74 to .89; see Appendix 3.A). 
Participants in Greece reported the strongest personal norms, while those in the 
United Kingdom and France reported the weakest. 
 
Perceived costliness of using renewable energy sources 
Costliness was measured by asking participants to indicate their agreement with 
two items: ‘It is possible for my household to use renewable energy sources in the 
next year’, and ‘My household could use renewable energy sources in the next year.’ 
We chose this indirect measure of costliness to ensure that we capture participants 
overall perceptions of the costliness of using renewable energy sources (see also 
Chapter 2). A perceived inability to use renewable energy sources suggests a 
perception of using renewable energy sources as (too) costly. In other words, 
individuals who feel unable to use energy from renewable sources presumably 
perceive doing so as (very) costly. We recoded the answers on this scale to ensure that 
higher scores on this scale indicate that using energy from sustainable sources is 
perceived as more costly. The reliability of the resulting scales was good in all 






We first compared the extent to which using renewable energy sources is perceived as 
costly in each country included in the study. To test our hypothesis that the NAM is 
more predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in countries in which using it 
is perceived as less costly than in countries in which it is perceived as more costly, we 
then ran logistic regression analyses for each country, using the use of renewable 
energy sources as the dependent variable and the NAM variables as predictors. All 
NAM variables were entered in the regression analyses simultaneously. We calculated 
the amount of variance (R2) that the NAM explains in the use of sustainable energy 
sources in each country. We calculated R2 using the method described by McFadden 
(McFadden’s R2). We chose this method of calculating R2 because it is argued to be 
both conceptually and mathematically closest to the R2 number calculated in ordinary 
linear regression (Menard, 2000). Next, we calculated 95% confidence intervals 
around these R2 values for each country (Lee, 1971, 1972; MS-DOS-Program provided 
by Steiger & Fouladi, 1992–1993), and assessed the extent to which these intervals 
overlap to establish whether the explained variances differed significantly between 
the six EU countries. We consider the R2 values of the regression models to be 
significantly different when the confidence intervals around the squared multiple 
correlation of these regression models overlap no more than half of the distance of 




Perceived costliness of using renewable energy sources 
Table 3.1 shows that, as expected, the perceived costliness of using renewable energy 
sources differs per country. In the Netherlands and Greece, using renewable energy 
sources is perceived as relatively low-cost behavior. In Switzerland, using renewable 
energy sources is perceived to be significantly more costly, while it is perceived as 
even more costly in France and the United Kingdom, and most costly in Hungary. 
These results indicate that clear differences in the perceived costliness of using 
renewable energy sources exist between countries. Based on these outcomes, we 
would expect the norm-activation model to be most predictive of the use of renewable 
energy sources in the Netherlands and least predictive in Hungary. 
  
Table 3.1: Cronbach’s Alpha, Means, and Standard Deviations for Perceived Costliness of 
Using Renewable Energy. 
Country M(SD) 
Netherlands 3.9 a (1.6) 
Greece 4.0 a (1.8) 
Switzerland 4.4 b (1.8) 
France 4.7 c (1.8) 
United Kingdom 4.8 c (1.6) 
Hungary 5.0 d (1.7) 
Note: Different letters denote significant differences between the means (p <.01).  
 
Predictive power of the NAM 
Figure 3.1 shows that, as expected, the NAM variables best predicted the use of 
renewable energy sources in the Netherlands, the country in which using renewable 
energy sources was perceived as least costly. Here, it explained 20.2 percent of 
variance in using renewable energy sources (95% CI: 15.9-25.3). This is more than 
twice the percentage of explained variance found in Switzerland (7.8%; 95% CI: 4.7-
11.3), the country with the second-highest explained variance by the NAM. The fact 
that the 95% confidence intervals around the R2 values for the Netherlands and 
Switzerland do not overlap clearly indicates that the NAM explains significantly more 
variance in the use of renewable energy sources in the Netherlands than in 
Switzerland. The percentage of explained variance found in France (7.6%; 95% CI: 
4.5-11.1) is similar to that in Switzerland, while the NAM is slightly, but not 
statistically significantly, less predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in the 
United Kingdom (5.7%; 95% CI 2.9-8.9). The NAM is least predictive of renewable 
energy use in Greece 3.4%; 95% CI: 1.3-5.9), and Hungary (3.1%; 95% CI 1.1-5.6).  
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Analysis strategy 
We first compared the extent to which using renewable energy sources is perceived as 
costly in each country included in the study. To test our hypothesis that the NAM is 
more predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in countries in which using it 
is perceived as less costly than in countries in which it is perceived as more costly, we 
then ran logistic regression analyses for each country, using the use of renewable 
energy sources as the dependent variable and the NAM variables as predictors. All 
NAM variables were entered in the regression analyses simultaneously. We calculated 
the amount of variance (R2) that the NAM explains in the use of sustainable energy 
sources in each country. We calculated R2 using the method described by McFadden 
(McFadden’s R2). We chose this method of calculating R2 because it is argued to be 
both conceptually and mathematically closest to the R2 number calculated in ordinary 
linear regression (Menard, 2000). Next, we calculated 95% confidence intervals 
around these R2 values for each country (Lee, 1971, 1972; MS-DOS-Program provided 
by Steiger & Fouladi, 1992–1993), and assessed the extent to which these intervals 
overlap to establish whether the explained variances differed significantly between 
the six EU countries. We consider the R2 values of the regression models to be 
significantly different when the confidence intervals around the squared multiple 
correlation of these regression models overlap no more than half of the distance of 




Perceived costliness of using renewable energy sources 
Table 3.1 shows that, as expected, the perceived costliness of using renewable energy 
sources differs per country. In the Netherlands and Greece, using renewable energy 
sources is perceived as relatively low-cost behavior. In Switzerland, using renewable 
energy sources is perceived to be significantly more costly, while it is perceived as 
even more costly in France and the United Kingdom, and most costly in Hungary. 
These results indicate that clear differences in the perceived costliness of using 
renewable energy sources exist between countries. Based on these outcomes, we 
would expect the norm-activation model to be most predictive of the use of renewable 
energy sources in the Netherlands and least predictive in Hungary. 
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Greece 4.0 a (1.8) 
Switzerland 4.4 b (1.8) 
France 4.7 c (1.8) 
United Kingdom 4.8 c (1.6) 
Hungary 5.0 d (1.7) 
Note: Different letters denote significant differences between the means (p <.01).  
 
Predictive power of the NAM 
Figure 3.1 shows that, as expected, the NAM variables best predicted the use of 
renewable energy sources in the Netherlands, the country in which using renewable 
energy sources was perceived as least costly. Here, it explained 20.2 percent of 
variance in using renewable energy sources (95% CI: 15.9-25.3). This is more than 
twice the percentage of explained variance found in Switzerland (7.8%; 95% CI: 4.7-
11.3), the country with the second-highest explained variance by the NAM. The fact 
that the 95% confidence intervals around the R2 values for the Netherlands and 
Switzerland do not overlap clearly indicates that the NAM explains significantly more 
variance in the use of renewable energy sources in the Netherlands than in 
Switzerland. The percentage of explained variance found in France (7.6%; 95% CI: 
4.5-11.1) is similar to that in Switzerland, while the NAM is slightly, but not 
statistically significantly, less predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in the 
United Kingdom (5.7%; 95% CI 2.9-8.9). The NAM is least predictive of renewable 





Figure 3.1: Percentage of variance explained by the norm-activation model per country 
 
 
These results show that the NAM is significantly more predictive of the use of 
renewable energy sources in the Netherlands than in Switzerland, France, and the 
United Kingdom, while it is least predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in 
Greece and Hungary (statistically significantly less so than in the four other 
countries). These findings support the low-cost hypothesis, because the extent to 
which individuals perceive using renewable energy sources as costly is related to the 
predictive power of the NAM in the hypothesized direction: the predictive power of 
the NAM decreased as the perceived costliness of using renewable energy sources 
increased. The only exception to this rule is Greece, where individuals indicated that 
they perceived using renewable energy sources as relatively low-cost behavior, but 
where the NAM was poorly predictive of the use of renewable energy sources. We 
discuss this exception in the Discussion section. Overall, though, the results are in 
line with our expectations.   
 
Regression coefficients per country 
Appendix 3.B provides the outcomes of the regression models that were used to test 
the predictive power of the NAM for each country. Personal norm is the top predictor 
of the use of renewable energy sources in each country, above and beyond awareness 
of consequences and outcome efficacy. This is in line with the NAM, which stipulates 
that personal norm is the most direct antecedent of behavior in the model (Schwartz, 
1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981). However, the Netherlands is the only country in 
which personal norm is the only predictor of the triad that significantly predicted the 
use of renewable energy sources. In Switzerland, outcome efficacy is also predictive of 
using renewable energy sources, while in Hungary, awareness of consequences is also 
predictive of using it. In the United Kingdom, France, and Greece, all three NAM 
variables were significantly predictive of using renewable energy sources7. These 
patterns of results suggest that when the costs of engaging in behavior are perceived 
as relatively low, personal norm is the sole predictor of behavior, while when the 
costs increase other model variables also become psychologically relevant. We will 




The aim of this paper was to test the low-cost hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 
2003). We did so by examining whether normative considerations are more 
predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in countries in which using 
renewable energy sources is perceived as relatively low-cost behavior. We could test 
this hypothesis in a unique way because we found support for our assumption that 
the perceived costliness of using renewable energy sources differed across six 
European countries. In the Netherlands, using renewable energy sources was 
perceived as relatively low-cost behavior, whereas in countries such as France, the 
United Kingdom, and Hungary, using renewable energy sources was perceived as 
                                                          
7 Surprisingly, the regression coefficients show that awareness of consequences is negatively 
related to using renewable energy sources, indicating that the more individuals are aware of 
the negative consequences of using fossil energy sources, the less likely they are to  use 
renewable energy sources. To test whether this negative relationship is a result of a 
suppressor effect, where the relationship between a predictor and the dependent variable is 
affected by the inclusion of other predictor variables, we also ran regression models 
containing only awareness of consequences as a predictor variable. These models revealed 
statistically significant positive relationships between awareness of consequences and the use 
of renewable energy sources in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and 
Switzerland, and non-significant positive relationships in Hungary and Greece. These results 
indicate that the negative relations between awareness of consequences and the use of 
renewable energy are not due to an unexpected reversal of the relation between the two 
concepts, but rather due to a statistical effect (see also Chapter 2). 
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of variance explained by the norm-activation model per country 
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of the use of renewable energy sources in each country, above and beyond awareness 
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that personal norm is the most direct antecedent of behavior in the model (Schwartz, 
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which personal norm is the only predictor of the triad that significantly predicted the 
use of renewable energy sources. In Switzerland, outcome efficacy is also predictive of 
using renewable energy sources, while in Hungary, awareness of consequences is also 
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variables were significantly predictive of using renewable energy sources7. These 
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more costly. These differences in perceived costliness allowed us to develop specific 
predictions. 
 Specifically, our results provided support for the low-cost hypothesis by 
showing that normative considerations, as measured by the NAM (Schwartz, 1977; 
Schwartz & Howard, 1981; Steg & De Groot, 2010), were most predictive of the use of 
renewable energy sources in countries in which such use is perceived to be relatively 
low-cost behavior --- in this case the Netherlands. By contrast, normative 
considerations were significantly less predictive of the use of sustainable energy 
sources in Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom --- all countries in which 
using renewable energy sources is perceived as significantly more costly behavior 
than in the Netherlands. Similarly, in Hungary, the country in which using renewable 
energy sources is perceived as most costly, normative considerations are significantly 
less predictive of behavior than in Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom. 
Thus, the low-cost hypothesis was supported. 
The only exception to our hypothesized pattern pertained to the Greek results, 
which did not support the low-cost hypothesis. Greek participants indicated that they 
perceived using renewable energy sources as a relatively low-cost behavior, but 
normative considerations were poorly predictive of the use of renewable energy 
sources in Greece. We believe that this finding should be interpreted with caution. 
Research has shown that Greek respondents are more likely than most others to 
indicate agreement with statements (e.g. Harzing, 2006; Van Herk, Poortinga, & 
Verhallen, 2004), and to use extreme answers (e.g. Harzing, 2006). Because the 
costliness scale is a reverse-coded scale, containing items such as ‘my household 
could use renewable energy in the next year’, a tendency to show agreement with 
these items results in low scores on the perceived costliness measure. As a result, 
these low scores appear to indicate that Greek participants perceive using renewable 
energy sources as low-cost behavior, while this finding may also be (partly) the result 
of a tendency to agree with questionnaire items. Further support for our belief that 
response patterns have played a role in the low scores of Greek participants on the 
perceived costliness measure can be found in the finding that Greek participants also 
scored highest on all three NAM variables, again indicating a general higher 
agreement with statements. For these reasons, we believe that the current Greek 
results do not necessarily cast doubt on the validity of the low-cost hypothesis, 
especially because this hypothesis was supported in the five other countries included 
in the study.  
We note that we took several steps to ensure that this study would provide a 
fair test of the low-cost hypothesis. As far as we know, this study is the first to test the 
low-cost hypothesis by comparing the extent to which identical psychological 
variables predict identical behavior in different countries. This set-up allowed for a 
clean test of the low-cost hypothesis, as differences between countries were the 
results of differences in perceived costs, and not of the use of different behaviors or 
behavioral measures, or differences in measurements of psychological variables. 
Furthermore, the use of an explicit measure of perceived costs provided us with a 
testable operationalization of our hypothesis: because we knew in which countries 
using renewable energy sources was perceived as highly costly or less costly, we had 
clear expectations regarding the predictive power of normative considerations in each 
country. All these points show the added value of our approach.  
 In a more practical sense, these results have potentially interesting 
implications. The difference in the extent to which the NAM predicts the use of 
renewable energy sources in the Netherlands and in the other countries is substantial, 
indicating that in the Netherlands, normative considerations are predictive of 
behavior, while in the other countries normative considerations played little or no 
role in determining whether individuals will use renewable energy sources or not. 
These findings thus show that policy measures focusing on strengthening individuals 
normative considerations regarding renewable energy sources, for example by 
informing people about the problems caused by the use of energy from fossil fuels 
(strengthening awareness of consequences), or about the extent to which they can 
make a difference by switching to renewable energy sources (strengthening outcome 
efficacy), might be effective in the Netherlands, because the strength of these 
normative considerations influences whether Dutch consumers use renewable energy 
or not. It seems likely that such a policy would be less effective in the other countries 
included in this study, because strengthening normative considerations is unlikely to 
be effective in promoting the use of renewable energy sources when these are not 
strongly predictive of actual use of renewable energy sources. Nevertheless, further 
research is required to test whether normative interventions are indeed differently 
effective depending on the perceived costs of engaging in behavior. 
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more costly. These differences in perceived costliness allowed us to develop specific 
predictions. 
 Specifically, our results provided support for the low-cost hypothesis by 
showing that normative considerations, as measured by the NAM (Schwartz, 1977; 
Schwartz & Howard, 1981; Steg & De Groot, 2010), were most predictive of the use of 
renewable energy sources in countries in which such use is perceived to be relatively 
low-cost behavior --- in this case the Netherlands. By contrast, normative 
considerations were significantly less predictive of the use of sustainable energy 
sources in Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom --- all countries in which 
using renewable energy sources is perceived as significantly more costly behavior 
than in the Netherlands. Similarly, in Hungary, the country in which using renewable 
energy sources is perceived as most costly, normative considerations are significantly 
less predictive of behavior than in Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom. 
Thus, the low-cost hypothesis was supported. 
The only exception to our hypothesized pattern pertained to the Greek results, 
which did not support the low-cost hypothesis. Greek participants indicated that they 
perceived using renewable energy sources as a relatively low-cost behavior, but 
normative considerations were poorly predictive of the use of renewable energy 
sources in Greece. We believe that this finding should be interpreted with caution. 
Research has shown that Greek respondents are more likely than most others to 
indicate agreement with statements (e.g. Harzing, 2006; Van Herk, Poortinga, & 
Verhallen, 2004), and to use extreme answers (e.g. Harzing, 2006). Because the 
costliness scale is a reverse-coded scale, containing items such as ‘my household 
could use renewable energy in the next year’, a tendency to show agreement with 
these items results in low scores on the perceived costliness measure. As a result, 
these low scores appear to indicate that Greek participants perceive using renewable 
energy sources as low-cost behavior, while this finding may also be (partly) the result 
of a tendency to agree with questionnaire items. Further support for our belief that 
response patterns have played a role in the low scores of Greek participants on the 
perceived costliness measure can be found in the finding that Greek participants also 
scored highest on all three NAM variables, again indicating a general higher 
agreement with statements. For these reasons, we believe that the current Greek 
results do not necessarily cast doubt on the validity of the low-cost hypothesis, 
especially because this hypothesis was supported in the five other countries included 
in the study.  
We note that we took several steps to ensure that this study would provide a 
fair test of the low-cost hypothesis. As far as we know, this study is the first to test the 
low-cost hypothesis by comparing the extent to which identical psychological 
variables predict identical behavior in different countries. This set-up allowed for a 
clean test of the low-cost hypothesis, as differences between countries were the 
results of differences in perceived costs, and not of the use of different behaviors or 
behavioral measures, or differences in measurements of psychological variables. 
Furthermore, the use of an explicit measure of perceived costs provided us with a 
testable operationalization of our hypothesis: because we knew in which countries 
using renewable energy sources was perceived as highly costly or less costly, we had 
clear expectations regarding the predictive power of normative considerations in each 
country. All these points show the added value of our approach.  
 In a more practical sense, these results have potentially interesting 
implications. The difference in the extent to which the NAM predicts the use of 
renewable energy sources in the Netherlands and in the other countries is substantial, 
indicating that in the Netherlands, normative considerations are predictive of 
behavior, while in the other countries normative considerations played little or no 
role in determining whether individuals will use renewable energy sources or not. 
These findings thus show that policy measures focusing on strengthening individuals 
normative considerations regarding renewable energy sources, for example by 
informing people about the problems caused by the use of energy from fossil fuels 
(strengthening awareness of consequences), or about the extent to which they can 
make a difference by switching to renewable energy sources (strengthening outcome 
efficacy), might be effective in the Netherlands, because the strength of these 
normative considerations influences whether Dutch consumers use renewable energy 
or not. It seems likely that such a policy would be less effective in the other countries 
included in this study, because strengthening normative considerations is unlikely to 
be effective in promoting the use of renewable energy sources when these are not 
strongly predictive of actual use of renewable energy sources. Nevertheless, further 
research is required to test whether normative interventions are indeed differently 




Limitations and future research 
One potential limitation of our study is that we measured the extent to which 
individuals perceive using renewable energy sources as costly, but not the reasons for 
why they do so. In contrast to other studies, we employed explicit measures of 
costliness to validate differences in the perceived costs of using renewable energy 
sources between countries. Our measure of perceived costs allowed us to test our 
hypothesis, but it did not provide information on the exact reasons why individuals 
perceive using renewable energy sources as costly. Of course, we did not require this 
type of information to test our hypothesis in this study. However, future research 
could use more specific questions to gain more insight into the exact psychological 
factors that inhibit people from using renewable energy sources.  
To collect the data for this study we used commercial opt-in panels. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this data collection method has benefits and possible 
drawbacks, with some studies reporting that data collected using such panels may 
differ from data collected using traditional means of data collection (AAPOR 
executive task force, 2010; Yeager, Krosnick, Chang, Javitz, Levendusky, Simpser, & 
Wang, 2011), while others show that these differences are small to non-existent 
(Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2011; Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2007).The 
use of opt-in web-based panels had clear advantages in this study, as it allowed us to 
reach a large number of participants in different countries at relatively limited cost. 
We did encounter some problems with the accuracy of the data, but, as in Chapter 2, 
we were able to resolve these issues by adopting strict guidelines on who to include in 
the data analysis (as described in note 4). The implementation of these guidelines led 
us to exclude 21% of all participants from the dataset. However, as in Chapter 2, no 
differences were found in the distribution of age and gender between included and 
excluded participants, indicating that the included participants form a correct 
representation of the total group of participants who completed the survey, at least 
for those dimensions. Furthermore, because our interest was primarily in relations 
between variables rather than the comparison of absolute numbers between groups, 
potential problems with non-representativeness of participants in the opt-in panel 
used here are less pressing than they would otherwise be (Schultz, Gouveia, Cameron, 
Tankha, Schmuck, & Franzek, 2005). 
  Future research can take different directions, one of which is to compare the 
predictive strength of the individual NAM predictors as a function of perceived costs. 
Indeed, we found that personal norm was not the only significant predictor of the use 
of renewable energy sources in most countries. While the NAM stipulates that 
personal norms should be more closely related to behavior than awareness of 
consequences or outcome efficacy (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981; Steg & 
De Groot, 2010), we found that it was the sole significant predictor of behavior only 
in the Netherlands. In all other countries, awareness of consequences and/or 
outcome efficacy were also significantly predictive of behavior. One potential cause 
for the difference between the Netherlands and the other countries may be the 
difference in predictive power of the NAM: in the Netherlands, the model is relatively 
strongly predictive of the use of renewable energy sources, while in the other 
countries, the predictive power is lower. This might suggest that personal norm is 
likely to be the sole predictor of behavior when the NAM is relatively strongly 
predictive of behavior, while awareness of consequences and outcome efficacy are 
also predictive when the NAM explains less variance in the behavior. Some initial 
support for this reasoning can be found in research by Abrahamse et al., (2009), who 
found that the NAM was a better predictor of intention to reduce car use than of 
actual car use reductions, and that personal norm was the only significant predictor 
of intention to reduce car use, while both personal norm and awareness of 
consequences were significantly predictive of actual car use reductions. However, as 
far as we know no research has been conducted looking specifically at whether 
different NAM variables predict behavior depending on the explanatory power of the 
overall model. Such research would be interesting theoretically and practically, as it 
would provide more insight into which factors are most predictive of behavior under 
different circumstances. 
Another direction for future research is provided by the extent to which the 
NAM predicts behavior in the different countries included in this study. We did not 
only find significant differences between the predictive power of the NAM in the 
Netherlands and all other countries, but also between Switzerland, France, and the 
United Kingdom on the one hand and Hungary and Greece on the other. In 
Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom, the NAM is poorly predictive of the 
use of renewable energy sources, but in Hungary and Greece the predictive power of 
the NAM is significantly smaller still. This difference may be caused by other factors 
than the perceived costliness of using renewable energy sources alone, such as 
differences in income levels (GDP per person is higher in the United Kingdom, 
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of intention to reduce car use, while both personal norm and awareness of 
consequences were significantly predictive of actual car use reductions. However, as 
far as we know no research has been conducted looking specifically at whether 
different NAM variables predict behavior depending on the explanatory power of the 
overall model. Such research would be interesting theoretically and practically, as it 
would provide more insight into which factors are most predictive of behavior under 
different circumstances. 
Another direction for future research is provided by the extent to which the 
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France, and Switzerland than in Greece and Hungary, meaning people can more 
easily afford to pay a little extra for renewable energy). Indeed, research shows that 
individuals in countries with higher GDP per person are willing to pay higher price 
premia for renewable energy sources than individuals in countries with lower GDP 
per person (Eurobarometer, 2006, p. 21). To fully test whether the NAM is indeed 
more predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in richer countries than in 
poorer countries, and to test what this means for the generalizability of the low-cost 
hypothesis across countries with different GDP levels, additional research needs to be 
conducted. 
  In conclusion, this study revealed that normative considerations regarding the 
use of renewable energy sources are more predictive of actual use of renewable 
energy in countries in which using it is perceived as relatively low-cost behavior. 
These results document important support for the low-cost hypothesis, as they 
suggest that normative considerations are more predictive of relatively low-cost 








Outcome Efficacy Personal Norm 
Country alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) alpha M(SD) 
Netherlands .77 4.4 (1.5) .82 4.6 (1.4) .89 4.2 (1.6) 
Greece .58 5.5 (1.3) .77 5.2 (1.3) .79 5.2 (1.4) 
Switzerland .67 4.9 (1.4) .79 4.9 (1.4) .86 4.2 (1.6) 
France .63 5.0 (1.4) .74 4.6 (1.5) .84 4.0 (1.6) 
United Kingdom .70 4.5 (1.4) .74 4.3 (1.3) .78 4.0 (1.4) 
Hungary .62 5.1 (1.4) .64 4.9 (1.4) .74 4.5 (1.6) 
 
  
Appendix 3.B: Model Coefficients per Country 
United Kingdom (N = 849)   
Variable R2 =.06     
Personal norm B=.51**  
Outcome efficacy B=.37**  
Awareness of consequences B=-.27*  
 
the Netherlands (N = 758)   
Variable R2 =.20     




Awareness of consequences 
 
France (N = 881)   
Variable R2 =.08     




Awareness of consequences 
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measures under high, low, and very low 
levels of behavioral costs.  
Chapter 4 is based on: 
Keizer, M., Steg, L., & Van Zomeren, M. (2014). The predictive power of 
normative considerations on the acceptability of high cost, low cost, and very 
low cost policy measures (Manuscript submitted for publication).
Chapter 4
68
The use of private cars causes serious environmental problems. To alleviate these 
problems, policy makers seek to implement policy measures to reduce car use. 
However, car use reduction measures, particularly those measures that have been 
shown to be effective, are often not very acceptable to the general public (Baron & 
Jurney 1993; Garling & Loukopoulos, 2007; Jaensirisak, Wardman, & May, 2005; 
Jones, 2003; Schade & Schlag 2003), halting their implementation (Garling & 
Loukopoulos, 2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003). If effective car use reduction measures 
can be made more acceptable, policy makers are more likely to implement them, and 
the negative consequences of private car use are likely to be reduced. To this end, it is 
essential to understand which factors influence acceptability of car use reduction 
measures. Following Schade and Schlag (2003), we define acceptability as ‘the 
prospective judgment of measures to be introduced in the future’. In other words, the 
acceptability of a policy measure refers to the extent to which individuals agree or 
disagree with the possible future implementation of this policy measure.  
In this paper, we examine the circumstances under which individuals' 
personal norms with respect to car use reductions (e.g. the belief that one ought to 
reduce one’s car use to protect the environment) are predictive of their acceptability 
of car use reduction measures. More specifically, we compare the extent to which 
such personal norms are predictive of acceptability of policy measures that differ in 
the extent to which they are perceived as personally costly. This set-up enables a test 
of the low-cost hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; see also Chapter 2 and 
3 of the current thesis), which states that personal norms are more likely to be 
predictive of behaviors that are relatively low-cost than of more costly ones. The 
rationale for this hypothesis is that individuals balance the personal costs required 
for a certain act (in terms of money, time, effort, status, and/or pleasure) against the 
potential benefits of ‘doing the right thing’. Specifically, the hypothesis states that 
individuals are likely to prioritize avoiding personal costs over their desire to act upon 
their personal norms if the costs of behavior are high, while if these costs are lower, 
individuals are more likely to act upon their personal norms.  
However, studies testing the low-cost hypothesis show inconsistent results 
(Best, 2010), and are typically difficult to interpret because they lack systematic 
variations in behavioral costs. This paper aims to provide a systematic test of the low-
cost hypothesis in the field of policy acceptability. Doing so is interesting 
theoretically, because it provides a novel application of the low-cost hypothesis to the 
field of policy acceptability, as well as practically, because it provides policy makers 
with a test of the circumstances under which individuals’ personal norms are likely to 
be predictive of acceptability of policy measures. To this end, we compare the extent 
to which personal norms are predictive of car use reduction measures that differ in 
perceived costliness in seven European countries. 
 
Balancing personal norms and personal costs 
We use personal norms as the central predictor of acceptability of car use reduction 
measures. Personal norms have been defined as ‘feelings of moral obligation to 
perform or refrain from specific actions’ (Schwartz & Howard, 1981, p. 191). Personal 
norms to engage in certain action are activated when individuals become aware of a 
problem that requires their attention and feel that they are able to solve this problem 
by engaging in actions to reduce this problem (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 
1981; see also Steg & De Groot, 2010). Applied to car use reductions, this means that 
individuals who perceive the adverse environmental and/or societal consequences of 
car use as problematic, and feel they are able to contribute to reducing these adverse 
consequences are likely to have stronger personal norms to reduce car use than 
individuals who do not perceive car use as problematic. 
 Personal norms have been shown to be a key factor influencing pro-social and 
pro-environmental behavior, including willingness to reduce car use and acceptability 
of environmental policies (Eriksson, Garvill, & Nordlund, 2006; Nordlund & Garvill, 
2003; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005). For example, Steg and colleagues 
(2005) found that individuals with relatively strong personal norms rated policy 
measures to reduce household energy use as more acceptable than individuals with 
relatively weak personal norms. Similarly, Nordlund and Garvill (2003) showed that 
stronger personal norms were associated with a greater willingness to reduce car use, 
Taken together, these studies suggest that personal norms are predictive of pro-
environmental behaviors and acceptability of policy measures.  
  However, these studies all examined the extent to which personal norms were 
predictive of a particular behavior without taking into account the personal costs 
associated with engaging in this behavior. We aim to build upon and extend this line 
of thought by studying the extent to which personal norms are predictive of the 
acceptability of car use reduction measures that differ in the extent to which they are 
personally costly. This is interesting because individuals with strong personal norms 
4Pulling and pushing policy acceptance
69
The use of private cars causes serious environmental problems. To alleviate these 
problems, policy makers seek to implement policy measures to reduce car use. 
However, car use reduction measures, particularly those measures that have been 
shown to be effective, are often not very acceptable to the general public (Baron & 
Jurney 1993; Garling & Loukopoulos, 2007; Jaensirisak, Wardman, & May, 2005; 
Jones, 2003; Schade & Schlag 2003), halting their implementation (Garling & 
Loukopoulos, 2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003). If effective car use reduction measures 
can be made more acceptable, policy makers are more likely to implement them, and 
the negative consequences of private car use are likely to be reduced. To this end, it is 
essential to understand which factors influence acceptability of car use reduction 
measures. Following Schade and Schlag (2003), we define acceptability as ‘the 
prospective judgment of measures to be introduced in the future’. In other words, the 
acceptability of a policy measure refers to the extent to which individuals agree or 
disagree with the possible future implementation of this policy measure.  
In this paper, we examine the circumstances under which individuals' 
personal norms with respect to car use reductions (e.g. the belief that one ought to 
reduce one’s car use to protect the environment) are predictive of their acceptability 
of car use reduction measures. More specifically, we compare the extent to which 
such personal norms are predictive of acceptability of policy measures that differ in 
the extent to which they are perceived as personally costly. This set-up enables a test 
of the low-cost hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; see also Chapter 2 and 
3 of the current thesis), which states that personal norms are more likely to be 
predictive of behaviors that are relatively low-cost than of more costly ones. The 
rationale for this hypothesis is that individuals balance the personal costs required 
for a certain act (in terms of money, time, effort, status, and/or pleasure) against the 
potential benefits of ‘doing the right thing’. Specifically, the hypothesis states that 
individuals are likely to prioritize avoiding personal costs over their desire to act upon 
their personal norms if the costs of behavior are high, while if these costs are lower, 
individuals are more likely to act upon their personal norms.  
However, studies testing the low-cost hypothesis show inconsistent results 
(Best, 2010), and are typically difficult to interpret because they lack systematic 
variations in behavioral costs. This paper aims to provide a systematic test of the low-
cost hypothesis in the field of policy acceptability. Doing so is interesting 
theoretically, because it provides a novel application of the low-cost hypothesis to the 
field of policy acceptability, as well as practically, because it provides policy makers 
with a test of the circumstances under which individuals’ personal norms are likely to 
be predictive of acceptability of policy measures. To this end, we compare the extent 
to which personal norms are predictive of car use reduction measures that differ in 
perceived costliness in seven European countries. 
 
Balancing personal norms and personal costs 
We use personal norms as the central predictor of acceptability of car use reduction 
measures. Personal norms have been defined as ‘feelings of moral obligation to 
perform or refrain from specific actions’ (Schwartz & Howard, 1981, p. 191). Personal 
norms to engage in certain action are activated when individuals become aware of a 
problem that requires their attention and feel that they are able to solve this problem 
by engaging in actions to reduce this problem (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 
1981; see also Steg & De Groot, 2010). Applied to car use reductions, this means that 
individuals who perceive the adverse environmental and/or societal consequences of 
car use as problematic, and feel they are able to contribute to reducing these adverse 
consequences are likely to have stronger personal norms to reduce car use than 
individuals who do not perceive car use as problematic. 
 Personal norms have been shown to be a key factor influencing pro-social and 
pro-environmental behavior, including willingness to reduce car use and acceptability 
of environmental policies (Eriksson, Garvill, & Nordlund, 2006; Nordlund & Garvill, 
2003; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005). For example, Steg and colleagues 
(2005) found that individuals with relatively strong personal norms rated policy 
measures to reduce household energy use as more acceptable than individuals with 
relatively weak personal norms. Similarly, Nordlund and Garvill (2003) showed that 
stronger personal norms were associated with a greater willingness to reduce car use, 
Taken together, these studies suggest that personal norms are predictive of pro-
environmental behaviors and acceptability of policy measures.  
  However, these studies all examined the extent to which personal norms were 
predictive of a particular behavior without taking into account the personal costs 
associated with engaging in this behavior. We aim to build upon and extend this line 
of thought by studying the extent to which personal norms are predictive of the 
acceptability of car use reduction measures that differ in the extent to which they are 
personally costly. This is interesting because individuals with strong personal norms 
Chapter 4
70
regarding environmental action may fail to translate their personal norms into actual 
behavior if doing so is too personally costly (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; 
Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Instead, in 
this case, these individuals are likely to prioritize avoiding the potential personal 
costs (in terms of money, time, effort, status, and/or pleasure) of engaging in the 
behavior and not act in line with their personal norms. Indeed, research on the 
predictive power of personal norms on environmental behavior appears to suggest 
that the extent to which engaging in pro-environmental behavior is personally costly 
affects the extent to which personal norms are predictive of behavior (e.g. Steg & 
Vlek, 2009). Personal norms appeared to be particularly predictive of low-cost 
actions and intentions, while they were less predictive of behaviors that are relatively 
costly to engage in (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Chapters 2 & 3; Lindenberg & Steg, 
2007; Schwarz, 1977) These results appear to be in line with the idea that individuals 
balance the benefits of ‘doing the right thing’ against the costs of doing so (Matthies 
& Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 1977; Schwarz & Howard, 1981). If the costs of acting in 
line with one’s personal norms are relatively low, individuals are likely to act upon 
their personal norms, while in cases in which the costs are high, individuals are less 
likely to act on them, because in that case the costs of acting in line with your 
personal norms are likely to outweigh the benefits of doing so. As a result, personal 
norms should be more predictive of relatively low-cost behavior, because for more 
costly behavior, the desire to avoid the costs of acting pro-environmentally is likely to 
outweigh the desire to act in line with one’s personal norms (Chapters 2 & 3; 
Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 1977).  
  At the same time, however, there is some initial evidence to suggest that 
personal norms may also be less predictive of behaviors that require very little 
personal costs (e.g. Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995). Although this finding may seem 
counter-intuitive, it actually fits the idea that individuals balance personal costs 
against their personal norms well. This is because, in the absence of reasons to refrain 
from normative action, individuals are likely to engage in pro-environmental 
behavior irrespective of the strength of their personal norms. In other words, when 
very low personal costs are involved, individuals are likely to engage in 
environmental behavior irrespective of whether they have strong personal norms 
regarding environmental behavior or not. Hence, personal norms are unlikely to be 
strongly related to very low-cost behavior. Applied to acceptability of policy 
measures, this means that personal norms should likely be less predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that are associated with very low personal costs than 
with policy measures that are somewhat more costly to an individual. Thus, personal 
norms should be more predictive of acceptability of policy measures that are 
associated with lower than higher costs (with the exception of very low-cost 
behavior). An illustration of this reasoning is provided in Figure 1.1 (p. 8). By 
including very low-cost behavior as well as relatively low-cost and high-cost 
behaviors, this chapter extends the work presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
The current study 
The aim of this study is to test the reasoning illustrated in Figure 1.1 in the field of 
policy acceptability. This field is particularly suitable for the test of our hypotheses, 
because the personal costs caused by implementation of policy measures differ 
strongly. Some measures, such as significant car tax increases, may involve relatively 
high personal cost for car drivers after their implementation, while other measures, 
such as improvement of public transport, will involve fewer costs for an individual 
when they are implemented (Eriksson, Garvill, & Nordlund, 2006; 2008; 
Loukopoulos, 2007). We will test whether these differences in personal costs affect 
the extent to which personal norms are predictive of acceptability of policy measures 
to reduce car use. More specifically, we will test two hypotheses.  First, personal 
norms should be less predictive of policy measures that are associated with little or 
no personal costs than of policy measures that are associated with low costs to an 
individual (but not high costs). Second, personal norms should be less predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that are highly personally costly than of policy 
measures that are associated with lower individuals costs (but not very low costs). 
Below, we discuss how we will test these hypotheses in more detail, and indicate how 
we distinguish very low cost, low-cost, and high-cost policy measures.  
We test our hypotheses by examining how predictive personal norms are of 
acceptability of policy measures targeting car use. The literature on car use reduction 
measures distinguishes two major categories of policy measures: pull and push 
measures (Loukopoulos, 2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003; Steg & Vlek 1997). Pull 
measures aim to change peoples’ behavior by making alternatives for car use more 
attractive. The implementation of a pull measure, for example an improvement in 
public transport quality, is mostly not associated with personal costs: driving a car 
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counter-intuitive, it actually fits the idea that individuals balance personal costs 
against their personal norms well. This is because, in the absence of reasons to refrain 
from normative action, individuals are likely to engage in pro-environmental 
behavior irrespective of the strength of their personal norms. In other words, when 
very low personal costs are involved, individuals are likely to engage in 
environmental behavior irrespective of whether they have strong personal norms 
regarding environmental behavior or not. Hence, personal norms are unlikely to be 
strongly related to very low-cost behavior. Applied to acceptability of policy 
measures, this means that personal norms should likely be less predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that are associated with very low personal costs than 
with policy measures that are somewhat more costly to an individual. Thus, personal 
norms should be more predictive of acceptability of policy measures that are 
associated with lower than higher costs (with the exception of very low-cost 
behavior). An illustration of this reasoning is provided in Figure 1.1 (p. 8). By 
including very low-cost behavior as well as relatively low-cost and high-cost 
behaviors, this chapter extends the work presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
The current study 
The aim of this study is to test the reasoning illustrated in Figure 1.1 in the field of 
policy acceptability. This field is particularly suitable for the test of our hypotheses, 
because the personal costs caused by implementation of policy measures differ 
strongly. Some measures, such as significant car tax increases, may involve relatively 
high personal cost for car drivers after their implementation, while other measures, 
such as improvement of public transport, will involve fewer costs for an individual 
when they are implemented (Eriksson, Garvill, & Nordlund, 2006; 2008; 
Loukopoulos, 2007). We will test whether these differences in personal costs affect 
the extent to which personal norms are predictive of acceptability of policy measures 
to reduce car use. More specifically, we will test two hypotheses.  First, personal 
norms should be less predictive of policy measures that are associated with little or 
no personal costs than of policy measures that are associated with low costs to an 
individual (but not high costs). Second, personal norms should be less predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that are highly personally costly than of policy 
measures that are associated with lower individuals costs (but not very low costs). 
Below, we discuss how we will test these hypotheses in more detail, and indicate how 
we distinguish very low cost, low-cost, and high-cost policy measures.  
We test our hypotheses by examining how predictive personal norms are of 
acceptability of policy measures targeting car use. The literature on car use reduction 
measures distinguishes two major categories of policy measures: pull and push 
measures (Loukopoulos, 2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003; Steg & Vlek 1997). Pull 
measures aim to change peoples’ behavior by making alternatives for car use more 
attractive. The implementation of a pull measure, for example an improvement in 
public transport quality, is mostly not associated with personal costs: driving a car 
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will not be more costly after public transport links have been improved. Accepting a 
pull measure can therefore be said to imply lower personal costs for car drivers than 
accepting push measures that are aimed at making car use more personally costly (in 
terms of money, effort, time, and/or comfort) in order to motivate car drivers to drive 
less. The implementation of such push measures, for example an increase in car use 
taxes, will therefore generally involve personal costs: if this measure would be 
implemented, one would have to pay more for using a car, or reduce one’s car use 
which is also likely to involve some costs, such as a restriction in one’s freedom to 
move. It follows that personal norms should be less predictive of acceptability of pull 
measures that are associated with very low or no costs to an individual than of push 
measures that are more personally costly.  
 Our second hypothesis is that personal norms are less predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that are more personally costly than of less costly 
policy measures. We will focus on push measures here because, in contrast to pull 
measures, push measures are generally believed to be personally costly (Loukopoulos, 
2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003; Steg & Vlek, 1997). The extent to which push measures 
are perceived as costly is likely to differ across individuals and situations. An 
important factor that affects the costs associated with push measures is the extent to 
which individuals feel able to adapt their travel behavior to the incentive provided by 
the measure (Gärling & Schuitema, 2007; Goodwin, 1997). More specifically, 
individuals who feel poorly able to reduce their car use (for example because no 
alternative modes of transport are available) are likely to perceive implementation of 
a push measure as costly, because it forces them to either continue driving their cars 
at increased costs or to travel less, which is also costly as it reduces their freedom to 
move. Individuals who feel more able to reduce their car use, on the other hand, can 
at least partly avoid the increased costs that are caused by the implementation of a 
push measure, meaning that they are likely to perceive the implementation of such a 
measure as less personally costly. In other words, implementation of a push measure 
to reduce car use is likely to imply relatively high personal costs to individuals who 
feel poorly able to reduce their car use, while it implies lower personal costs (but not 
very low costs) to those who feel better able to do so. As a result, we expect personal 
norms to be less predictive of acceptability of push measures for individuals who feel 
poorly able to reduce their car use than for those who feel better able to do so. In 
other words, we expect that acceptability of a push measure is significantly predicted 
by an interaction effect between personal norms and ability to reduce car use.  
To test our first hypothesis, we will compare the extent to which personal 
norms predict acceptability of pull measures and push measures to reduce car use. 
We expect that personal norms are less predictive of acceptability of pull measures 
than of acceptability of push measures, because pull measures generally are expected 
to lead to very low personal costs and are therefore likely to be perceived as 
acceptable irrespective of the strength of individuals’ personal norms, while 
individuals generally expect that push measures increase personal costs meaning that 
individuals with strong personal norms are more likely to perceive these measures as 
acceptable than individuals with weak personal norms. To test our second hypothesis, 
we will examine whether personal norms are less predictive of a push measure to 
reduce car use for individuals who feel poorly able to reduce their car use than for 
those who feel better able to do so.  
To enable a comprehensive test of our hypotheses, we collected data on 
acceptability of policy measures, personal norms to reduce car use, and ability to 
reduce car use in seven European countries (see also Chapter 2). This approach 
allows us to test our hypotheses across different contexts by combining the data from 
all seven countries and hence to draw general conclusions about the relationship 
between personal norms towards reducing car use, the personal costs associated with 
the implementation of policy measures, and acceptability of the policy. Furthermore, 
our large dataset also allows us to zoom in on the data from each individual country 
to examine the comparability of the results across countries, so as to study whether 





An on-line questionnaire study was conducted among large representative samples of 
the populations of Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, 
Switzerland, Hungary, and Greece. Participants were selected from panels from 
Advanced Market Research (AMR), the company that collected the data, on the basis 
of a number of stratification criteria (i.e., gender, age, household income, education 
level, marital status, and household composition). A total of 7703 participants 
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will not be more costly after public transport links have been improved. Accepting a 
pull measure can therefore be said to imply lower personal costs for car drivers than 
accepting push measures that are aimed at making car use more personally costly (in 
terms of money, effort, time, and/or comfort) in order to motivate car drivers to drive 
less. The implementation of such push measures, for example an increase in car use 
taxes, will therefore generally involve personal costs: if this measure would be 
implemented, one would have to pay more for using a car, or reduce one’s car use 
which is also likely to involve some costs, such as a restriction in one’s freedom to 
move. It follows that personal norms should be less predictive of acceptability of pull 
measures that are associated with very low or no costs to an individual than of push 
measures that are more personally costly.  
 Our second hypothesis is that personal norms are less predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that are more personally costly than of less costly 
policy measures. We will focus on push measures here because, in contrast to pull 
measures, push measures are generally believed to be personally costly (Loukopoulos, 
2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003; Steg & Vlek, 1997). The extent to which push measures 
are perceived as costly is likely to differ across individuals and situations. An 
important factor that affects the costs associated with push measures is the extent to 
which individuals feel able to adapt their travel behavior to the incentive provided by 
the measure (Gärling & Schuitema, 2007; Goodwin, 1997). More specifically, 
individuals who feel poorly able to reduce their car use (for example because no 
alternative modes of transport are available) are likely to perceive implementation of 
a push measure as costly, because it forces them to either continue driving their cars 
at increased costs or to travel less, which is also costly as it reduces their freedom to 
move. Individuals who feel more able to reduce their car use, on the other hand, can 
at least partly avoid the increased costs that are caused by the implementation of a 
push measure, meaning that they are likely to perceive the implementation of such a 
measure as less personally costly. In other words, implementation of a push measure 
to reduce car use is likely to imply relatively high personal costs to individuals who 
feel poorly able to reduce their car use, while it implies lower personal costs (but not 
very low costs) to those who feel better able to do so. As a result, we expect personal 
norms to be less predictive of acceptability of push measures for individuals who feel 
poorly able to reduce their car use than for those who feel better able to do so. In 
other words, we expect that acceptability of a push measure is significantly predicted 
by an interaction effect between personal norms and ability to reduce car use.  
To test our first hypothesis, we will compare the extent to which personal 
norms predict acceptability of pull measures and push measures to reduce car use. 
We expect that personal norms are less predictive of acceptability of pull measures 
than of acceptability of push measures, because pull measures generally are expected 
to lead to very low personal costs and are therefore likely to be perceived as 
acceptable irrespective of the strength of individuals’ personal norms, while 
individuals generally expect that push measures increase personal costs meaning that 
individuals with strong personal norms are more likely to perceive these measures as 
acceptable than individuals with weak personal norms. To test our second hypothesis, 
we will examine whether personal norms are less predictive of a push measure to 
reduce car use for individuals who feel poorly able to reduce their car use than for 
those who feel better able to do so.  
To enable a comprehensive test of our hypotheses, we collected data on 
acceptability of policy measures, personal norms to reduce car use, and ability to 
reduce car use in seven European countries (see also Chapter 2). This approach 
allows us to test our hypotheses across different contexts by combining the data from 
all seven countries and hence to draw general conclusions about the relationship 
between personal norms towards reducing car use, the personal costs associated with 
the implementation of policy measures, and acceptability of the policy. Furthermore, 
our large dataset also allows us to zoom in on the data from each individual country 
to examine the comparability of the results across countries, so as to study whether 





An on-line questionnaire study was conducted among large representative samples of 
the populations of Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, 
Switzerland, Hungary, and Greece. Participants were selected from panels from 
Advanced Market Research (AMR), the company that collected the data, on the basis 
of a number of stratification criteria (i.e., gender, age, household income, education 
level, marital status, and household composition). A total of 7703 participants 
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(approximately 1100 per country) completed the questionnaire. To ensure the quality 
of the data, we removed a number of participants from the data sets because of 
irregular answering patterns8. After the application of these quality check criteria, 
6045 participants were included in the data-analysis (Norway: 843; United Kingdom: 
849; The Netherlands: 758; France: 881; Switzerland: 940; Hungary: 856; Greece: 
918). This means that a total of 78% of all participants who took part in the online 
survey were included in the data-analysis. The average age of the included 
participants was 44 years old (SD = 14.78); 50.8 percent of the participants was 
female. Distributions of age and gender did not differ between those included or 
excluded from the data-analysis.  
 
Procedure 
Participants first completed a set of questions on car use and psychological 
antecedents of car use, including personal norms to reduce car use and perceived 
ability to change one’s car use. Next, they indicated the extent to which they found six 
energy-related policy measures acceptable.  Two of these policy measures were 
related to car use and focused either on a pull or push measure; these measures were 
included as dependent variables in this study. 
 
Measures 
Acceptability of policy measures. Two policy measures targeting car use (one 
push measure, one pull measure) were included in the questionnaire. Participants 
rated the acceptability of these measures on seven point scales, ranging from 1 (not at 
all acceptable) to 7 (very acceptable). The push measure was ‘An increase of car use 
costs (through taxes on car ownership and car fuel) of 30%’. The average acceptability 
of this measure was low (M = 2.6; SD = 1.66). Variation in acceptability between 
countries was limited. Acceptability was lowest in France (M = 2.2) and highest in 
Switzerland (M = 2.9), but the low means indicate that this policy measure was 
deemed unacceptable in all seven countries. The pull measure was ‘Improvement of 
                                                          
8 To filter out participants that were unsuitable for inclusion in the analysis, the following 
criteria were used: we removed participants who answered more than 2/3 of all questions 
from one question battery identically as well as participants who filled out improbable 
answers in quality-control questions that requested participants to fill out a particular 
number. Most participants who were removed from the data set used identical answering 
patterns in several question batteries, indicating that they did not complete the questionnaire 
seriously. 
 
public transport – increased frequency of public transport service and the opening of 
new public transport routes.’ This measure was generally deemed acceptable (M = 
6.0; SD = 1.16). Again, variation between countries was limited, with acceptability 
lowest in the Netherlands (M = 5.9), and highest in Greece (M = 6.4). These high 
mean scores indicate that this measure was deemed highly acceptable in all seven 
countries. 
 
Antecedents of policy acceptability.  
Personal norms. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with the 
following three items on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree): ‘I feel morally obliged to reduce the percentage of trips I travel by car,’ ‘I 
would violate my principles if I would not try to reduce my car use,’ ‘I feel guilty if I 
do not try to reduce the percentage of journeys I travel by car.’ We combined these 
items to create the personal norms scale. The reliability of the resulting scale was 
high (Cronbach’s alpha = .81; range in different countries between .77 and .83). The 
average score on personal norms was slightly below the midpoint of the scale (M = 
3.7, SD = 1.59; range in different countries between 3.1 and 4.1), indicating 
moderately strong personal norms to reduce one’s car use. 
Ability to reduce car use. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed 
with the following two items on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree): ‘It is possible for me to reduce my car use in the next year,’ ‘I could 
reduce my car use in the next year.’ We combined these items to create the ability to 
reduce car use scale (see also Chapters 2). The reliability of this scale was high 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .86; range in different countries between .84 and .89). The 
average score on ability to reduce car use was 3.8 (SD = 1.79; range in different 
countries between 3.4 and 4.1), indicating that on average, participants felt somewhat 
able to reduce their car use. 
 
Analysis Strategy 
We first tested our hypotheses by running an overall analysis in which we combined 
all participants from all countries. To test our first hypothesis that personal norms 
are less predictive of acceptability of pull measures than of acceptability of push 
measures, we ran two linear regression analyses: one using personal norms as 
predictor and acceptability of increasing car use taxes as the dependent variable and 
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(approximately 1100 per country) completed the questionnaire. To ensure the quality 
of the data, we removed a number of participants from the data sets because of 
irregular answering patterns8. After the application of these quality check criteria, 
6045 participants were included in the data-analysis (Norway: 843; United Kingdom: 
849; The Netherlands: 758; France: 881; Switzerland: 940; Hungary: 856; Greece: 
918). This means that a total of 78% of all participants who took part in the online 
survey were included in the data-analysis. The average age of the included 
participants was 44 years old (SD = 14.78); 50.8 percent of the participants was 
female. Distributions of age and gender did not differ between those included or 
excluded from the data-analysis.  
 
Procedure 
Participants first completed a set of questions on car use and psychological 
antecedents of car use, including personal norms to reduce car use and perceived 
ability to change one’s car use. Next, they indicated the extent to which they found six 
energy-related policy measures acceptable.  Two of these policy measures were 
related to car use and focused either on a pull or push measure; these measures were 
included as dependent variables in this study. 
 
Measures 
Acceptability of policy measures. Two policy measures targeting car use (one 
push measure, one pull measure) were included in the questionnaire. Participants 
rated the acceptability of these measures on seven point scales, ranging from 1 (not at 
all acceptable) to 7 (very acceptable). The push measure was ‘An increase of car use 
costs (through taxes on car ownership and car fuel) of 30%’. The average acceptability 
of this measure was low (M = 2.6; SD = 1.66). Variation in acceptability between 
countries was limited. Acceptability was lowest in France (M = 2.2) and highest in 
Switzerland (M = 2.9), but the low means indicate that this policy measure was 
deemed unacceptable in all seven countries. The pull measure was ‘Improvement of 
                                                          
8 To filter out participants that were unsuitable for inclusion in the analysis, the following 
criteria were used: we removed participants who answered more than 2/3 of all questions 
from one question battery identically as well as participants who filled out improbable 
answers in quality-control questions that requested participants to fill out a particular 
number. Most participants who were removed from the data set used identical answering 
patterns in several question batteries, indicating that they did not complete the questionnaire 
seriously. 
 
public transport – increased frequency of public transport service and the opening of 
new public transport routes.’ This measure was generally deemed acceptable (M = 
6.0; SD = 1.16). Again, variation between countries was limited, with acceptability 
lowest in the Netherlands (M = 5.9), and highest in Greece (M = 6.4). These high 
mean scores indicate that this measure was deemed highly acceptable in all seven 
countries. 
 
Antecedents of policy acceptability.  
Personal norms. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with the 
following three items on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree): ‘I feel morally obliged to reduce the percentage of trips I travel by car,’ ‘I 
would violate my principles if I would not try to reduce my car use,’ ‘I feel guilty if I 
do not try to reduce the percentage of journeys I travel by car.’ We combined these 
items to create the personal norms scale. The reliability of the resulting scale was 
high (Cronbach’s alpha = .81; range in different countries between .77 and .83). The 
average score on personal norms was slightly below the midpoint of the scale (M = 
3.7, SD = 1.59; range in different countries between 3.1 and 4.1), indicating 
moderately strong personal norms to reduce one’s car use. 
Ability to reduce car use. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed 
with the following two items on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree): ‘It is possible for me to reduce my car use in the next year,’ ‘I could 
reduce my car use in the next year.’ We combined these items to create the ability to 
reduce car use scale (see also Chapters 2). The reliability of this scale was high 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .86; range in different countries between .84 and .89). The 
average score on ability to reduce car use was 3.8 (SD = 1.79; range in different 
countries between 3.4 and 4.1), indicating that on average, participants felt somewhat 
able to reduce their car use. 
 
Analysis Strategy 
We first tested our hypotheses by running an overall analysis in which we combined 
all participants from all countries. To test our first hypothesis that personal norms 
are less predictive of acceptability of pull measures than of acceptability of push 
measures, we ran two linear regression analyses: one using personal norms as 
predictor and acceptability of increasing car use taxes as the dependent variable and 
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one using personal norms as predictor and acceptability of public transport 
improvement as the dependent variable. To test our hypothesis, we compared the 
amount of variance (R2) that personal norms explain in acceptability of a pull 
measure with the explained variance in acceptability of a push measure. As in 
previous chapters, we calculated 95% confidence intervals around these R2 values 
(Lee, 1971, 1972; MS-DOS-Program provided by Steiger & Fouladi, 1992), and 
examined the extent to which these intervals overlap to establish whether differences 
between the explained variances in short-distance and overall car use were 
statistically significant. We consider the R2 values of the regression models to be 
significantly different when the confidence intervals around the squared multiple 
correlation of these regression models overlap no more than half of the distance of 
one side on a confidence interval (see Masson & Loftus, 2003).  
  To test our second hypotheses that personal norms will be more predictive of a 
push measure to reduce car use for individuals who feel able to reduce their car use 
than for those who feel less able to do so, we ran a regression model including 
personal norm, ability to reduce car use, and their interaction term as predictors and 
acceptability of increasing car use taxes as the dependent variable. Next, we ran the 





We started with an overall analysis including all participants from all countries. Our 
first hypothesis stated that personal norms would be more predictive of acceptability 
of a (costly) push measure than a (very low cost) pull measure. Regression analysis 
revealed that this is indeed the case: personal norms to reduce car use explained 9.2% 
of the variance in acceptability of a car use tax increase (F (6043,1) = 615.90; p < 
.001; 95% CI: 7.7 - 10.7), while they only explained 1.5% of the variance in 
acceptability of improving public transport (F (6043,1) = 91.58; p < .001; 95% CI: 0.9 
– 2.2). The complete lack of overlap in the 95% confidence intervals indicates that the 
difference in explained variance in acceptability of the two policy measures is 
statistically significant. 
To test our second hypothesis, we ran a regression model containing personal 
norms, ability to reduce car use, and their interaction terms as predictors and 
acceptability of a car use tax increase as the dependent variable (see Table 4.1). We 
found statistically significant main effects for both personal norms and ability to 
reduce car use. Individuals with relatively strong personal norms to reduce their car 
use were more likely to perceive a car tax increase as acceptable than individuals with 
weaker personal norms (β = .25, t(6041) = 16.59, p < .001), and the more individuals 
felt able to reduce their car use, the more acceptable they found a car tax increase 
policy measure (β = .10, t(6041) = 6.57, p < .001). More importantly, we found the 
expected personal norms * ability to reduce car use interaction effect (β = .05, t(6041) 
= 3.80, p < .001) on acceptability of a car use tax increase. To explore the nature of 
this interaction effect in more detail, we ran simple slopes analyses to examine the 
relationship between personal norms and acceptability for individuals who reported a 
weak or strong ability to reduce their car use (see Figure 4.1). In line with our 
expectations, these analyses showed that for participants who reported a weak ability 
to reduce their car use (2 SDs below mean; i.e., those who perceived higher costs), the 
relationship between personal norms and acceptability of car tax increases was 
weaker (β = .16, t(6041) = 5.65, p < .001), compared to those with strong ability to 
reduce their car use (2 SDs above mean; i.e., those who perceived lower costs; β = .33, 
t(6041) = 12.47, p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 2.  
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one using personal norms as predictor and acceptability of public transport 
improvement as the dependent variable. To test our hypothesis, we compared the 
amount of variance (R2) that personal norms explain in acceptability of a pull 
measure with the explained variance in acceptability of a push measure. As in 
previous chapters, we calculated 95% confidence intervals around these R2 values 
(Lee, 1971, 1972; MS-DOS-Program provided by Steiger & Fouladi, 1992), and 
examined the extent to which these intervals overlap to establish whether differences 
between the explained variances in short-distance and overall car use were 
statistically significant. We consider the R2 values of the regression models to be 
significantly different when the confidence intervals around the squared multiple 
correlation of these regression models overlap no more than half of the distance of 
one side on a confidence interval (see Masson & Loftus, 2003).  
  To test our second hypotheses that personal norms will be more predictive of a 
push measure to reduce car use for individuals who feel able to reduce their car use 
than for those who feel less able to do so, we ran a regression model including 
personal norm, ability to reduce car use, and their interaction term as predictors and 
acceptability of increasing car use taxes as the dependent variable. Next, we ran the 





We started with an overall analysis including all participants from all countries. Our 
first hypothesis stated that personal norms would be more predictive of acceptability 
of a (costly) push measure than a (very low cost) pull measure. Regression analysis 
revealed that this is indeed the case: personal norms to reduce car use explained 9.2% 
of the variance in acceptability of a car use tax increase (F (6043,1) = 615.90; p < 
.001; 95% CI: 7.7 - 10.7), while they only explained 1.5% of the variance in 
acceptability of improving public transport (F (6043,1) = 91.58; p < .001; 95% CI: 0.9 
– 2.2). The complete lack of overlap in the 95% confidence intervals indicates that the 
difference in explained variance in acceptability of the two policy measures is 
statistically significant. 
To test our second hypothesis, we ran a regression model containing personal 
norms, ability to reduce car use, and their interaction terms as predictors and 
acceptability of a car use tax increase as the dependent variable (see Table 4.1). We 
found statistically significant main effects for both personal norms and ability to 
reduce car use. Individuals with relatively strong personal norms to reduce their car 
use were more likely to perceive a car tax increase as acceptable than individuals with 
weaker personal norms (β = .25, t(6041) = 16.59, p < .001), and the more individuals 
felt able to reduce their car use, the more acceptable they found a car tax increase 
policy measure (β = .10, t(6041) = 6.57, p < .001). More importantly, we found the 
expected personal norms * ability to reduce car use interaction effect (β = .05, t(6041) 
= 3.80, p < .001) on acceptability of a car use tax increase. To explore the nature of 
this interaction effect in more detail, we ran simple slopes analyses to examine the 
relationship between personal norms and acceptability for individuals who reported a 
weak or strong ability to reduce their car use (see Figure 4.1). In line with our 
expectations, these analyses showed that for participants who reported a weak ability 
to reduce their car use (2 SDs below mean; i.e., those who perceived higher costs), the 
relationship between personal norms and acceptability of car tax increases was 
weaker (β = .16, t(6041) = 5.65, p < .001), compared to those with strong ability to 
reduce their car use (2 SDs above mean; i.e., those who perceived lower costs; β = .33, 





Table 4.1: Multiple regression results with acceptability of push measure as dependent 
variable and personal norms, ability to reduce car use, and their interaction as independent 
variables 
 β T R2 F 
change 
Df p 
Model 1 (N = 6045)   .101 226.29 3,6041 <.001 
Personal norms .25 16.59**     
Ability to reduce car 
use 
.10 6.57**     
Personal norms * 
Ability 
.05 3.80**     
Note: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01 
 
Figure 4.1: Acceptability of an increase in car use taxes as a function of personal norms and 
ability to reduce car use 
 
Note: Ability low = Standardized ability to reduce car use -2SD; Ability high = 
Standardized ability to reduce car use +2SD. For PN Weak, a personal norms score of 2 
was chosen, while for PN Strong a personal norms score of 6 was chosen. 
 
Analysis per country 
To study the extent to which the results of the overall analysis were replicated within 
the separate countries, we also ran our analyses on a country-by-country basis. In 
support of our first hypothesis, we found that personal norms towards reducing car 
use were more predictive of acceptability of car use tax increases (the push measure) 
than of public transport improvements (the pull measure) in all seven countries 
included in the study. Personal norms explained between 6.2 (in the United 
Kingdom) and 19.7 (in Norway) percent of variance in acceptability of car use tax 
increases, while they only explained between 0.1 (in Hungary) and 2.7 (In France) 
percent of variance in acceptability of public transport improvements. This result 
shows that, as expected, personal norms are more predictive of acceptability of a push 
than a pull measure to reduce car use. 
With regard to our second hypothesis, results were more mixed. Although we 
did find that personal norms is significantly predictive of acceptability of a push 
measure in all seven countries, and that ability to reduce car use is also significantly 
predictive in five of the seven countries (the Netherlands and Switzerland being the 
exceptions), we only found the expected statistically significant personal 
norms*ability to reduce car use interaction effect in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Norway, but not in the other four countries (see Appendix 4.A for 
the regression models and Appendix 4.B for correlation tables). These results mean 
that our second hypothesis, which stated that personal norms would be more 
predictive of acceptability of a push measure among individuals who are more able to 
reduce their car use than among those who are less able to do so, is supported in 
three out of seven countries included in the analysis. We discuss this mixed support 




The aim of this study was to examine to what extent personal norms predict the 
acceptability of policy measures to reduce car use that differ in personal costs in 
seven European countries. We argued that accepting environmental policies is often 
associated with some behavioral costs, and that individuals are more likely to judge a 
policy measure as acceptable if the associated costs are relatively low. When personal 
norms (which reflect feelings of moral obligations) are strong, people are likely to act 
upon these norms even when this is somewhat costly. However, we argued that the 
extent to which personal norms predict behavior and policy acceptability depends on 
the costliness of behavior, as people will balance the benefits of acting in line with 
their personal norms against the costs of doing so when deciding whether to act pro-
environmentally or not (Chapters 2 & 3; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwarz, 1977; 
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Table 4.1: Multiple regression results with acceptability of push measure as dependent 
variable and personal norms, ability to reduce car use, and their interaction as independent 
variables 
 β T R2 F 
change 
Df p 
Model 1 (N = 6045)   .101 226.29 3,6041 <.001 
Personal norms .25 16.59**     
Ability to reduce car 
use 
.10 6.57**     
Personal norms * 
Ability 
.05 3.80**     
Note: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01 
 
Figure 4.1: Acceptability of an increase in car use taxes as a function of personal norms and 
ability to reduce car use 
 
Note: Ability low = Standardized ability to reduce car use -2SD; Ability high = 
Standardized ability to reduce car use +2SD. For PN Weak, a personal norms score of 2 
was chosen, while for PN Strong a personal norms score of 6 was chosen. 
 
Analysis per country 
To study the extent to which the results of the overall analysis were replicated within 
the separate countries, we also ran our analyses on a country-by-country basis. In 
support of our first hypothesis, we found that personal norms towards reducing car 
use were more predictive of acceptability of car use tax increases (the push measure) 
than of public transport improvements (the pull measure) in all seven countries 
included in the study. Personal norms explained between 6.2 (in the United 
Kingdom) and 19.7 (in Norway) percent of variance in acceptability of car use tax 
increases, while they only explained between 0.1 (in Hungary) and 2.7 (In France) 
percent of variance in acceptability of public transport improvements. This result 
shows that, as expected, personal norms are more predictive of acceptability of a push 
than a pull measure to reduce car use. 
With regard to our second hypothesis, results were more mixed. Although we 
did find that personal norms is significantly predictive of acceptability of a push 
measure in all seven countries, and that ability to reduce car use is also significantly 
predictive in five of the seven countries (the Netherlands and Switzerland being the 
exceptions), we only found the expected statistically significant personal 
norms*ability to reduce car use interaction effect in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Norway, but not in the other four countries (see Appendix 4.A for 
the regression models and Appendix 4.B for correlation tables). These results mean 
that our second hypothesis, which stated that personal norms would be more 
predictive of acceptability of a push measure among individuals who are more able to 
reduce their car use than among those who are less able to do so, is supported in 
three out of seven countries included in the analysis. We discuss this mixed support 




The aim of this study was to examine to what extent personal norms predict the 
acceptability of policy measures to reduce car use that differ in personal costs in 
seven European countries. We argued that accepting environmental policies is often 
associated with some behavioral costs, and that individuals are more likely to judge a 
policy measure as acceptable if the associated costs are relatively low. When personal 
norms (which reflect feelings of moral obligations) are strong, people are likely to act 
upon these norms even when this is somewhat costly. However, we argued that the 
extent to which personal norms predict behavior and policy acceptability depends on 
the costliness of behavior, as people will balance the benefits of acting in line with 
their personal norms against the costs of doing so when deciding whether to act pro-
environmentally or not (Chapters 2 & 3; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwarz, 1977; 
Chapter 4
80
Schwarz and Howard, 1981). Our aim was to provide a systematic test of the extent to 
which personal norms predict acceptability of policy measures that differ in the 
extent to which they are personally costly.  
  Specifically, we tested two hypotheses. First, we expected that personal norms 
should be less predictive of acceptability of policy measures that are associated very 
low costs to an individual than of policy measures that are more personally costly. 
Second, we hypothesized that personal norms should be less predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that are associated with very high costs than of policy 
measures that are less personally costly. To test our hypotheses, and to test the 
robustness of our findings, we analyzed data from a questionnaire study in seven 
European countries. We first conducted an overall analysis, in which we combined all 
participants from all seven countries, and next conducted a per-country analysis, 
which allowed us to test to what extent the overall effects could be replicated in 
different countries. 
 The overall as well as the per-country analyses supported our first hypothesis. 
We found that personal norms were significantly less predictive of acceptability of 
public transport improvements (a measure that is unlikely to be personally costly 
when implemented) than of acceptability of a car tax increase (a measure that is likely 
to induce personal costs). This finding fits the balancing mechanism, because it 
suggests that individuals will accept policy measures that are associated with very 
little or no personal costs irrespective of the strength of their personal norms, 
meaning that personal norms are not likely to predict acceptability of this type of 
policy measure (for another example see Guagnano et al, 1995). For policy measures 
that are associated with higher personal costs, on the other hand, the strength of 
individuals’ personal norms does affect acceptability, with individuals with relatively 
strong personal norms more likely to accept such policy measures than individuals 
with weaker personal norms. This result was replicated in all seven countries in the 
study. The results of this systematic study of the low-cost hypothesis therefore 
suggest a further specification of this hypothesis: Individuals are indeed more likely 
to act upon normative considerations when the cost of doing so is low rather than 
high, but not when these costs are very low. 
  Our overall analysis also supported our second hypothesis, showing that 
personal norms were less predictive of acceptability of a car tax increase for 
individuals who felt poorly able to reduce their car use, for whom this measure would 
be relatively highly costly, than for individuals who felt more able to reduce their car 
use, for whom this measure would be less costly. This finding again fits our balancing 
framework (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 
1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981) because it suggests that individuals are less likely to 
act in accordance with personal norms when the personal costs associated with doing 
so are relatively high than when these costs are lower. Although it should be noted 
that size of the expected interaction effect between personal norms and ability to 
reduce car use was relatively small, it was statistically significant (and even small 
effects can be theoretically meaningful).  
 However, looking at the countries separately, we found support for the 
hypothesized interaction between personal norms and ability to reduce car use in the 
Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, but not in the four other countries. 
These diverging patterns can have a number of reasons. First, one potential reason 
for the absence of a statistically significant interaction effect in France, Switzerland, 
Greece, and Hungary is the limited predictive power of the overall model in these 
countries. Acceptability of a car use tax increase was relatively poorly predicted by the 
psychological variables we included as predictors in this study, and the inclusion of 
an additional interaction effect meant a further partialization of the explained 
variance. Given this conservative test of our hypotheses, we believe the support for 
them should be weighed more heavily than the lack of support of them. Nevertheless, 
of course it is possible that there is a theoretical reason for the existence of a 'third 
variable' that differs between Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands and 
the other countries and that explains the different patterns in the data. However, we 
are not in the position to test such speculations even if a likely candidate was easy to 
identify. This is an important direction for future research to pursue.  
As far as we know, this study provides the first focused test of the predictive 
power of personal norms under different levels of personal costs in the field of policy 
acceptability (for tests in other fields, see Chapter 2 and 3) . As such, it is also the first 
study that has attempted to show that individuals balance the potential benefits of 
acting in line with their personal norms against the personal costs associated with 
doing so in this research field. The support that we found for our two hypotheses is in 
line with previous work on the relationship between personal norms and pro-
environmental behavior which suggested that personal norms are mainly predictive 
of low-cost behavior, but less predictive of very low cost and high-cost behavior (e.g. 
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Schwarz and Howard, 1981). Our aim was to provide a systematic test of the extent to 
which personal norms predict acceptability of policy measures that differ in the 
extent to which they are personally costly.  
  Specifically, we tested two hypotheses. First, we expected that personal norms 
should be less predictive of acceptability of policy measures that are associated very 
low costs to an individual than of policy measures that are more personally costly. 
Second, we hypothesized that personal norms should be less predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that are associated with very high costs than of policy 
measures that are less personally costly. To test our hypotheses, and to test the 
robustness of our findings, we analyzed data from a questionnaire study in seven 
European countries. We first conducted an overall analysis, in which we combined all 
participants from all seven countries, and next conducted a per-country analysis, 
which allowed us to test to what extent the overall effects could be replicated in 
different countries. 
 The overall as well as the per-country analyses supported our first hypothesis. 
We found that personal norms were significantly less predictive of acceptability of 
public transport improvements (a measure that is unlikely to be personally costly 
when implemented) than of acceptability of a car tax increase (a measure that is likely 
to induce personal costs). This finding fits the balancing mechanism, because it 
suggests that individuals will accept policy measures that are associated with very 
little or no personal costs irrespective of the strength of their personal norms, 
meaning that personal norms are not likely to predict acceptability of this type of 
policy measure (for another example see Guagnano et al, 1995). For policy measures 
that are associated with higher personal costs, on the other hand, the strength of 
individuals’ personal norms does affect acceptability, with individuals with relatively 
strong personal norms more likely to accept such policy measures than individuals 
with weaker personal norms. This result was replicated in all seven countries in the 
study. The results of this systematic study of the low-cost hypothesis therefore 
suggest a further specification of this hypothesis: Individuals are indeed more likely 
to act upon normative considerations when the cost of doing so is low rather than 
high, but not when these costs are very low. 
  Our overall analysis also supported our second hypothesis, showing that 
personal norms were less predictive of acceptability of a car tax increase for 
individuals who felt poorly able to reduce their car use, for whom this measure would 
be relatively highly costly, than for individuals who felt more able to reduce their car 
use, for whom this measure would be less costly. This finding again fits our balancing 
framework (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 
1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981) because it suggests that individuals are less likely to 
act in accordance with personal norms when the personal costs associated with doing 
so are relatively high than when these costs are lower. Although it should be noted 
that size of the expected interaction effect between personal norms and ability to 
reduce car use was relatively small, it was statistically significant (and even small 
effects can be theoretically meaningful).  
 However, looking at the countries separately, we found support for the 
hypothesized interaction between personal norms and ability to reduce car use in the 
Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, but not in the four other countries. 
These diverging patterns can have a number of reasons. First, one potential reason 
for the absence of a statistically significant interaction effect in France, Switzerland, 
Greece, and Hungary is the limited predictive power of the overall model in these 
countries. Acceptability of a car use tax increase was relatively poorly predicted by the 
psychological variables we included as predictors in this study, and the inclusion of 
an additional interaction effect meant a further partialization of the explained 
variance. Given this conservative test of our hypotheses, we believe the support for 
them should be weighed more heavily than the lack of support of them. Nevertheless, 
of course it is possible that there is a theoretical reason for the existence of a 'third 
variable' that differs between Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands and 
the other countries and that explains the different patterns in the data. However, we 
are not in the position to test such speculations even if a likely candidate was easy to 
identify. This is an important direction for future research to pursue.  
As far as we know, this study provides the first focused test of the predictive 
power of personal norms under different levels of personal costs in the field of policy 
acceptability (for tests in other fields, see Chapter 2 and 3) . As such, it is also the first 
study that has attempted to show that individuals balance the potential benefits of 
acting in line with their personal norms against the personal costs associated with 
doing so in this research field. The support that we found for our two hypotheses is in 
line with previous work on the relationship between personal norms and pro-
environmental behavior which suggested that personal norms are mainly predictive 
of low-cost behavior, but less predictive of very low cost and high-cost behavior (e.g. 
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Guagnano et al., 1995). These results also fit nicely with findings from Eriksson et al., 
(2006), who found a direct relationship between personal norms and acceptability of 
a push measure but not of a pull measure to reduce car use. Our study differed in two 
important ways from the one by Eriksson and colleagues, as we provided a direct test 
of the hypothesis rather than a test of a larger model and included policy measures in 
our research design that were perceived to be either very low cost, low-cost, or high 
cost to examine to what extent normative considerations predicted acceptability of 
these measures under these different levels of perceived costs. Nonetheless, the fact 
that both studies showed highly similar results provides additional support to the 
hypotheses tested here. 
Our findings may have important implications for policy makers. With regard 
to policy measures that are hardly or not at all personally costly, we find that these 
policies are generally perceived as acceptable, irrespective of the strength of 
individuals’ personal norms regarding the topic. This suggests that strengthening 
individuals’ personal norms (e.g. by stressing the collective benefits of car use 
reductions) is unlikely to lead to increases in acceptability of such policy measures. 
Yet, we note that acceptability of this type of measure is likely to be high regardless of 
policy makers’ efforts to increase it. Importantly, however, when personal costs 
associated with a policy measure are relatively high, strengthening individuals’ 
personal norms is also unlikely to lead to an increase in acceptability either, because 
the high personal costs mean that most individuals will view this measure to be 
unacceptable irrespective of the strength of their personal norms. However, if these 
personal costs are somewhat lower, for example when people feel able to reduce their 
car use, personal norms become more predictive of acceptability, and strengthening 
individuals’ personal norms may result in more positive acceptability judgments. In 
terms of the balancing framework put forward in the introduction: strengthening 
personal norms is less likely to lead to improved acceptability judgments if the 
personal costs associated with a policy measure are high, but when personal costs are 
lower, the policy measure may become more acceptable if policy makers strengthen 
individuals’ personal norms.  
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
We decided to include only those variables in our study that were directly relevant to 
our hypotheses. Doing so provided us with a clean and focused test of the extent to 
which personal norms predict acceptability of policy measures that differ in the 
extent to which they are personally costly. However, our decision to only include 
personal norms, ability to reduce car use, and their interaction term as antecedents of 
acceptability also means that our regression models explain relatively modest 
amounts of variance in acceptability, particularly in the analysis of the data from 
individual countries. Although this means that additional variance remains to be 
explained, the setup of the study allowed us to answer our main research question. 
Other studies have identified a variety of factors that potentially predict acceptability 
over and above the variables included in our study, such as beliefs regarding fairness 
and efficiency of policy measures, perceived freedom, and revenue allocation (see e.g. 
Eriksson et al., 2006; 2008; Gärling & Schuitema, 2007; Schuitema & Steg, 2008; 
Schuitema & Jacobsson, 2012). Future studies can test whether the inclusion of such 
predictor variables increases the amount of explained variance in acceptability over 
and beyond the levels we reported here. 
We further note the challenging nature of coming up with a clear and 
comprehensive operationalization of personal costs. As far as we know, no clear 
operationalization of the extent to which engaging in specific behavior is costly to an 
individual (in terms of money, time, comfort, status, and/or pleasure) is available in 
the literature. We dealt with this issue in two ways. First, we employed the widely 
used distinction between costly push and non-costly pull measures to distinguish 
between costly and non-costly policy measures (Loukopoulos, 2007; Schade & 
Schlag, 2003; Steg & Vlek 1997). Second, we used a very general measure of 
individuals’ ability to reduce their car use in the future as a means to assess the extent 
to which individuals were likely to be affected by implementation of the personally 
costly push measure. We feel that these measures provided an adequate way to assess 
the extent to which accepting a policy measure would be personally costly, but future 
studies may try other operationalizations of personal costs as well to see whether 
results are replicated when using other ways to measure this concept, and to gain 
more insight into the role of personal costs as predictors of specific behaviors. 
To collect the data for this study we used commercial opt-in panels. As 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this data collection method has benefits and possible 
drawbacks, with some studies reporting that data collected using such panels may 
differ from data collected using traditional means of data collection (AAPOR 
executive task force, 2010; Yeager, Krosnick, Chang, Javitz, Levendusky, Simpser, & 
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Guagnano et al., 1995). These results also fit nicely with findings from Eriksson et al., 
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important ways from the one by Eriksson and colleagues, as we provided a direct test 
of the hypothesis rather than a test of a larger model and included policy measures in 
our research design that were perceived to be either very low cost, low-cost, or high 
cost to examine to what extent normative considerations predicted acceptability of 
these measures under these different levels of perceived costs. Nonetheless, the fact 
that both studies showed highly similar results provides additional support to the 
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Our findings may have important implications for policy makers. With regard 
to policy measures that are hardly or not at all personally costly, we find that these 
policies are generally perceived as acceptable, irrespective of the strength of 
individuals’ personal norms regarding the topic. This suggests that strengthening 
individuals’ personal norms (e.g. by stressing the collective benefits of car use 
reductions) is unlikely to lead to increases in acceptability of such policy measures. 
Yet, we note that acceptability of this type of measure is likely to be high regardless of 
policy makers’ efforts to increase it. Importantly, however, when personal costs 
associated with a policy measure are relatively high, strengthening individuals’ 
personal norms is also unlikely to lead to an increase in acceptability either, because 
the high personal costs mean that most individuals will view this measure to be 
unacceptable irrespective of the strength of their personal norms. However, if these 
personal costs are somewhat lower, for example when people feel able to reduce their 
car use, personal norms become more predictive of acceptability, and strengthening 
individuals’ personal norms may result in more positive acceptability judgments. In 
terms of the balancing framework put forward in the introduction: strengthening 
personal norms is less likely to lead to improved acceptability judgments if the 
personal costs associated with a policy measure are high, but when personal costs are 
lower, the policy measure may become more acceptable if policy makers strengthen 
individuals’ personal norms.  
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
We decided to include only those variables in our study that were directly relevant to 
our hypotheses. Doing so provided us with a clean and focused test of the extent to 
which personal norms predict acceptability of policy measures that differ in the 
extent to which they are personally costly. However, our decision to only include 
personal norms, ability to reduce car use, and their interaction term as antecedents of 
acceptability also means that our regression models explain relatively modest 
amounts of variance in acceptability, particularly in the analysis of the data from 
individual countries. Although this means that additional variance remains to be 
explained, the setup of the study allowed us to answer our main research question. 
Other studies have identified a variety of factors that potentially predict acceptability 
over and above the variables included in our study, such as beliefs regarding fairness 
and efficiency of policy measures, perceived freedom, and revenue allocation (see e.g. 
Eriksson et al., 2006; 2008; Gärling & Schuitema, 2007; Schuitema & Steg, 2008; 
Schuitema & Jacobsson, 2012). Future studies can test whether the inclusion of such 
predictor variables increases the amount of explained variance in acceptability over 
and beyond the levels we reported here. 
We further note the challenging nature of coming up with a clear and 
comprehensive operationalization of personal costs. As far as we know, no clear 
operationalization of the extent to which engaging in specific behavior is costly to an 
individual (in terms of money, time, comfort, status, and/or pleasure) is available in 
the literature. We dealt with this issue in two ways. First, we employed the widely 
used distinction between costly push and non-costly pull measures to distinguish 
between costly and non-costly policy measures (Loukopoulos, 2007; Schade & 
Schlag, 2003; Steg & Vlek 1997). Second, we used a very general measure of 
individuals’ ability to reduce their car use in the future as a means to assess the extent 
to which individuals were likely to be affected by implementation of the personally 
costly push measure. We feel that these measures provided an adequate way to assess 
the extent to which accepting a policy measure would be personally costly, but future 
studies may try other operationalizations of personal costs as well to see whether 
results are replicated when using other ways to measure this concept, and to gain 
more insight into the role of personal costs as predictors of specific behaviors. 
To collect the data for this study we used commercial opt-in panels. As 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this data collection method has benefits and possible 
drawbacks, with some studies reporting that data collected using such panels may 
differ from data collected using traditional means of data collection (AAPOR 
executive task force, 2010; Yeager, Krosnick, Chang, Javitz, Levendusky, Simpser, & 
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Wang, 2011), while others show that these differences are small to non-existent 
(Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2011; Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2007). As in 
the previous chapters, we encountered some problems with the accuracy of the data, 
but we were able to resolve these issues by adopting strict guidelines on who to 
include in the data analysis (as described in note 8). The implementation of these 
guidelines led us to exclude 22% of all participants from the dataset. However, as in 
the previous chapters, no differences were found in the distribution of age and gender 
between included and excluded participants, indicating that the included participants 
form a correct representation of the total group of participants who completed the 
survey, at least for those dimensions. Furthermore, because our interest was 
primarily in relations between variables rather than the comparison of absolute 
numbers between groups, potential problems with non-representativeness of 
participants in the opt-in panel used here are less pressing than they would otherwise 
be (Schultz, Gouveia, Cameron, Tankha, Schmuck, & Franzek, 2005). 
Finally, we note that this study focused on car use reduction measures. Future 
research could also study the acceptability of policy measures in other domains. 
These policy measures can be relatively similar to the car use measures examined 
here, such as policy measures to change household energy use, were we would expect 
one would also find that personal norms are predictive of relatively low-cost policy 
measures, but less predictive of measures that are hardly or not at all costly or highly 
costly. Looking beyond the environmental domain, future research could also try to 
replicate these results in other domains to test whether the results found here 
generalize into these domains as well.     
In conclusion, this research revealed that personal norms with regard to car 
use reductions are more predictive of acceptability of policy measures that are 
somewhat personally costly than of acceptability of policy measures that are hardly or 
not at all personally costly or highly personally costly. We found that personal norms 
were significantly less predictive of acceptability of (very low cost) public transport 
improvements than of more costly car tax increases. Furthermore, we showed that 
personal norms were less predictive of acceptability of car tax increases among 
individuals who felt poorly able to reduce their car use (for whom implementation of 
such a policy measure would be highly costly) than among those who felt better able 
to do so (for whom implementation of such a measure would be less costly), 
indicating that personal norms were less predictive of acceptability of a policy 
measure that was perceived to be highly costly than of one that was perceived to be 
less costly. These results support the balancing framework, as they suggest that 
individuals balance personal norms and personal costs when deciding whether to 
support a policy measure or not, and that personal norms are particularly predictive 
of policy acceptability when personal costs are neither too high, nor too low. 
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personal norms were less predictive of acceptability of car tax increases among 
individuals who felt poorly able to reduce their car use (for whom implementation of 
such a policy measure would be highly costly) than among those who felt better able 
to do so (for whom implementation of such a measure would be less costly), 
indicating that personal norms were less predictive of acceptability of a policy 
measure that was perceived to be highly costly than of one that was perceived to be 
less costly. These results support the balancing framework, as they suggest that 
individuals balance personal norms and personal costs when deciding whether to 
support a policy measure or not, and that personal norms are particularly predictive 




Appendix 4.A: Results of regression models per policy measure per country (including R2). 
United Kingdom Push measure  Pull measure 
(N = 849) R2   T  R2   t 
Personal norm .08 .20 5.23**  .01 0.05 1.30 
Ability to reduce car use  .09 2.43*   0.02 .41 
Personal norm*Ability  .12 3.58**   0.04 1.06 
         
France (N = 881) Push measure  Pull measure 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Personal norm .08 .17 4.37**  .03 .15 3.08** 
Ability to reduce car use  .14 3.61**   -.02 -.47 
Personal norm*Ability  .00 .03   .03 .71 
         
The Netherlands  Push measure  Pull measure 
 (N = 758)  R2   T  R2   t 
Personal norm .18 .42 9.99**  .03 .14 3.06** 
Ability to reduce car use  -.01 -.034   .03 .55 
Personal norm*Ability  .07 -2.05*   .06 1.76 
         
Greece (N = 918) Push measure  Pull measure 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Personal norm .08 .21 5.52**  .02 .10 2.58* 
Ability to reduce car use  .09 2.25*   .04 .90 
Personal norm*Ability  .02 .52   .04 1.27 
         
Switzerland (N = 940) Push measure  Pull measure 
   R2   t  R2   t 
Personal norm .11 .29 7.74**  .02 .10 2.50* 
Ability to reduce car use  .07 1.75   .00 .11 
Personal norm*Ability  .05 1.50   .09 2.83** 
         
  
Norway (N = 843)  Push measure  Pull measure 
   R2   t  R2   t 
Personal norm .21 .37 9.66**  .02 .05 1.21 
Ability to reduce car use  .10 2.76**   .06 1.52 
Personal norm*Ability  .10 3.05**   .05 1.47 
         
Hungary (N = 856) Push measure  Pull measure 
   R2   t  R2   t 
Personal norm .09 .23 5.67**  .01 .02 .65 
Ability to reduce car use  .10 2.59*   .00 .03 
Personal norm*Ability  .03 1.04   .11 3.17** 
Note: * p< .05, ** p<.01 
 
Appendix 4.B: Correlation tables of relevant variables per measure per country. 
United Kingdom    
 PN AB A-Push 
Personal norm (PN)   1 0,50 0,25 
Ability to reduce car use (AB)  1 0,19 
Acceptability Push measure (A-Push)   1 
    
 PN AB A-Pull 
Personal norm (PN)   1 0,50 0,06 
Ability to reduce car use (AB)   0,04 
Acceptability Pull measure (A-Pull)   1 
    
France    
 PN AB A-Push 
Personal norm (PN)   1 0,57 0,26 
Ability to reduce car use (AB)  1 0,24 
Acceptability Push measure (A-Push)   1 
    
 PN AB A-Pull 
Personal norm (PN)   1 0,57 0,16 
Ability to reduce car use (AB)  1 0,08 
Acceptability Pull measure (A-Pull)   1 
 
The Netherlands 
   
 PN AB A-Push 
Personal norm (PN)   1 0,62 0,42 
Ability to reduce car use (AB)  1 0,25 
Acceptability Push measure (A-Push)   1 
    
 PN AB A-Pull 
Personal norm (PN)   1 0,62 0,17 
Ability to reduce car use (AB)  1 0,12 
Acceptability Pull measure (A-Pull)   1 
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Appendix 4.A: Results of regression models per policy measure per country (including R2). 
United Kingdom Push measure  Pull measure 
(N = 849) R2   T  R2   t 
Personal norm .08 .20 5.23**  .01 0.05 1.30 
Ability to reduce car use  .09 2.43*   0.02 .41 
Personal norm*Ability  .12 3.58**   0.04 1.06 
         
France (N = 881) Push measure  Pull measure 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Personal norm .08 .17 4.37**  .03 .15 3.08** 
Ability to reduce car use  .14 3.61**   -.02 -.47 
Personal norm*Ability  .00 .03   .03 .71 
         
The Netherlands  Push measure  Pull measure 
 (N = 758)  R2   T  R2   t 
Personal norm .18 .42 9.99**  .03 .14 3.06** 
Ability to reduce car use  -.01 -.034   .03 .55 
Personal norm*Ability  .07 -2.05*   .06 1.76 
         
Greece (N = 918) Push measure  Pull measure 
   R2   T  R2   t 
Personal norm .08 .21 5.52**  .02 .10 2.58* 
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Switzerland (N = 940) Push measure  Pull measure 
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Ability to reduce car use  .07 1.75   .00 .11 
Personal norm*Ability  .05 1.50   .09 2.83** 
         
  
Norway (N = 843)  Push measure  Pull measure 
   R2   t  R2   t 
Personal norm .21 .37 9.66**  .02 .05 1.21 
Ability to reduce car use  .10 2.76**   .06 1.52 
Personal norm*Ability  .10 3.05**   .05 1.47 
         
Hungary (N = 856) Push measure  Pull measure 
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Personal norm*Ability  .03 1.04   .11 3.17** 
Note: * p< .05, ** p<.01 
 
Appendix 4.B: Correlation tables of relevant variables per measure per country. 
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Personal norm (PN)   1 0,54 0,32 
Ability to reduce car use (AB)  1 0,21 
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A vast majority of people in Western countries appears to be concerned about 
environmental problems. For example, 96% of all participants in a Europe-wide 
attitude study indicated that they find protecting the environment either ‘very 
important’ or ‘fairly important’ (Special Eurobarometer 295, 2008), and 86% of 
survey respondents in the United States agreed with the statement ‘I am concerned 
about environmental issues’ (ecoAmerica, 2006). Similarly, most individuals endorse 
environmental values (De Groot & Steg, 2007, 2008). Does this imply that many 
individuals act upon their general environmental concerns and values and engage in 
pro-environmental behavior on a regular basis? Although many people engage in 
some types of pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., nine out of ten Europeans engage in 
recycling; Flash Eurobarometer 316, 2011 – p. 9), there are many examples of people 
not acting pro-environmentally as well. For example, 84.1% of all passenger 
kilometers in the European Union are traveled by car instead of by other, more 
environmentally-friendly modes of transport (Eurostat, 2012), and a very small 
percentage of all money spent on food is spent on organic products (European 
commission, 2010; Van Doorn & Verhoef, 2011). Apparently, at least in some 
instances, individuals fail to translate their pro-environmental beliefs into actual 
behavior. 
Does this mean that general pro-environmental beliefs are not important to 
consider for policy makers trying to stimulate actual pro-environmental behavior? 
We do not believe so. In this paper, we propose that chronic pro-environmental 
considerations, such as biospheric values (De Groot & Steg 2007; 2008) can influence 
specific environmental behavior, but that situational activation may be required for 
them to do so. By situational activation, we mean using a situational cue to focus 
one’s attention on a particular concept or goal. The general idea is that one's values 
are not always immediately accessible in every situation, and that, for this reason, 
individuals may fail to translate these values into behavior. For instance, one can do 
one's groceries in the supermarket without thinking too much about the "green"-ness 
of the products one buys. Yet, when the supermarket clearly displays which articles 
are “green”, this may activate one’s values and thus allow them to influence one’s 
behavior. In line with this idea, some research shows that situational activation of 
values themselves has increased value-congruent behavior (Verplanken & Holland, 
2002).  
In the current study, we examine a different way to situationally increase 
value-congruent behavior in the environmental domain, namely by activating 
situational norms. The central difference between activating values and activating 
norms is that value activation focuses attention on the self-importance of a specific 
behavioral domain (‘the environment’), while situational norm activation focuses 
attention on norms toward normative action within a specific domain (‘you ought to 
act environmentally friendly’). These activated norms are expected to promote value-
congruent pro-environmental behavior by providing a link between general 
biospheric values and specific pro-environmental behavior. Situational norm 
activation has the added advantage that not only activated domain-specific 
environmental norms (e.g. recycle used paper, do not litter), but also more general 
societal norms that focus individuals’ attention on acting normatively across different 
behavioral domains (e.g. be honest, do the right thing) may increase motivation to act 
pro-environmentally among individuals who endorse biospheric values. To this end, 
we test experimentally whether situational norm activation increases pro-
environmental motivation among individuals with moderate to strong biospheric 
values, and whether the activated norms need to be part of the specific environmental 




In this study, we use individuals’ biospheric values as our operationalization of 
general environmental beliefs. Schwartz (1992) defined a value as “a desirable 
transsituational goal varying in importance, which serves as a guiding principle in 
the life of a person or other social entity” (p. 21; emphasis added). Biospheric values 
thus reflect how important environmental issues are as a guiding principle in one’s 
life and whether enhancing environmental quality is an important goal to an 
individual (De Groot & Steg, 2008). Biospheric values appear to be related to a range 
of pro-environmental beliefs, norms, and actions (see Steg & De Groot, 2012, for a 
review). Recent research has shown that values, and particularly biospheric values, 
are more predictive of pro-environmental beliefs, norms, and action than other 
measures of general environmental beliefs, such as the New Ecological Paradigm 
(Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000), the 
environmental concern scale (Schultz, 2000; 2001), and the Motivation Towards the 
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percentage of all money spent on food is spent on organic products (European 
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instances, individuals fail to translate their pro-environmental beliefs into actual 
behavior. 
Does this mean that general pro-environmental beliefs are not important to 
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We do not believe so. In this paper, we propose that chronic pro-environmental 
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individuals may fail to translate these values into behavior. For instance, one can do 
one's groceries in the supermarket without thinking too much about the "green"-ness 
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are “green”, this may activate one’s values and thus allow them to influence one’s 
behavior. In line with this idea, some research shows that situational activation of 
values themselves has increased value-congruent behavior (Verplanken & Holland, 
2002).  
In the current study, we examine a different way to situationally increase 
value-congruent behavior in the environmental domain, namely by activating 
situational norms. The central difference between activating values and activating 
norms is that value activation focuses attention on the self-importance of a specific 
behavioral domain (‘the environment’), while situational norm activation focuses 
attention on norms toward normative action within a specific domain (‘you ought to 
act environmentally friendly’). These activated norms are expected to promote value-
congruent pro-environmental behavior by providing a link between general 
biospheric values and specific pro-environmental behavior. Situational norm 
activation has the added advantage that not only activated domain-specific 
environmental norms (e.g. recycle used paper, do not litter), but also more general 
societal norms that focus individuals’ attention on acting normatively across different 
behavioral domains (e.g. be honest, do the right thing) may increase motivation to act 
pro-environmentally among individuals who endorse biospheric values. To this end, 
we test experimentally whether situational norm activation increases pro-
environmental motivation among individuals with moderate to strong biospheric 
values, and whether the activated norms need to be part of the specific environmental 




In this study, we use individuals’ biospheric values as our operationalization of 
general environmental beliefs. Schwartz (1992) defined a value as “a desirable 
transsituational goal varying in importance, which serves as a guiding principle in 
the life of a person or other social entity” (p. 21; emphasis added). Biospheric values 
thus reflect how important environmental issues are as a guiding principle in one’s 
life and whether enhancing environmental quality is an important goal to an 
individual (De Groot & Steg, 2008). Biospheric values appear to be related to a range 
of pro-environmental beliefs, norms, and actions (see Steg & De Groot, 2012, for a 
review). Recent research has shown that values, and particularly biospheric values, 
are more predictive of pro-environmental beliefs, norms, and action than other 
measures of general environmental beliefs, such as the New Ecological Paradigm 
(Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000), the 
environmental concern scale (Schultz, 2000; 2001), and the Motivation Towards the 
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Environment Scale (Green-Demers, Pelletier, & Ménard, 1997; Pelletier, Tuson, 
Green-Demers, Noels, & Beaton, 1998) (Steg, De Groot, Dreijerink, Abrahamse, & 
Siero, 2011; De Groot & Steg, 2010). 
 It seems almost too obvious to predict that individuals with strong biospheric 
values should be more strongly motivated to act pro-environmentally than 
individuals with weak biospheric values. Indeed, research shows that biospheric 
values are predictive of the strength of beliefs and norms regarding pro-
environmental behaviors (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern, 2000). For example, 
individuals with strong biospheric values are more likely to feel morally obliged to act 
pro-environmentally (Nordlund & Garvill, 2002), to feel morally obliged to reduce 
their car use (De Groot, Steg, Keizer, Farsang, & Watt, 2012; Nordlund & Garvill 
2003), and to be aware of negative consequences caused by private car use (Eriksson, 
Nordlund, & Garvill, 2006) than individuals with weaker biospheric values. However, 
research also shows that biospheric values are not consistently positively related to 
actual environmental behavior and pro-environmental intentions. Although some 
studies showed that values, and particularly biospheric values, predict environmental 
actions (e.g. Nilsson, Von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004), other research showed that 
biospheric values are not very predictive of environmental intentions and behaviors. 
For example, biospheric values have been shown to be a poor predictor of car use 
(Steg, Perlavicuite, Van der Werff, & Lurvink, 2014) and of intention to reduce car use 
(De Groot, Steg, & Dicke, 2008). Overall, this body of research thus shows mixed 
results with regard to the role of biospheric values as predictors of pro-environmental 
behaviors and intentions. That is, a direct positive link between values and behavior 
is not as consistently found as one might have expected.  
 One reason for this inconsistent translation of biospheric values into pro-
environmental action is that biospheric values are not always central to individuals’ 
thinking within a specific situation in which they can act pro-environmentally. 
Indeed, research shows that when biospheric values are situationally activated (that 
is, when situational cues focus individuals’ attention on environmental issues), 
individuals who endorse biospheric values were more likely to translate them into 
actual behavior (Maio, 2010; Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002). This is an interesting finding with potentially important practical 
implications. For instance, if one could activate individuals’ biospheric values in 
situations in which individuals can act upon these values, individuals who endorse 
these values may be more strongly motivated to engage in pro-environmental 
behavior. However, it is unclear whether such an increase in pro-environmental 
motivation requires the situational activation of these specific biospheric values, or 
whether situationally activating norms in general may yield a similar effect.  
 
Situational norm activation 
One explanation for the gap between biospheric values and pro-environmental 
behavior is that biospheric values will be particularly predictive of behavior if 
individuals consider these values in situations in which they are able to translate 
them into behavior. Indeed, Verplanken and Holland (2002) showed that the 
activation of biospheric values may make biospheric values more predictive of 
behavior. In a series of studies, they showed that activating the concept ‘environment’ 
led to an increase in value-congruent behavior among individuals who indicated that 
biospheric values were a central part of who they are, but not among those who 
indicated that biospheric values were not a central part of who they are. They further 
showed that value activation was a necessary condition for value-congruent behavior: 
Individuals with strong biospheric values only acted upon these values if they were 
activated situationally (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Thus, these results suggest that 
values related to the environment need to be activated by specific environmental cues 
in order to facilitate their translation into motivation, and that these activation effects 
are restricted to individuals who endorse the relevant values. 
Interestingly, the literature on the relationship between biospheric values and 
pro-environmental behavior suggests another potential route to situationally 
promote value-congruent motivation. The norm-activation model (NAM; Schwartz, 
1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981), and the related value-belief-norm or VBN theory 
(Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999) state that although values 
may not necessarily be strongly predictive of behavior, they are important and often 
necessary antecedents of behavior-specific beliefs and norms, which in turn predict 
motivation and behavior. Values are by definition general and transcend situations 
(Schwartz, 1992). In the NAM and VBN theory, norms are conceptualized on a more 
specific level, providing the step from a general value (environmental quality is 
important) to a behavioral rule (I ought to engage in a specific pro-environmental 
act), which motivates individuals to engage in in value-congruent behavior. In other 
words, abstract, general values influence motivation and behavior mainly indirectly 
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through more specific norms (e.g. De Groot et al., 2008; Jakovcevic & Steg, 2013; 
Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; 2003; Steg , Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005; Stern et al., 
1999).  
More specifically, this means that for biospheric values to be predictive of 
behavior, individuals need to translate them into norms, which in turn affect their 
motivation to act pro-environmentally. If the translation of general values into norms 
can be facilitated situationally, the likelihood of individuals being motivated to 
engage in value-congruent behavior should increase, meaning that individuals with 
moderate to strong biospheric values should be more strongly motivated to engage in 
pro-environmental behavior. We propose that such an increase in pro-environmental 
motivation among individuals who endorse biospheric values can be achieved by 
situationally activating norms. We apply this idea to the environmental domain by 
testing whether situationally activating specific environmental norms influences 
those individuals’ motivation in the environmental domain (which is our first 
experimental condition in the study to come). 
Situational norm activation may be effective across a broad range of domains. 
This means that one does not necessarily have to activate specific norms about the 
environment in order to strengthen pro-environmental motivation. For instance, 
more general societal norms that suggest ‘doing the right thing’, such as ‘be honest’ 
may also encourage pro-environmental motivation, because the activation of such 
general societal norms may result in a motivation to act normatively that transcends 
specific behavioral domains. This reasoning is in line with goal-framing theory 
(Lindenberg & Steg, 2007), which posits that situational cues can activate a general 
normative goal to do the right thing, which affects individuals’ information 
processing and decision making across behavioral domains. We apply this idea to the 
environmental domain by testing whether situationally activating general societal 
norms influences those individuals’ motivation in the environmental domain (which 
is our second experimental condition in the study to come). 
In sum, we examine whether situationally activating norms leads to an 
increase in pro-environmental motivation among individuals who endorse biospheric 
values. We expect this to be the case because activated norms provide a link between 
general biospheric values and specific pro-environmental behavior. Key to the 
present study is that we examine whether environmental and societal norm 
activation yield the same effects vis-a-vis a control condition. We expect that 
situational norm activation (whether focused specifically on the environment or more 
broadly on society) strengthens pro-environmental motivations for individuals with 




Participants and design 
In total, 53 psychology1 students participated in the experimental study in return for 
course credits. Participants’ age was between 17 and 50 years old (M = 19.9; SD = 
4.49), and 43 participants (81%) were female. The study had a single factor 
(normative condition: environment / societal / control) between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions.   
Participants in the environmental norm activation condition (N = 19) 
read the following text on the computer screen: ‘To ensure a sustainable future of the 
world, it is important that individuals abide by certain norms regarding the 
environment. These norms can be rather abstract, such as ‘prevent pollution’, but 
also rather specific, such as ‘do not waste printing paper’. We are interested to find 
out which environmental norms you think are important. Please list the first five 
norms that spring to mind’. Below this text, five text boxes were provided to allow 
participants to write down their environmental norms. Examples of norms 
mentioned by participants are ‘do not waste energy’, ‘avoid traveling by car’, and 
‘recycle paper and glass’.  
 Participants in the societal norm activation condition (N = 17) received 
the following instruction: To be able to live together in society, it is important that 
people stick to certain norms. These norms can be rather abstract, such as ‘be honest’, 
but also rather specific, such as ‘do not talk loudly in a library’. We are interested to 
find out which societal norms you think are important. Please list the first five norms 
that spring to mind’. Below this text, five text boxes were provided to allow 
participants to write down their societal norms. Examples of norms mentioned by 
participants are ‘be trustworthy’, ‘try not to act on prejudices’, and ‘donate to charity’. 
 Participants in the control condition were not asked to list any norms; they 
skipped this part of the questionnaire. Before analyzing the data, we checked the 
                                                          
1 Another 24 participants signed up but they did not complete any questions. These 
participants could not be included in the data analyses. 
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behavior, individuals need to translate them into norms, which in turn affect their 
motivation to act pro-environmentally. If the translation of general values into norms 
can be facilitated situationally, the likelihood of individuals being motivated to 
engage in value-congruent behavior should increase, meaning that individuals with 
moderate to strong biospheric values should be more strongly motivated to engage in 
pro-environmental behavior. We propose that such an increase in pro-environmental 
motivation among individuals who endorse biospheric values can be achieved by 
situationally activating norms. We apply this idea to the environmental domain by 
testing whether situationally activating specific environmental norms influences 
those individuals’ motivation in the environmental domain (which is our first 
experimental condition in the study to come). 
Situational norm activation may be effective across a broad range of domains. 
This means that one does not necessarily have to activate specific norms about the 
environment in order to strengthen pro-environmental motivation. For instance, 
more general societal norms that suggest ‘doing the right thing’, such as ‘be honest’ 
may also encourage pro-environmental motivation, because the activation of such 
general societal norms may result in a motivation to act normatively that transcends 
specific behavioral domains. This reasoning is in line with goal-framing theory 
(Lindenberg & Steg, 2007), which posits that situational cues can activate a general 
normative goal to do the right thing, which affects individuals’ information 
processing and decision making across behavioral domains. We apply this idea to the 
environmental domain by testing whether situationally activating general societal 
norms influences those individuals’ motivation in the environmental domain (which 
is our second experimental condition in the study to come). 
In sum, we examine whether situationally activating norms leads to an 
increase in pro-environmental motivation among individuals who endorse biospheric 
values. We expect this to be the case because activated norms provide a link between 
general biospheric values and specific pro-environmental behavior. Key to the 
present study is that we examine whether environmental and societal norm 
activation yield the same effects vis-a-vis a control condition. We expect that 
situational norm activation (whether focused specifically on the environment or more 
broadly on society) strengthens pro-environmental motivations for individuals with 




Participants and design 
In total, 53 psychology1 students participated in the experimental study in return for 
course credits. Participants’ age was between 17 and 50 years old (M = 19.9; SD = 
4.49), and 43 participants (81%) were female. The study had a single factor 
(normative condition: environment / societal / control) between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions.   
Participants in the environmental norm activation condition (N = 19) 
read the following text on the computer screen: ‘To ensure a sustainable future of the 
world, it is important that individuals abide by certain norms regarding the 
environment. These norms can be rather abstract, such as ‘prevent pollution’, but 
also rather specific, such as ‘do not waste printing paper’. We are interested to find 
out which environmental norms you think are important. Please list the first five 
norms that spring to mind’. Below this text, five text boxes were provided to allow 
participants to write down their environmental norms. Examples of norms 
mentioned by participants are ‘do not waste energy’, ‘avoid traveling by car’, and 
‘recycle paper and glass’.  
 Participants in the societal norm activation condition (N = 17) received 
the following instruction: To be able to live together in society, it is important that 
people stick to certain norms. These norms can be rather abstract, such as ‘be honest’, 
but also rather specific, such as ‘do not talk loudly in a library’. We are interested to 
find out which societal norms you think are important. Please list the first five norms 
that spring to mind’. Below this text, five text boxes were provided to allow 
participants to write down their societal norms. Examples of norms mentioned by 
participants are ‘be trustworthy’, ‘try not to act on prejudices’, and ‘donate to charity’. 
 Participants in the control condition were not asked to list any norms; they 
skipped this part of the questionnaire. Before analyzing the data, we checked the 
                                                          
1 Another 24 participants signed up but they did not complete any questions. These 
participants could not be included in the data analyses. 
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content of these boxes to see if participants had followed the instructions. All 
participants complied with the instructions.  
 
Procedure  
Participants completed an on-line version the value scale at least one week prior to 
participating in the main experiment; completion of this scale was a requirement for 
participation in the experiment. The main experiment consisted of four parts. First, 
participants completed a set of socio-demographic questions. The second task 
contained the norm activation manipulation. Third, participants received information 
about a non-existing environmental NGO named VIER9. The first page of information 
presented VIER as a collaboration of four existing Dutch NGO’s (names and logos 
were provided to increase credibility), which aimed to reduce the negative 
environmental impact of factory farming (the process of raising livestock in 
confinement at high stocking density, where a farm operates as a factory). On the 
second page, we printed a piece of text and indicated that VIER intended to use this 
text in future public campaigns. This ten-line long text listed several negative 
consequences of factory farming and ended with a request to participants to stop 
buying meat from factory farming (see Appendix 5.A for the full text). To test whether 
participants had read the text, they were asked on the next page to list the main topic 
of the text as well as one of the reasons provided by VIER to stop factory farming. 
Fourth, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they intended to support 
VIER in various ways. This was the dependent variable of this study. Other questions 
regarding factory farming and peoples’ perceptions of VIER followed, but these will 




At the end of the questionnaire, participants in the environmental and societal norm 
activation conditions answered the following question: ‘At the beginning of this 
study, you were asked to list five examples of something. These were examples of 
what exactly?’ We checked whether participants indicated that they had to list 
examples of environmental or societal norms. Although wording differed, all 
                                                          
9 VIER was an abbreviation of ‘Vee-industrie: Ecologische ramp’ (‘Factory farming: 
Ecological disaster’). It is also the Dutch word for the number 4, fitting with the four 
organizations that supposedly collaborated to form VIER.  
participants stated that they had listed examples of environmental or societal 
norms/rules, indicating that they had understood and remembered the task.  
 
Biospheric values 
Biospheric values were assessed via an adapted version of Schwartz’ value scale 
(1992, 1994), developed by Steg and colleagues (Steg, Perlaviciute, et al., 2014). The 
value instrument consisted of 16 values and aimed to measure biospheric, altruistic, 
egoistic, and hedonic values. Following Schwartz (1992, 1994), participants rated the 
importance of each value as ‘a guiding principle in their lives’ on a nine-point scale, 
ranging from -1 (opposed to the values), 0 (not at all important), to 7 (of supreme 
importance). We were interested in the four biospheric value items: preventing 
pollution, respecting the earth, unity with nature, and protecting the environment. 
Mean scores across these four items indicated that on average, individuals found 
biospheric values important (M = 4.02, SD = 1.51). We decided to use the importance 
of biospheric values relative to all values as the central variable in our analyses, 
because we were interested in the importance of environmental values relative to the 
importance of other values in individuals’ lives. To calculate this relative importance 
of biospheric values, we subtracted the mean score across all 16 value items from the 
score on each biospheric value item (as suggested by Hicks, 1970). We then combined 
these corrected scores on the biospheric values items to create a biospheric values 
scale that indicates the extent to which participants endorse biospheric values relative 
to other values (M = -.04, SD = 1.05, α = .86). 
 
Control questions 
After reading the information about VIER, participants were asked to answer the 
following two questions: ‘What is, in one sentence, the main message of the text you 
just read’ and ‘List one the reasons that was provided to support this message’. All 
participants provided answers that indicated that they had read and understood the 
text provided by VIER. 
 
Dependent variable 
Participants indicated to what extent they intended to engage in eight behaviors 
related to the campaign by VIER and factory farming (see Table 5.1), on a scale 
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content of these boxes to see if participants had followed the instructions. All 
participants complied with the instructions.  
 
Procedure  
Participants completed an on-line version the value scale at least one week prior to 
participating in the main experiment; completion of this scale was a requirement for 
participation in the experiment. The main experiment consisted of four parts. First, 
participants completed a set of socio-demographic questions. The second task 
contained the norm activation manipulation. Third, participants received information 
about a non-existing environmental NGO named VIER9. The first page of information 
presented VIER as a collaboration of four existing Dutch NGO’s (names and logos 
were provided to increase credibility), which aimed to reduce the negative 
environmental impact of factory farming (the process of raising livestock in 
confinement at high stocking density, where a farm operates as a factory). On the 
second page, we printed a piece of text and indicated that VIER intended to use this 
text in future public campaigns. This ten-line long text listed several negative 
consequences of factory farming and ended with a request to participants to stop 
buying meat from factory farming (see Appendix 5.A for the full text). To test whether 
participants had read the text, they were asked on the next page to list the main topic 
of the text as well as one of the reasons provided by VIER to stop factory farming. 
Fourth, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they intended to support 
VIER in various ways. This was the dependent variable of this study. Other questions 
regarding factory farming and peoples’ perceptions of VIER followed, but these will 




At the end of the questionnaire, participants in the environmental and societal norm 
activation conditions answered the following question: ‘At the beginning of this 
study, you were asked to list five examples of something. These were examples of 
what exactly?’ We checked whether participants indicated that they had to list 
examples of environmental or societal norms. Although wording differed, all 
                                                          
9 VIER was an abbreviation of ‘Vee-industrie: Ecologische ramp’ (‘Factory farming: 
Ecological disaster’). It is also the Dutch word for the number 4, fitting with the four 
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participants stated that they had listed examples of environmental or societal 
norms/rules, indicating that they had understood and remembered the task.  
 
Biospheric values 
Biospheric values were assessed via an adapted version of Schwartz’ value scale 
(1992, 1994), developed by Steg and colleagues (Steg, Perlaviciute, et al., 2014). The 
value instrument consisted of 16 values and aimed to measure biospheric, altruistic, 
egoistic, and hedonic values. Following Schwartz (1992, 1994), participants rated the 
importance of each value as ‘a guiding principle in their lives’ on a nine-point scale, 
ranging from -1 (opposed to the values), 0 (not at all important), to 7 (of supreme 
importance). We were interested in the four biospheric value items: preventing 
pollution, respecting the earth, unity with nature, and protecting the environment. 
Mean scores across these four items indicated that on average, individuals found 
biospheric values important (M = 4.02, SD = 1.51). We decided to use the importance 
of biospheric values relative to all values as the central variable in our analyses, 
because we were interested in the importance of environmental values relative to the 
importance of other values in individuals’ lives. To calculate this relative importance 
of biospheric values, we subtracted the mean score across all 16 value items from the 
score on each biospheric value item (as suggested by Hicks, 1970). We then combined 
these corrected scores on the biospheric values items to create a biospheric values 
scale that indicates the extent to which participants endorse biospheric values relative 
to other values (M = -.04, SD = 1.05, α = .86). 
 
Control questions 
After reading the information about VIER, participants were asked to answer the 
following two questions: ‘What is, in one sentence, the main message of the text you 
just read’ and ‘List one the reasons that was provided to support this message’. All 
participants provided answers that indicated that they had read and understood the 
text provided by VIER. 
 
Dependent variable 
Participants indicated to what extent they intended to engage in eight behaviors 
related to the campaign by VIER and factory farming (see Table 5.1), on a scale 
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ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very likely). Items were presented in random 
order. Mean scores on these items were computed (M = 3.6, SD = 1.25, α = .86). 
  
Table 5.1: Mean, and standard deviations for intention measures 
Intention M (SD) 
Sign a petition against factory farming 5.3 (1.7) 
Not eat meat one additional day each week a 4.8 (2.0) 
Replace factory-farmed meat by organic meat at least once a 
week a 
4.6 (1.9) 
Eat meat no more than twice a week a 3.4 (2.0) 
Eat only organic meat a 3.3 (1.9) 
Become a member of an NGO that fights factory farming 2.9 (1.7) 
Collect signatures against factory farming door-to-door 2.4 (1.6) 
Participate in demonstrations against the sale of factory-farmed 
meat at supermarkets 
2.4 (1.6) 
a An additional option ‘I am a vegetarian’ was provided for these items, as strict vegetarians 
who do not eat meat are not able to meaningfully answer questions about reducing their 
meat intake. Five participants ticked this option – they were not included in the data 
analysis for these four items. 
 
Analysis strategy 
We ran a regression model containing norm activation condition, biospheric values, 
and their interaction effect as predictors of intention to support VIER to test our 
hypotheses. To test whether intention to support VIER in the norm activation 
conditions differed from the control condition, we coded both norm activation 
conditions ‘1’ and the control condition ‘-1’. We expected to find a significant 
(positive) main effect of norm activation condition, indicating that intention to 
support VIER is stronger in the norm activation conditions than in the control 
condition. We expected this main effect to be qualified by a statistically significant 
condition * biospheric values interaction effect, indicating that norm activation leads 
to an increased intention to support VIER among participants with moderate to 






We first tested whether individuals in both the environmental and societal norm 
activation conditions reported a stronger intention to support VIER relative to 
participants in the control condition. Table 5.2 showed that this is indeed the case: 
individuals in the norm activation conditions (M = 3.80, SD = 1.30) were more likely 
to intent to support VIER than participants in the control condition (M = 2.92, SD = 
.88) (f(1,46) = 5,29, p = .02;  = .10). This result shows that participants in the 
norm-activation conditions showed stronger intentions to support VIER than 
participants in the control condition, supporting our first hypothesis.  
 The second hypothesis stated that the activation manipulation would lead to 
more support for VIER among individuals with moderate to strong biospheric values, 
but not among those with weak biospheric values. We found a marginally significant 
biospheric values * activation condition interaction effect (β = .27, t(44) = 1.68, p = 
.10). To test whether norm activation was indeed more effective among individuals 
with moderate to strong biospheric values than among those with weak biospheric 
values, we ran simple slopes analyses to test the strength of the relationship between 
the activation manipulation and intention to support VIER for different levels of 
biospheric values (see Table 5.3). These analyses showed that for individuals with 
weak biospheric values, the activation manipulation was not significantly predictive 
of intention to support VIER (β = .11, t(44) = .58, p = .56), while the activation 
manipulation resulted in a stronger intention to support VIER for those with 
moderate (β = .34, t(44) = 2.60, p = .01), and strong biospheric values (β = .58, t(44) 
= 2.92, p < .01). The outcome of these analyses is in line with our expectation that the 
activation manipulations would lead to a stronger intention to support VIER among 
individuals with moderate and strong biospheric values, but would have no 
significant effect on intentions of individuals with weak biospheric values. 
 
  
5Increasing the weight of normative considerations
99
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(positive) main effect of norm activation condition, indicating that intention to 
support VIER is stronger in the norm activation conditions than in the control 
condition. We expected this main effect to be qualified by a statistically significant 
condition * biospheric values interaction effect, indicating that norm activation leads 
to an increased intention to support VIER among participants with moderate to 
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individuals in the norm activation conditions (M = 3.80, SD = 1.30) were more likely 
to intent to support VIER than participants in the control condition (M = 2.92, SD = 
.88) (f(1,46) = 5,29, p = .02;  = .10). This result shows that participants in the 
norm-activation conditions showed stronger intentions to support VIER than 
participants in the control condition, supporting our first hypothesis.  
 The second hypothesis stated that the activation manipulation would lead to 
more support for VIER among individuals with moderate to strong biospheric values, 
but not among those with weak biospheric values. We found a marginally significant 
biospheric values * activation condition interaction effect (β = .27, t(44) = 1.68, p = 
.10). To test whether norm activation was indeed more effective among individuals 
with moderate to strong biospheric values than among those with weak biospheric 
values, we ran simple slopes analyses to test the strength of the relationship between 
the activation manipulation and intention to support VIER for different levels of 
biospheric values (see Table 5.3). These analyses showed that for individuals with 
weak biospheric values, the activation manipulation was not significantly predictive 
of intention to support VIER (β = .11, t(44) = .58, p = .56), while the activation 
manipulation resulted in a stronger intention to support VIER for those with 
moderate (β = .34, t(44) = 2.60, p = .01), and strong biospheric values (β = .58, t(44) 
= 2.92, p < .01). The outcome of these analyses is in line with our expectation that the 
activation manipulations would lead to a stronger intention to support VIER among 
individuals with moderate and strong biospheric values, but would have no 





Table 5.2: Linear regression model with normative condition, biospheric values, and 
condition*biospheric values as predictors and intention to support VIER as dependent 
variable. 
Variable Beta T p-value R2 
Norm activation 
condition# 
.34 2.60 .01 .24 
Biospheric values .15 .93 .36  
Condition*Biospheric 
values 
.27 1.68 .10  
#Coded ‘-1’ for control condition; ‘1’ for environmental and societal norm conditions. 
 
Table 5.3: Simple slopes analysis on the effect of norm activation condition on intention to 
support VIER for different levels of biospheric value strength. 
Normative condition 
 intention 
Beta T p-value 
Biospheric weak .11 .58 .56 
Biospheric moderate .34 2.56 .01 
Biospheric strong .58 2.92 <.01 
Note: Biospheric weak represents the standardized scores of biospherc values -1 SD; 
Biospheric moderate represents the standardized scores of biospheric values; Biospheric 
strong represents the standardized scores of biospherc values +1 SD. 
 
These results can be contrasted to the null effects of a test of an alternative hypothesis 
that predicts situational norm activation to be effective only when the situationally 
activated norm is specific to the environmental domain. To test this potential 
alternative hypothesis, we ran a second regression model in which we coded the 
environmental norm condition ‘1’ and the societal norm and control conditions  
‘-1’. Table 5.4 shows that individuals in the environmental norm condition were no 
more likely to intent to support VIER than participants in the other conditions (β = 
.12, t(44) = .77, p = .44). Moreover, the norm activation condition * biospheric values 
interaction term was not statistically significantly predictive of intention to support 
VIER (β = -.08, t(44) = -.47, p = .64), indicating that the effect of the environmental 
norm activation condition did not differ for participants with different levels of 
biospheric values. Thus, the alternative hypothesis that situational norm activation is 
only effective when the situationally activated norm is specific to the environmental 
domain is not supported by the results. 
 
Table 5.4: Linear regression model with normative condition, biospheric values, and 
condition * biospheric values as predictors and intention to support VIER as dependent 
variable. 
Variable Beta T p-value R2 
Norm activation 
condition# 
.12 .77 .44 .11 
Biospheric values .27 1.60 .12  
Condition*Biospheric 
values 
-.08 -.47 .64  




This study aimed to test whether situational norm activation (whether focused 
specifically on the environment or more broadly on society) strengthens pro-
environmental motivation for individuals with moderate to strong biospheric values. 
In line with predictions, our results revealed that situational norm activation led to 
stronger intentions to support an environmental NGO among individuals with 
moderate to strong biospheric values. At the same time, situational norm activation 
had no effect on intention to support the NGO for individuals with weaker biospheric 
values. This result indicates that situational norm activation can lead to increased 
pro-environmental motivation, but only among those who already endorse biospheric 
values to some extent. Thus, for situational norm activation to lead to increased 
motivation in a particular behavioral domain, it appears that individuals already need 
to endorse corresponding values to some extent. At the same time, however, this 
finding also shows that very strong biospheric values are not required for norm 
activation to have an effect: the situational norm activation effect also occurred for 
those with moderately strong biospheric values. 
 Moving beyond previous research, our study shows that the activation of 
domain-specific environmental norms and more general societal norms yielded 
similar effects. That is, both types of situational norm activation led to a stronger 
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activated norm is specific to the environmental domain. To test this potential 
alternative hypothesis, we ran a second regression model in which we coded the 
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‘-1’. Table 5.4 shows that individuals in the environmental norm condition were no 
more likely to intent to support VIER than participants in the other conditions (β = 
.12, t(44) = .77, p = .44). Moreover, the norm activation condition * biospheric values 
interaction term was not statistically significantly predictive of intention to support 
VIER (β = -.08, t(44) = -.47, p = .64), indicating that the effect of the environmental 
norm activation condition did not differ for participants with different levels of 
biospheric values. Thus, the alternative hypothesis that situational norm activation is 
only effective when the situationally activated norm is specific to the environmental 
domain is not supported by the results. 
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This study aimed to test whether situational norm activation (whether focused 
specifically on the environment or more broadly on society) strengthens pro-
environmental motivation for individuals with moderate to strong biospheric values. 
In line with predictions, our results revealed that situational norm activation led to 
stronger intentions to support an environmental NGO among individuals with 
moderate to strong biospheric values. At the same time, situational norm activation 
had no effect on intention to support the NGO for individuals with weaker biospheric 
values. This result indicates that situational norm activation can lead to increased 
pro-environmental motivation, but only among those who already endorse biospheric 
values to some extent. Thus, for situational norm activation to lead to increased 
motivation in a particular behavioral domain, it appears that individuals already need 
to endorse corresponding values to some extent. At the same time, however, this 
finding also shows that very strong biospheric values are not required for norm 
activation to have an effect: the situational norm activation effect also occurred for 
those with moderately strong biospheric values. 
 Moving beyond previous research, our study shows that the activation of 
domain-specific environmental norms and more general societal norms yielded 
similar effects. That is, both types of situational norm activation led to a stronger 
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intention to support VIER relative to a control group. Moreover, in either norm 
activation condition the effect was driven by individuals with moderate to strong 
biospheric values. These findings suggest that it is the situational norm activation 
itself, rather than the specific environmental content of the activated norms, that led 
individuals to report a stronger intention to support VIER. Importantly, this implies 
that activating domain-specific environmental norms, but also activating general 
societal norms, can lead to increased pro-environmental motivation. Below, we first 
discuss the implications of our findings, followed by a discussion of the limitations of 
the study and directions for future research. 
 
Theoretical and practical implications 
Theoretically, the finding that activated general societal norms and domain-specific 
environmental norms lead to similar increases in pro-environmental motivation is 
interesting and, at least as far as we know, novel. We believe that activating general 
societal norms can lead to stronger pro-environmental motivation because these 
norms transcend specific behavioral domains. This reasoning implies that 
manipulations that activate such general norms can lead to an increased motivation 
to engage in normative behavior in any behavioral domain as long as individuals 
endorse corresponding values. For example, activated general societal norms may 
also lead to an increased motivation to engage in helping behavior among individuals 
who endorse altruistic values. However, because we only tested the effect of our 
situational norm activation manipulations within the environmental domain, we can 
only speculate about the effects of activation of general societal norms in other 
behavioral domains. However, it appears unlikely that activating societal norms 
would affect motivation in the environmental domain but not in other domains of 
pro-social behavior. The key point here is that because societal norms are broader 
than environmental norms (but still overlapping; cf. Lindenberg & Steg, 2007), a 
focus on societal norms may have an additional advantage of being able to motivate a 
broad range of pro-social behavior. Of course, future research will need to 
corroborate this specific interpretation of the current findings. 
Another interesting theoretical issue is the distinction between activating 
values and activating norms. Although the addition of the societal norm condition 
already moves us beyond previous research, the question is relevant with respect to 
the Verplanken and Holland (2002) argument about value activation. To our minds, 
the conceptual difference between value activation and domain-specific situational 
norm activation is that the value activation manipulation focuses attention on the 
self-importance of a specific behavioral domain (‘the environment’), while situational 
norm activation focuses attention on norms toward normative action within a specific 
domain (‘you ought to act environmentally friendly’). As such, the latter is arguably 
more proximal to motivation than the former. Furthermore, at a more specific level 
our manipulation asked participants to be actively engaged in the norm activation 
process (because we asked them to self-generate and write down important norms). 
By contrast, in the Verplanken and Holland (2002) studies, the concept 
‘environment’ was activated using a priming task that did not require participants to 
actively consider environmental values or norms. Despite these operational 
differences, however, results seem similar across their and our studies. Yet, the 
addition of the societal norm condition suggests that positive effects of norm 
activation can even be found at a broader level.  
Our finding that situationally activating norms can lead to increased 
motivation to act pro-environmentally also has potential practical implications. 
Firstly, it shows that focusing individuals’ attention on environmental norms in a 
situation in which they are able to translate these norms into pro-environmental 
action may lead to increased pro-environmental motivation and behavior. This may 
suggest to organizers and practitioners of environmental action that one way to 
motivate individuals for pro-environmental action is to activate the relevant norms in 
situations in which individuals can translate these norms into action (e.g., norm 
statements on billboards or posters at gas stations or in shops). Secondly, our results 
may also suggest to them that activating more general societal norms may lead to 
increased motivation to act pro-environmentally (e.g., billboard or poster statements 
that target "doing the right thing"). However, the caveat for each of these practical 
considerations is that these efforts may only be effective for those who already 
endorse the relevant values to some extent. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that 
without such norm activation chances of not acting on one's values appear to 
increase.  
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
The aim of this study was to test whether situational norm activation can lead to 
increased pro-environmental motivation. To meet this aim, we designed an 
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intention to support VIER relative to a control group. Moreover, in either norm 
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that activating domain-specific environmental norms, but also activating general 
societal norms, can lead to increased pro-environmental motivation. Below, we first 
discuss the implications of our findings, followed by a discussion of the limitations of 
the study and directions for future research. 
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increased motivation to act pro-environmentally (e.g., billboard or poster statements 
that target "doing the right thing"). However, the caveat for each of these practical 
considerations is that these efforts may only be effective for those who already 
endorse the relevant values to some extent. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that 
without such norm activation chances of not acting on one's values appear to 
increase.  
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increased pro-environmental motivation. To meet this aim, we designed an 
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experiment that allowed us to test whether situational activation of domain-specific 
environmental norms and more general societal norms led to stronger intentions to 
support an environmental NGO. Although a strong suit of this set-up was that it 
allowed us to test the internal validity of our hypotheses (although based on only a 
single experiment), experiments score considerably lower with respect to testing their 
external validity. For this reason, we are careful not to draw firm conclusions about 
the applicability of our findings to environmental and other behavior and settings. In 
thise sense, our results leave unanswered several interesting practical and theoretical 
questions that further research can pursue. One such question is whether the 
activation of domain-specific or broader norms affects motivation in a different 
behavioral domain (e.g., volunteering for community work). We would expect that 
the effects of situationally activated domain-specific norms are limited to the relevant 
specific behavioral domain, but this is not necessarily the case for broader norms 
(e.g., activating pro-environmental norms should not necessarily increase motivation 
to do community work, but activating societal norms should do so). Although the 
current study was not designed to answer this question, future studies may do so by 
seeking more support for the internal as well as external validity of the current 
findings.  
Another road for future research is to explore other factors that determine 
whether situational norm activation is likely to inhibit or increase motivation. One 
candidate, in our view, is the perceived costliness of behavior (see Chapter 2-4 of this 
thesis). Indeed, in the current study, we used a relatively low-cost act as our 
operationalization of motivation. Individuals only indicated what they were willing to 
do in the future without making a commitment. An open question, therefore, is 
whether situational norm activation will also have favorable effects on individuals' 
motivation to engage in more costly pro-environmental behavior. Research has 
shown that the extent to which individuals act on their normative beliefs partly 
depends on the costliness of engaging in the behavior (e.g. Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 
1995). Indeed, Chapters 2-4 of this thesis showed that normative considerations were 
more predictive of pro-environmental behavior that was perceived as relatively low-
cost. Future research could look systematically into this role of behavioral costs with 
respect to the effectiveness of situational norm activation. This may shed new light on 
the circumstances under which situational norm activation leads to increased pro-
environmental motivation. 
Another question for future research follows from our finding that situational 
norm activation led to increased pro-environmental intentions among individuals 
with moderate to strong biospheric values, but not among those with weak biospheric 
values. Future research could examine how individuals with weaker biospheric values 
could become more strongly motivated to act pro-environmentally. For these 
individuals, manipulations that rely on a perception of pro-environmental action as 
normatively right (‘saving the environment is the right thing to do’) may generally 
have little effect because these manipulations do not provide a good fit with the 
values of the target population. A more fruitful approach would therefore be to use 
manipulations that focus on other aspects of pro-environmental behavior that 
provide a better fit with the values and perceptions of individuals who are not 
motivated to act pro-environmentally for the sake of the environment itself. For 
example, efforts to make engaging in pro-environmental behavior more financially 
rewarding or more pleasurable may be more effective among individuals with weak 
biospheric values, because such instrumental factors are more likely to appeal to 
these individuals than attempts to stress how normatively right engaging in pro-
environmental action is. Previous research into the potentially important role of 
instrumental factors as predictors of pro-environmental behavior (e.g., Guagnano et 
al., 1995; Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2002; Chapters 2-4) has typically showed that 
individuals are more likely to engage in pro-environmental behavior when it is more 
instrumentally attractive to do so. However, the extent to which this applies to 
individuals with weak biospheric values has not been studied directly, at least as far 
as we know. 
In conclusion, this study provides important first evidence that situational 
norm activation leads to increased pro-environmental motivation among individuals 
with moderate to strong pro-environmental values. The finding that both the 
situational activation of domain-specific environmental norms and the activation of 
more general societal norms increases pro-environmental motivation indicates that it 
is the activation of norms in general, rather than the specific environmental 
connotation of these norms, that causes the manipulation to be effective. This is an 
intriguing finding because it suggests that focusing individuals’ attention on norms 
and normative behavior may lead to increased normative behavior across different 
behavioral domains.  
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Cheap meat causes environmental problems 
European farmers cause serious environmental problems in both Europe and the 
developing world in their pursuit of cheap mass-produced meat. Developing 
countries, like Thailand and Peru, grow the cheap cattle feed that is used by European 
farmers. The demand for this cheap cattle feed comes at a cost to local nature, as it 
causes deforestation and loss of biodiversity, but also to local populations, as the 
production of cattle feed uses up land that is no longer available to local people. In 
Europe, the meat industry causes enormous fertilizer surpluses, which pollute both 
soil and water. This is not all: the animals that are used in the meat industry are fed 
up as quickly as possible, having little or no room to move – bad for the animal, good 
for the price of the meat. 
As a European consumer, you can contribute to the reduction of these 
problems. Show that you do not support the meat industry and all the problems it 
causes by reducing your meat consumption or choosing organic meat over cheap 
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Many individuals are concerned about environmental issues and feel that they ought 
to engage in pro-environmental actions in order to enhance the quality of the 
environment (EcoAmerica, 2011; Eurobarometer, 2011). However, while these 
normative considerations (considerations in which the wellbeing of others or the 
environment, rather than one’s own interest, are the central motivating factor) 
encourage individuals to engage in pro-environmental behavior from within, 
contextual and situational barriers (that increase personal costs of pro-
environmental actions) represent external factors that may prevent individuals from 
acting upon these normative considerations. The central aim of this dissertation was 
to gain more insight into how these contextual and situational barriers influence the 
predictive power of normative considerations across different contexts and behaviors. 
Specifically, this dissertation aimed to find out to what extent contextual factors 
affect the likelihood that normative considerations (such as pro-environmental 
beliefs) translate into the motivation to act pro-environmentally in two ways: first, by 
systematically varying the strength of barriers that may prevent individuals from 
acting pro-environmentally; and second, by varying the extent to which normative 
considerations are supported situationally. 
  Throughout this dissertation I have argued that individuals weigh their desire 
to act upon their normative considerations against their desire to avoid the costs of 
doing so (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 
1977), a process I referred to as balancing. I proposed that the outcome of the 
balancing process depends upon the strength and accessibility of individuals’ 
normative considerations as well as the perceived strength of external barriers (which 
affect the costliness of behavior). To test both aspects of the balancing mechanism, I 
studied the extent to which specific (Chapter 2-4) and general (Chapter 5) normative 
considerations predicted different pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., car use 
reductions, support for an environmental NGO) under different levels of behavioral 
costs (Chapter 2-4) and situational activation of these normative considerations 
(Chapter 5).  
 In this discussion chapter, I will reflect on the main results from the empirical 
chapters and ponder their theoretical and practical implications. I will first discuss 
the results from Chapters 2-4, focusing on the question to what extent specific 
normative considerations predicted pro-environmental behaviors under different 
levels of behavioral costs. This section is followed by a discussion of the main results 
of Chapter 5, which examined whether situational activation of environmental or 
societal norms leads to an increase in pro-environmental behavior when behavioral 
costs remain the same. To round up, I summarize the main theoretical and practical 
implications of the results of all four chapters, followed by a section discussing 
potential limitations of these chapters, suggestions for future research, and a 
conclusion. 
 
The predictive power of normative considerations under different levels 
of behavioral costs 
The aim of the first three empirical chapters was to test a part of the balancing 
mechanism by examining, across different countries, the predictive power of 
normative considerations under different levels of perceived costs. To do so, the first 
three empirical chapters of this dissertation offer different tests of the low-cost 
hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003), which predicts that normative 
considerations are less predictive of high-cost pro-environmental behavior than of 
low-cost behavior. This is assumed to be the case because normative considerations 
are easily pushed into the background in case of high costs (Diekmann & 
Preisendörfer, 2003; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). This hypothesis plays an important 
role in this dissertation because it provides a direct test of (part of) the balancing 
mechanism. Specifically, testing the low-cost hypothesis involves examining whether 
individuals are indeed more likely to translate their normative considerations into 
motivation and behavior when the costs of doing so are relatively low than when they 
are higher. Moreover, in Chapter 4, I extend the low-cost hypothesis by including 
very low-cost behavior as well as relatively low cost and high cost behavior. These 
tests of the (extended) low-cost hypothesis fit perfectly with a test of the balancing 
mechanism because they contain an examination of the predictive power of 
normative considerations under different levels of perceived behavioral costs. 
Furthermore, the difference between lower-cost and higher-cost behaviors that is 
hypothesized in the low-cost hypothesis aligns well with one of the hypotheses that 
follow from the balancing mechanism, namely that normative considerations are 
likely to be less predictive of pro-environmental behavior when the costs of engaging 
in the behavior are higher. 
 Previous tests of the low-cost hypothesis have met with mixed results. Some 
findings appear to support the low-cost hypothesis (e.g. Derksen & Gartrell, 1993; 
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Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998; 2003), while other studies report no support (e.g. 
Anderson & Von Borgstede, 2010; Best, 2010; Best & Kneip, 2011; Guagnano, Stern, 
& Dietz, 1995). These mixed results may be due in part to differences in the 
conceptualization of the costs of behavior (Best, 2010). As a case in point, some 
studies that found no support for the low-cost hypothesis appear to examine very 
low-cost behaviors (e.g. making recycling very low-cost behavior by providing bins 
and a curbside pickup system, Guagnano et al., 1995). Normative considerations may 
be less relevant in such situations because the absence of behavioral costs to refrain 
from normative action means that individuals are likely to engage in such very low-
cost behaviors irrespective of the strength of their normative considerations (see 
Guagnano et al., 1995). This differentiation between low-cost and very low-cost 
behavior is absent in the low-cost hypothesis, but I included it to my test of the 
hypothesis (and the balancing mechanism) in Chapter 4 to gain more insight into 
how the perceived costliness of pro-environmental behaviors affects the predictive 
power of normative considerations on these behaviors. Another complicating factor 
in the evaluation of the status of the low-cost hypothesis is that several studies lacked 
systematic variation between low-cost and high-cost behaviors, for example because 
they compared behaviors that differ on multiple dimensions, (e.g. recycling and 
transportation behavior in Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 1998), meaning that it is 
difficult to tell whether differences in costs or on another dimension caused the 
predictive power of normative considerations to differ between the two behaviors.  
   In Chapters 2-4, I took several steps to ensure that the studies reported in 
these chapters would provide relatively fair tests of the low-cost hypothesis that 
would shed more light upon its validity. First, when designing the studies, I selected 
behaviors that that are highly similar but likely to differ in perceived behavioral costs 
within each study design. Second, I included measures of perceived costs to check 
whether I did indeed compare behaviors that differed in perceived costs in the 
intended directions. Third, I tested the low-cost hypothesis in and across various 
contexts (e.g. various countries that differ with regard to the strength of barriers and 
facilitators of pro-environmental behaviors), testing the effect of perceived behavioral 
costs on the predictive power of normative considerations on various environmental 
behaviors (i.e., car use reductions, the use of green energy, and policy acceptability). 
This test of the hypothesis across different behaviors provides insight into the 
generalizability of the process. Finally, In Chapter 4 I also distinguished between 
relatively low-cost and very low-cost behaviors to examine whether normative 
considerations predict these two types of behaviors differently. By including 
comparable behaviors in each study, explicitly testing whether participants indeed 
perceived differences in costs of these behaviors in the expected way, replicating the 
test over different contexts and behaviors, and including high cost, low cost, and very 
low-cost behaviors, I attempted to provide a valid test of the low-cost hypothesis.  
To assess the behavioral costs associated with particular behaviors, I focused 
on the extent to which individuals perceive engaging in particular behavior to be 
costly rather than on an objective measure of costs. This is important because it is the 
perception of potential costs, and not the actual costs in terms of money, time, 
comfort, pleasure, or status, which potentially deters individuals from engaging in 
actions. This perception may follow from these objective costs, but not necessarily so 
(e.g., increased objective monetary costs may not be perceived as psychologically 
costly when one feels it is worth it or when one is able to afford it, while reductions in 
objective costs may not be perceived as such). This imperfect link between objective 
and perceived costs, along with the inherent difficulty of measuring the impact of all 
factors that together make up the objective costs of engaging in a particular behavior, 
convinced me to use a general measure of perceived costs as the main measure of 
behavioral costs throughout this dissertation.  
Specifically, I conceptualized behavioral costs as the inverse of individuals’ 
ability to engage in particular behaviors. The logic behind this choice is that by 
indicating the extent to which they feel able to engage in behavior, individuals also 
implicitly indicate the extent to which they perceive barriers stopping them from 
engaging in behavior. Individuals who indicate feeling strongly able to engage in 
particular behavior thereby indicate that they perceive few barriers preventing them 
from doing so (reflecting low-cost behavior). Individuals who feel poorly able to 
engage in the same behavior, on the other hand, perceive important barriers stopping 
them from engaging in the behavior. In other words, they perceive engaging in the 
behavior as relatively costly. Essentially, the use of ability as an inverse (proxy) 
measure of behavioral costs meets the criteria of practical feasibility (as ability is 
relatively easy to measure) and comprehensiveness (by encompassing the general 
perception individuals have of a behavior).  
In all three chapters, I compared the predictive power of behavior-specific 
normative considerations as reflected by the norm-activation model (NAM; Schwartz, 
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To assess the behavioral costs associated with particular behaviors, I focused 
on the extent to which individuals perceive engaging in particular behavior to be 
costly rather than on an objective measure of costs. This is important because it is the 
perception of potential costs, and not the actual costs in terms of money, time, 
comfort, pleasure, or status, which potentially deters individuals from engaging in 
actions. This perception may follow from these objective costs, but not necessarily so 
(e.g., increased objective monetary costs may not be perceived as psychologically 
costly when one feels it is worth it or when one is able to afford it, while reductions in 
objective costs may not be perceived as such). This imperfect link between objective 
and perceived costs, along with the inherent difficulty of measuring the impact of all 
factors that together make up the objective costs of engaging in a particular behavior, 
convinced me to use a general measure of perceived costs as the main measure of 
behavioral costs throughout this dissertation.  
Specifically, I conceptualized behavioral costs as the inverse of individuals’ 
ability to engage in particular behaviors. The logic behind this choice is that by 
indicating the extent to which they feel able to engage in behavior, individuals also 
implicitly indicate the extent to which they perceive barriers stopping them from 
engaging in behavior. Individuals who indicate feeling strongly able to engage in 
particular behavior thereby indicate that they perceive few barriers preventing them 
from doing so (reflecting low-cost behavior). Individuals who feel poorly able to 
engage in the same behavior, on the other hand, perceive important barriers stopping 
them from engaging in the behavior. In other words, they perceive engaging in the 
behavior as relatively costly. Essentially, the use of ability as an inverse (proxy) 
measure of behavioral costs meets the criteria of practical feasibility (as ability is 
relatively easy to measure) and comprehensiveness (by encompassing the general 
perception individuals have of a behavior).  
In all three chapters, I compared the predictive power of behavior-specific 
normative considerations as reflected by the norm-activation model (NAM; Schwartz, 
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1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981; Steg & De Groot, 2010) under different levels of 
perceived behavioral costs to test the low-cost hypothesis. I chose to use the NAM as 
a conceptualization of normative considerations for two reasons. First, the NAM has 
been applied successfully to explain a wide range of pro-environmental behaviors, 
such as recycling (Hopper & Nielsen, 1991; Vinning & Ebreo, 1992), reducing car use 
(Abrahamse, Steg, Gifford, & Vlek, 2009; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Hunecke, 
Blöbaum, Matthies, & Höger, 2001; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; Wall, Devine-Wright, 
& Mill, 2007), consumer behavior (Thogersen, 1999) and policy acceptability (Steg, 
Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005). Second, the NAM provides measures of behavior-
specific norms, as opposed to more general pro-environmental beliefs such as those 
measured by biospheric values (the central motivating factor in Chapter 5). This is 
important because the compatibility principle (Ajzen, 1988, Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) 
implies that predictor variables are most predictive of dependent variables when they 
are measured at the same level of specificity (e.g. behavior-specific or general). 
Therefore, I measured normative considerations on the same behavior-specific level 
as behavioral costs and behaviors, to ensure a fair test of the low-cost hypothesis.  
In order to provide convergent support for the low-cost hypothesis, I employed 
a multi-method, multi-sample approach. First, I used different methods to assess the 
low-cost hypothesis. In Chapter 2 and 4, I compared the predictive power of 
normative considerations on different behaviors that varied in the extent to which 
they were personally costly, whereas in Chapter 3 I compared the extent to which 
normative considerations predicted an identical behavior across situations in which 
the costs of engaging in that behavior differed. Moreover, I also used different proxies 
for environmental behavior as dependent variables in each chapter: reductions in car 
use in Chapter 2, the use of renewable energy sources in Chapter 3, and acceptability 
of policy measures in Chapter 4. In addition, I conducted these studies among 
multiple samples of participants in different countries allowing for a test of the 
generalizability of the results that is based on the use of different behaviors, different 
samples, and varying contextual conditions. I believe that this set-up of the first three 
empirical chapters, with a focus on gaining broad and convergent evidence, provides 
valuable insight into the validity of the low-cost hypothesis, and thereby into the 
validity of the balancing mechanism. I discuss the implications of the studies in more 
detail below, after a summary of the main results of Chapters 2-4 of this dissertation. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 tested the low-cost hypothesis by examining whether 
normative considerations regarding car use reductions were more predictive of short-
distance car use (which individuals were expected to be able to reduce at relatively 
low costs) than of overall car use (which was expected to be more costly to reduce) 
across samples from seven European countries. Importantly, I included an explicit 
measure of the perceived costs of reducing car use to test whether these expectations 
concerning the costs of reducing car use were indeed correct. This measure, which 
was based on a broad operationalization of behavioral costs, focused on individuals’ 
reported ability to reduce their car use. Participants generally reported feeling able to 
reduce their car use for short distances, but feeling less able to do so for longer 
distances, validating the distinction between reducing short-distance car use as 
relatively low-cost behavior and reducing overall car use as a more costly one. 
 The study showed that normative considerations regarding car use reductions 
are indeed more predictive of short-distance car use than of more costly overall car 
use. These results clearly support the low-cost hypothesis, as they show that 
individuals are more likely to act upon their normative considerations when the 
perceived costs of doing so are relatively low than when these costs are higher. 
Moreover, the study enabled a test of the generalizability of the low-cost hypothesis 
by comparing questionnaire data from seven European countries, which showed that 
the implications of this study are likely to be valid across countries and contexts. The 
only exception was Norway, where we found that normative considerations were 
equally poorly predictive of overall and short-distance car use. This finding may be 
explained by the finding that Norwegian participants perceived reducing their short-
distance car use as similarly costly as reducing their overall car use (in contrast to 
participants from other countries who perceived reducing short-distance car use to be 
less costly than reducing overall car use), quite likely causing normative 
considerations to be less predictive of short-distance car use in Norway than 
elsewhere. In sum, Chapter 2 provided support for the low-cost hypothesis by 
showing that specific normative considerations were more predictive of a relatively 
low-cost behavior than of a more costly act in the context of car use. As such it also 
provides support for the balancing mechanism in this particular context. 
 Chapter 3 employed a different method and context to test the low-cost 
hypothesis. Instead of comparing two different behaviors that differed in costliness, I 
tested the predictive power of normative considerations on one behavior, the use of 
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the implications of this study are likely to be valid across countries and contexts. The 
only exception was Norway, where we found that normative considerations were 
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showing that specific normative considerations were more predictive of a relatively 
low-cost behavior than of a more costly act in the context of car use. As such it also 
provides support for the balancing mechanism in this particular context. 
 Chapter 3 employed a different method and context to test the low-cost 
hypothesis. Instead of comparing two different behaviors that differed in costliness, I 
tested the predictive power of normative considerations on one behavior, the use of 
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renewable energy, in six European countries in which the costs of engaging in this 
behavior were likely to differ. Compared to Chapters 2 and 4 I omitted Norway 
because of fundamental differences between the Norwegian energy market (where 
renewable sources are the main source of energy for many households, International 
Energy Agency, 2011; Eurostat, 2013) and the energy markets of the other six 
countries (where using energy from renewable sources generally required an active 
choice). Based on the low-cost hypothesis, I hypothesized that normative 
considerations would be more predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in 
countries in which the costs of using these energy sources were perceived to be 
relatively low than in countries in which they were perceived to be higher. As in 
Chapter 2, this study contained an explicit measure of perceived costs in order to 
validate the assumption that the costs of using renewable energy sources would differ 
between countries. This measure assessed individuals’ perceived ability to use 
renewable energy; when people indicate that ability to use renewable energy sources 
is low, choosing to use renewable energy can be said to be relatively high-cost 
behavior, while higher perceived ability indicates that using renewable energy is 
likely to be less costly.  
The results of the study again provided support for the low-cost hypothesis by 
showing that normative considerations regarding the use of renewable energy were 
most predictive of the use of renewable energy sources in countries in which such use 
is perceived to be relatively low-cost behavior – in this case the Netherlands. By 
contrast, normative considerations were significantly less predictive of the use of 
renewable energy sources in Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom, were the 
costs of using renewable energy were reported to be higher than in the Netherlands, 
and least predictive in Hungary, the country in which the perceived costs of using 
renewable energy sources were highest. These results are all in line with the low-cost 
hypothesis. The only exception to the hypothesized pattern, however, was Greece: 
Greek participants indicated that they perceived using renewable energy sources as a 
relatively low-cost behavior, but normative considerations were poorly predictive of 
the use of renewable energy sources in Greece. This may be the result of response 
patterns (a tendency by Greek participants to give both positive and extreme answers 
that I also encountered to a lesser extent in Chapters 2 and 410; for more information 
                                                          
10 This tendency of Greek respondents to answer affirmatively and to use extreme answers 
was also prevalent in Chapters 2 & 4. For example, in Chapter 2, Greek participants answered 
and similar cases see Harzing, 2006; Van Herk, Poortinga, & Verhallen, 2004), 
making the Greek results less reliable and thus harder to interpret. As such they do 
not necessarily cast doubt on the general validity of the low-cost hypothesis, 
especially because this hypothesis was supported in the five other countries included 
in the study. In other words, Chapter 3 provides further support for the low-cost 
hypothesis and thus also for the balancing mechanism in the context of renewable 
energy use. 
Chapter 4 provided the first examination of the low-cost hypothesis in the field 
of policy acceptability. Specifically, this chapter tested the extent to which normative 
considerations predict acceptability of policy measures to reduce car use that differ in 
the extent to which they are costly to individuals in seven European countries. 
Furthermore, Chapter 4 extended the scope of the previous two chapters by 
examining the predictive power of normative considerations in a very low cost 
condition as well as the previously studied relatively low-cost and high-cost 
conditions. I argued that normative considerations are not likely to be strongly 
predictive of very low-cost behavior, because in the absence of clear costs to act pro-
environmentally, most individuals will accept a policy irrespective of the strength of 
their normative considerations (see also Guagnano et al., 1995). Based on this line of 
thought, I hypothesized that normative considerations would be more predictive of 
acceptability of policy measures that were relatively low-cost than of policy measures 
that were either associated with very low costs, or with high costs.  
In Chapter 4, I looked at perceived costs in two ways. First, I did so by 
comparing two different types of policy measures: pull measures (public transport 
improvements), which are likely to cause only very low levels of personal cost, and 
push measures (increases in car taxes), which are likely to be more personally costly 
(Loukopoulos, 2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003; Steg & Vlek, 1997). Second, I measured 
individuals’ perceived ability to reduce their car use in order to assess the extent to 
which the push measure would be personally costly to them. The reasoning behind 
this measure was that individuals who feel more able to reduce their car use are less 
likely to be negatively affected by the introduction of potentially costly policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
more affirmatively to questions regarding variables in the norm-activation model than 
participants from any other country. However, while the absolute answers in Chapters 2 & 4 
seem to have been affected by these answering tendencies, Chapter 3 is the only chapter in 
which these tendencies led to a pattern of results that was not in line with expectations. 
Although it seems wise to treat the Greek data in each of those chapters with some caution, I 
do not believe that it affects the interpretation of the general pattern of findings 
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measures than individuals who feel less able to do so. Based on these expected 
differences in perceived costs, I tested two hypotheses. First, I compared the 
predictive power of normative considerations on a push and a pull measure to test the 
hypothesis that normative considerations are less predictive of very low-cost act 
(accepting a pull measure) than of a more costly one (accepting a push measure). 
Second, I compared the extent to which normative considerations predicted 
acceptability of a push measure for individuals who feel more able to reduce their car 
use with those who feel less able to do so in order to test the hypothesis that 
normative considerations are less predictive of high-cost behavior than of less costly 
behavior.   
The results of the study showed that normative considerations were indeed 
less predictive of acceptability of a (pull) policy measure that was associated with very 
low costs than of a (push) policy measure associated with higher costs. Furthermore, 
I found that normative considerations were less predictive of acceptability of a car tax 
increase (a push measure) for individuals who felt poorly able to reduce their car use 
(for whom this would be relatively highly costly) than for individuals who felt better 
able to reduce their car use (for whom this would be less costly). These findings are in 
line with the balancing mechanism because they fit the idea that normative 
considerations are more predictive of motivation and behavior in situations of 
relatively low cost, than in situations of very low or high costs.  
Furthermore, as in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 contained a test of the generalizability 
of the tested effects by comparing questionnaire data from seven European countries. 
I found the hypothesized difference in the predictive power of normative 
considerations between the acceptability of low-cost and very low cost policy 
measures in all seven countries, supporting its generalizability. The difference in 
acceptability of the relatively low-cost and high-cost policy measures, on the other 
hand, was replicated in three countries (the Netherlands, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom), but not in the other four countries (France, Greece, Hungary, and 
Switzerland). One reason why I did not find the expected result in these four 
countries may be a lack of statistical variance which may have obscured the 
hypothesized interaction between normative considerations and perceived costs. An 
alternative possibility is that an unidentified ‘third variable’ that differentiates the 
Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom from France, Greece, Hungary, and 
Switzerland, explains these results. Interestingly, I only found this pattern of results 
in Chapter 4; Chapters 2 and 3 do not reveal clear differences between the first three 
countries and the other four countries. Identifying this potential third variable is 
therefore an interesting topic for future research at the more specific level, but all in 
all the pattern of results in Chapter 4 supports my analysis. 
In sum, Chapter 2-4 document evidence for the balancing mechanism in the 
context of pro-environmental behavior and support for environmental policies across 
different countries and contexts. Specifically, the low-cost hypothesis was supported 
in a majority of cases, confirming that normative considerations are more predictive 
of such behavior or environmental policy support when external barriers (e.g., costs) 
are lower. Below I discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings.  
 
Theoretical and practical implications regarding the role of behavioral 
costs 
Theoretically, the main contribution of Chapters 2-4 is the convergent support for the 
low-cost hypothesis (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003), thereby for the validity of the 
balancing mechanism. Using different methods, dependent variables, and samples, 
all three chapters showed that behavior-specific normative considerations were more 
predictive of relatively low-cost behavior and acceptability judgments than of more 
costly behaviors. The use of research designs that included comparable behaviors, 
explicit tests of expected differences in perceived costs between these behaviors, and 
replications over different contexts and behaviors mean that I am confident that the 
empirical chapters presented here provide a valid and thorough test of the low-cost 
hypothesis. This broad support for the low-cost hypothesis also corroborates part of 
the balancing mechanism I outlined before by showing that individuals weigh their 
desire to ‘do the right thing’ by engaging in pro-environmental behavior against the 
perceived costs of doing so, which means that normative considerations regarding 
environmental action are likely to be less predictive of motivation and behavior when 
the costs of engaging in this behavior are higher. 
  Indeed, all three chapters showed that individuals are less likely to act upon 
normative considerations when the costs of doing so are higher. This broad support 
for the low-cost hypothesis is particularly interesting in light of the mixed results 
reported in the literature. As indicated earlier in this chapter, some research appears 
to support the low-cost hypothesis (e.g. normative considerations being more 
predictive of low-cost recycling behavior than of more costly recycling; Derksen & 
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context of pro-environmental behavior and support for environmental policies across 
different countries and contexts. Specifically, the low-cost hypothesis was supported 
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all three chapters showed that behavior-specific normative considerations were more 
predictive of relatively low-cost behavior and acceptability judgments than of more 
costly behaviors. The use of research designs that included comparable behaviors, 
explicit tests of expected differences in perceived costs between these behaviors, and 
replications over different contexts and behaviors mean that I am confident that the 
empirical chapters presented here provide a valid and thorough test of the low-cost 
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Gartrell, 1993; for other examples, see Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998; 2003). Yet, 
other research reports no support (e.g. environmental concern predicting adoption of 
pro-environmental farming practices irrespective of the associated costs; Best, 2010; 
for other examples, see Anderson & Von Borgstede, 2010; Best & Kneip, 2011; 
Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995). I argued that these differences are likely due to the 
use of research designs containing behaviors that differ on more dimensions than 
costs alone as well as the inclusion of very low-cost behaviors. If this is correct, then 
the research in this dissertation shows more unequivocal support for the low-cost 
hypothesis because of the systematic methods and measures I used. Indeed, the fact 
that I consistently find this result across behaviors and contexts provides further 
support for the generalizability and validity of this outcome.   
Zooming in on the generalizability of the results reported in Chapters 2-4, the 
general pattern of results is replicated in each chapter. However, on a more specific 
level, some deviations from this pattern were found. Importantly, these deviations 
appeared unsystematic: different countries deviate from the expected pattern of 
results in different chapters for different reasons. Specifically, in Chapter 2, 
Norwegian data did not quite fit the pattern of normative considerations being more 
predictive of low-cost behavior than of more costly behavior because the 
operationalization of relatively low-cost and high-cost behavior was unsuccessful in 
Norway (but successful in other countries). In Chapter 3 Greek participants did not 
fit this pattern due to response tendencies, while in Chapter 4 the expected difference 
in predictive power of normative considerations on high cost and relatively low-cost 
behaviors was found in three countries, but not in the other four, a difference that is 
not replicated in the other chapters. The general pattern remains the same across all 
three chapters: Normative considerations are more predictive of pro-environmental 
behavior when the costs of engaging in behavior are relatively low than when these 
costs are higher.  
Moving beyond the low-cost hypothesis, Chapter 4 provides further support 
for the balancing mechanism by showing that normative considerations are less 
predictive of acceptability of very low cost policy measures than of more costly policy 
measures. This result fits the idea that individuals balance personal costs against the 
benefits of acting in line with their normative considerations, because when perceived 
costs are very low, individuals are likely to engage in pro-environmental behavior 
irrespective of the strength of their normative considerations. Theoretically, this is an 
interesting point because it suggests that normative considerations lose their 
predictive power if behavioral costs are very low. Furthermore, these findings provide 
a further specification of the low-cost hypothesis: Individuals are indeed more likely 
to act upon normative considerations when the cost of doing so is low rather than 
high, but not when these costs are very low. Similar results are reported by 
Guagnano, Stern, and Dietz (1995), who argued that attitudes towards pro-
environmental behavior are most likely to be predictive of this behavior when 
contextual factors are neither very inhibitive nor very supportive. Practically, these 
results suggest that reducing the costs of engaging in pro-environmental behavior to 
the extent that motivational factors are no longer predictive of this behavior may 
result in an increase in uptake of the behavior. However, the effectiveness of such a 
strategy to promote pro-environmental behavior relies on the continued absence of 
behavioral costs (e.g. free bus tickets remaining free). That is, when external factors 
change and hitherto very low-cost behavior becomes more costly, motivational 
factors come into play again, meaning that individuals who do not share strong 
normative considerations regarding the behavior are likely to stop engaging in it 
(Lindenberg & Steg, 2007).  
In many situations, reducing the perceived costs of pro-environmental 
behavior to levels where motivational factors are no longer predictive of this behavior 
is not feasible due to practical considerations (e.g. budget constraints). This means 
that policy makers need to take motivational factors into account when aiming to 
promote pro-environmental behavior. One important question that follows from 
Chapters 2 and 3 is which motivational factors policy makers should be targeting. 
These chapters showed that personal norms, awareness of consequences, and 
outcome efficacy are all to some extent predictive of pro-environmental behaviors, 
with personal norms generally the strongest predictor of behavior. One way to 
promote pro-environmental behavior could be to target personal norms directly by 
focusing attention on the moral dimension of behavior (e.g. ‘purchasing organic 
products is the right thing to do’). However, such a strategy may not work when 
individuals are unaware of the environmental problems associated with certain 
behavior (low awareness of consequences) and/or when they feel that they are unable 
to contribute to solving these problems by changing their behavior (low outcome 
efficacy; Schwartz & Howard, 1981; Steg & De Groot, 2010). Schwartz and Howard 
(1981) suggest that under these circumstances, strengthening awareness of 
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Gartrell, 1993; for other examples, see Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998; 2003). Yet, 
other research reports no support (e.g. environmental concern predicting adoption of 
pro-environmental farming practices irrespective of the associated costs; Best, 2010; 
for other examples, see Anderson & Von Borgstede, 2010; Best & Kneip, 2011; 
Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995). I argued that these differences are likely due to the 
use of research designs containing behaviors that differ on more dimensions than 
costs alone as well as the inclusion of very low-cost behaviors. If this is correct, then 
the research in this dissertation shows more unequivocal support for the low-cost 
hypothesis because of the systematic methods and measures I used. Indeed, the fact 
that I consistently find this result across behaviors and contexts provides further 
support for the generalizability and validity of this outcome.   
Zooming in on the generalizability of the results reported in Chapters 2-4, the 
general pattern of results is replicated in each chapter. However, on a more specific 
level, some deviations from this pattern were found. Importantly, these deviations 
appeared unsystematic: different countries deviate from the expected pattern of 
results in different chapters for different reasons. Specifically, in Chapter 2, 
Norwegian data did not quite fit the pattern of normative considerations being more 
predictive of low-cost behavior than of more costly behavior because the 
operationalization of relatively low-cost and high-cost behavior was unsuccessful in 
Norway (but successful in other countries). In Chapter 3 Greek participants did not 
fit this pattern due to response tendencies, while in Chapter 4 the expected difference 
in predictive power of normative considerations on high cost and relatively low-cost 
behaviors was found in three countries, but not in the other four, a difference that is 
not replicated in the other chapters. The general pattern remains the same across all 
three chapters: Normative considerations are more predictive of pro-environmental 
behavior when the costs of engaging in behavior are relatively low than when these 
costs are higher.  
Moving beyond the low-cost hypothesis, Chapter 4 provides further support 
for the balancing mechanism by showing that normative considerations are less 
predictive of acceptability of very low cost policy measures than of more costly policy 
measures. This result fits the idea that individuals balance personal costs against the 
benefits of acting in line with their normative considerations, because when perceived 
costs are very low, individuals are likely to engage in pro-environmental behavior 
irrespective of the strength of their normative considerations. Theoretically, this is an 
interesting point because it suggests that normative considerations lose their 
predictive power if behavioral costs are very low. Furthermore, these findings provide 
a further specification of the low-cost hypothesis: Individuals are indeed more likely 
to act upon normative considerations when the cost of doing so is low rather than 
high, but not when these costs are very low. Similar results are reported by 
Guagnano, Stern, and Dietz (1995), who argued that attitudes towards pro-
environmental behavior are most likely to be predictive of this behavior when 
contextual factors are neither very inhibitive nor very supportive. Practically, these 
results suggest that reducing the costs of engaging in pro-environmental behavior to 
the extent that motivational factors are no longer predictive of this behavior may 
result in an increase in uptake of the behavior. However, the effectiveness of such a 
strategy to promote pro-environmental behavior relies on the continued absence of 
behavioral costs (e.g. free bus tickets remaining free). That is, when external factors 
change and hitherto very low-cost behavior becomes more costly, motivational 
factors come into play again, meaning that individuals who do not share strong 
normative considerations regarding the behavior are likely to stop engaging in it 
(Lindenberg & Steg, 2007).  
In many situations, reducing the perceived costs of pro-environmental 
behavior to levels where motivational factors are no longer predictive of this behavior 
is not feasible due to practical considerations (e.g. budget constraints). This means 
that policy makers need to take motivational factors into account when aiming to 
promote pro-environmental behavior. One important question that follows from 
Chapters 2 and 3 is which motivational factors policy makers should be targeting. 
These chapters showed that personal norms, awareness of consequences, and 
outcome efficacy are all to some extent predictive of pro-environmental behaviors, 
with personal norms generally the strongest predictor of behavior. One way to 
promote pro-environmental behavior could be to target personal norms directly by 
focusing attention on the moral dimension of behavior (e.g. ‘purchasing organic 
products is the right thing to do’). However, such a strategy may not work when 
individuals are unaware of the environmental problems associated with certain 
behavior (low awareness of consequences) and/or when they feel that they are unable 
to contribute to solving these problems by changing their behavior (low outcome 
efficacy; Schwartz & Howard, 1981; Steg & De Groot, 2010). Schwartz and Howard 
(1981) suggest that under these circumstances, strengthening awareness of 
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consequences and/or outcome efficacy regarding particular behavior should lead to 
stronger associated personal norms as well, a suggestion verified by Steg and De 
Groot (2010) in a series of experimental studies. It follows that policy makers could 
also attempt to strengthen motivation to act pro-environmentally by focusing 
individuals’ attention on the consequences of not acting pro-environmentally 
(manipulating awareness of consequences) or on individuals’ ability to make a 
difference by engaging in the desired behavior (manipulating outcome efficacy). The 
results of Chapters 2-4 show that normative considerations can be predictive of pro-
environmental behavior, and therefore that manipulations that increase the strength 
of normative considerations regarding pro-environmental behavior (i.e. personal 
norms) can result in increased pro-environmental action.   
Indeed, the main practical conclusion from Chapters 2-4 is that normative 
considerations can be predictive of pro-environmental motivation and behavior, 
which implies that strategies strengthening these considerations (for example by 
implementing so-called ‘soft’ travel demand management strategies; Pas, 1995, 
Kitamura, Fujii, & Pas, 1997; Steg & Vlek, 2009) can result in increases in 
environmental motivation and behavior. However, these chapters also reveal that 
normative considerations are mainly predictive of environmental behavior when the 
costs of engaging in that behavior are relatively low (but not too low). Important 
policy implications follow from these findings. First, strategies that aim to motivate 
individuals to engage in pro-environmental behavior by appealing to normative 
considerations (e.g. personal norms) can lead to an increase in specific pro-
environmental motivation and behavior, but the likelihood that such strategies are 
effective in promoting pro-environmental motivations and behavior depends on the 
extent to which engaging in the associated behavior is perceived as costly. In concrete 
terms, such strategies may be effective when behavior is perceived as relatively low-
cost, but they are likely to be less effective when behavior is perceived as more costly 
or not costly at all. Second, related to this point, to maximize the effect of behavior 
change strategies that target normative considerations, policy makers would be well 
advised to first assess the perceived costliness of the behavior they want individuals 
to engage in. If these costs are too high, attempts to reduce these perceived costs 
should be planned alongside behavior change strategies that target individuals’ 
normative considerations regarding particular behavior in order to gain maximum 
results. 
Situational activation of normative considerations 
The introduction of this dissertation started with the central question ‘when, and to 
what extent, do individuals translate pro-environmental beliefs into motivation to act 
pro-environmentally?’ Chapters 2-4 provided steps towards answering this question 
by examining how differences in contextual barriers that might prevent individuals 
from acting upon their normative considerations influence the predictive power of 
these considerations. In Chapter 5, I approached the main question of this 
dissertation from a different but complementary angle by studying whether 
situational activation may increase the predictive power of normative considerations 
when contextual barriers are kept constant. Put differently, Chapter 5 focused on 
shifting the normative side of the balance. As a result, the central question that is 
being answered in Chapter 5 is the same as the one in Chapters 2-4, but the focus of 
the chapter is different: instead of focusing on differences in contextual barriers that 
prevent individuals from acting upon their normative considerations, it focuses on 
how to ‘increase the weight’ of these considerations in order to make them more 
predictive of pro-environmental motivation and behavior.  
 Apart from the focus on the ‘normative side’ of the balancing mechanism, 
Chapter 5 differed in another important way from the previous chapters. To gain 
broad and convergent support for the balancing mechanism, I used a different 
indicator of normative considerations in this chapter. Whereas the previous chapters 
focused on behavior-specific normative considerations, such as the extent to which 
individuals felt morally obliged to reduce their car use, Chapter 5 focused on more 
general normative considerations. These general considerations were operationalized 
as biospheric values, which reflect how important environmental issues are as a 
guiding principle in one’s life and whether enhancing environmental quality is an 
important goal to an individual (De Groot & Steg, 2008). The general nature of 
biospheric values means that these values are potentially predictive of a variety of 
pro-environmental beliefs and behaviors. Indeed, biospheric values are strongly 
related to a variety of environmental beliefs and norms (Steg, De Groot, Dreijerink, 
Abrahamse, & Siero, 2011; Steg & De Groot, 2012). However, research has provided 
mixed results with regard to the role of biospheric values as predictors of pro-
environmental intentions and behaviors: compare for example Nilsson, Von 
Borgstede, and Biel (2004) who report that biospheric values are predictive of pro-
environmental intentions and behaviors, with Honkanen and Verplanken (2004), 
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consequences and/or outcome efficacy regarding particular behavior should lead to 
stronger associated personal norms as well, a suggestion verified by Steg and De 
Groot (2010) in a series of experimental studies. It follows that policy makers could 
also attempt to strengthen motivation to act pro-environmentally by focusing 
individuals’ attention on the consequences of not acting pro-environmentally 
(manipulating awareness of consequences) or on individuals’ ability to make a 
difference by engaging in the desired behavior (manipulating outcome efficacy). The 
results of Chapters 2-4 show that normative considerations can be predictive of pro-
environmental behavior, and therefore that manipulations that increase the strength 
of normative considerations regarding pro-environmental behavior (i.e. personal 
norms) can result in increased pro-environmental action.   
Indeed, the main practical conclusion from Chapters 2-4 is that normative 
considerations can be predictive of pro-environmental motivation and behavior, 
which implies that strategies strengthening these considerations (for example by 
implementing so-called ‘soft’ travel demand management strategies; Pas, 1995, 
Kitamura, Fujii, & Pas, 1997; Steg & Vlek, 2009) can result in increases in 
environmental motivation and behavior. However, these chapters also reveal that 
normative considerations are mainly predictive of environmental behavior when the 
costs of engaging in that behavior are relatively low (but not too low). Important 
policy implications follow from these findings. First, strategies that aim to motivate 
individuals to engage in pro-environmental behavior by appealing to normative 
considerations (e.g. personal norms) can lead to an increase in specific pro-
environmental motivation and behavior, but the likelihood that such strategies are 
effective in promoting pro-environmental motivations and behavior depends on the 
extent to which engaging in the associated behavior is perceived as costly. In concrete 
terms, such strategies may be effective when behavior is perceived as relatively low-
cost, but they are likely to be less effective when behavior is perceived as more costly 
or not costly at all. Second, related to this point, to maximize the effect of behavior 
change strategies that target normative considerations, policy makers would be well 
advised to first assess the perceived costliness of the behavior they want individuals 
to engage in. If these costs are too high, attempts to reduce these perceived costs 
should be planned alongside behavior change strategies that target individuals’ 
normative considerations regarding particular behavior in order to gain maximum 
results. 
Situational activation of normative considerations 
The introduction of this dissertation started with the central question ‘when, and to 
what extent, do individuals translate pro-environmental beliefs into motivation to act 
pro-environmentally?’ Chapters 2-4 provided steps towards answering this question 
by examining how differences in contextual barriers that might prevent individuals 
from acting upon their normative considerations influence the predictive power of 
these considerations. In Chapter 5, I approached the main question of this 
dissertation from a different but complementary angle by studying whether 
situational activation may increase the predictive power of normative considerations 
when contextual barriers are kept constant. Put differently, Chapter 5 focused on 
shifting the normative side of the balance. As a result, the central question that is 
being answered in Chapter 5 is the same as the one in Chapters 2-4, but the focus of 
the chapter is different: instead of focusing on differences in contextual barriers that 
prevent individuals from acting upon their normative considerations, it focuses on 
how to ‘increase the weight’ of these considerations in order to make them more 
predictive of pro-environmental motivation and behavior.  
 Apart from the focus on the ‘normative side’ of the balancing mechanism, 
Chapter 5 differed in another important way from the previous chapters. To gain 
broad and convergent support for the balancing mechanism, I used a different 
indicator of normative considerations in this chapter. Whereas the previous chapters 
focused on behavior-specific normative considerations, such as the extent to which 
individuals felt morally obliged to reduce their car use, Chapter 5 focused on more 
general normative considerations. These general considerations were operationalized 
as biospheric values, which reflect how important environmental issues are as a 
guiding principle in one’s life and whether enhancing environmental quality is an 
important goal to an individual (De Groot & Steg, 2008). The general nature of 
biospheric values means that these values are potentially predictive of a variety of 
pro-environmental beliefs and behaviors. Indeed, biospheric values are strongly 
related to a variety of environmental beliefs and norms (Steg, De Groot, Dreijerink, 
Abrahamse, & Siero, 2011; Steg & De Groot, 2012). However, research has provided 
mixed results with regard to the role of biospheric values as predictors of pro-
environmental intentions and behaviors: compare for example Nilsson, Von 
Borgstede, and Biel (2004) who report that biospheric values are predictive of pro-
environmental intentions and behaviors, with Honkanen and Verplanken (2004), 
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Steg, Perlavicuite, Van der Werff, and Lurvink (2014), and Stern and Dietz (1994) 
who find that values both directly and indirectly predict motivation and behavior, and 
De Groot, Steg, and Dicke (2008), who find no direct relationships between values 
and behaviors.  
One reason why individuals may fail to translate their values into intentions or 
behavior is that biospheric values may not always be immediately accessible in every 
situation that offers an opportunity to act upon them by engaging in pro-
environmental behavior (Maio, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Steg, Bolderdijk, 
Keizer, & Perlaviciute, 2014). In other words, a lack of situational activation may 
serve as a barrier preventing individuals from translating their biospheric values into 
pro-environmental motivation and behavior. In Chapter 5, I used an experimental 
research design to explore this possibility because this method allows experimental 
control over the situation, which can be held constant except for the manipulated 
variable. 
In Chapter 5, I explored whether the activation of situational norms may 
result in an increase in the predictive power of biospheric values on pro-
environmental motivation. This line of thought was based upon the norm-activation 
model (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981) and value-belief-norm or VBN 
theory (Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999), which state that 
values may not necessarily be strongly predictive of behavior. Rather, they are 
important and often necessary antecedents of behavior-specific beliefs and norms, 
which in turn predict behavior. While values are by definition general and transcend 
situations, VBN theory conceptualizes norms on a more specific level, providing the 
step from a general value (environmental quality is important) to a situational norm 
(I ought to engage in a specific pro-environmental act), which in turn motivates 
individuals to engage in value-congruent behavior. In other words, abstract, general 
values may influence motivation and behavior indirectly through more specific 
situational norms (e.g. De Groot et al., 2008; Jakovcevic & Steg, 2013; Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2002; 2003; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005; Stern et al., 1999), which 
implies that norms are the more proximal predictor of behavior.  
The above reasoning suggests that for biospheric values to be predictive of 
behavior, individuals need to translate them into situational norms, which in turn 
affect their motivation to act pro-environmentally. The activation of such specific 
norms should particularly increase the motivation to engage in pro-environmental 
behavior among individuals with moderate to strong biospheric values, because these 
norms provide a link between their general pro-environmental beliefs and specific 
pro-environmental behaviors. For individuals with weak biospheric values, however, 
such a situational norm activation is unlikely to increase their pro-environmental 
motivation, because they do not strongly care about the quality of the environment 
and are therefore less likely to act pro-environmentally in the first place, irrespective 
of whether specific norms that correspond to these weak biospheric values are 
situationally activated or not. Verplanken and Holland (2002) hypothesized and 
showed similarly weak effects of the activation of biospheric values on pro-
environmental intentions among individuals with weak biospheric values. 
  In Chapter 5, I tested this idea by examining whether situationally activating 
environmental norms (specifically, requesting individuals to write down 
environmental norms) resulted in increased pro-environmental motivation among 
individuals with stronger biospheric values, but not among those with weaker 
biosperic values. Moreover, I broadened the scope of this line of research by also 
testing whether the activation of broad, societal norms (that suggest ‘doing the right 
thing’, such as ‘be honest’) encourages pro-environmental motivation. While 
environmental norms are domain-specific, broad societal norms transcend specific 
behavioral domains and can therefore function as intermediaries between values and 
motivation in more than one behavioral domain. The situational activation of societal 
norms is most likely to result in an increase in pro-environmental motivation among 
individuals with strong biospheric values, because such strong values reflect a belief 
that acting pro-environmentally is ‘the right thing to do’ (De Groot & Steg, 2008; 
Maio, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002), causing individuals to translate 
situational norms calling on them to do the right thing into pro-environmental 
motivation and behavior. Put differently, this means that activating broad societal 
norms may result in increased pro-environmental motivation among individuals who 
perceive environmental issues as important (those with relatively strong biospheric 
values), while it is unlikely to do so among those who do not perceive environmental 
issues as important. In other words, I expected the activation of societal norms to 
lead to the same pattern of results as the activation of environmental norms. 
The results of Chapter 5 supported this line of thought. Indeed, the results 
revealed that both the situational activation of environmental norms and of broad, 
societal norms led to increased pro-environmental motivation (in this case intentions 
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Steg, Perlavicuite, Van der Werff, and Lurvink (2014), and Stern and Dietz (1994) 
who find that values both directly and indirectly predict motivation and behavior, and 
De Groot, Steg, and Dicke (2008), who find no direct relationships between values 
and behaviors.  
One reason why individuals may fail to translate their values into intentions or 
behavior is that biospheric values may not always be immediately accessible in every 
situation that offers an opportunity to act upon them by engaging in pro-
environmental behavior (Maio, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Steg, Bolderdijk, 
Keizer, & Perlaviciute, 2014). In other words, a lack of situational activation may 
serve as a barrier preventing individuals from translating their biospheric values into 
pro-environmental motivation and behavior. In Chapter 5, I used an experimental 
research design to explore this possibility because this method allows experimental 
control over the situation, which can be held constant except for the manipulated 
variable. 
In Chapter 5, I explored whether the activation of situational norms may 
result in an increase in the predictive power of biospheric values on pro-
environmental motivation. This line of thought was based upon the norm-activation 
model (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981) and value-belief-norm or VBN 
theory (Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999), which state that 
values may not necessarily be strongly predictive of behavior. Rather, they are 
important and often necessary antecedents of behavior-specific beliefs and norms, 
which in turn predict behavior. While values are by definition general and transcend 
situations, VBN theory conceptualizes norms on a more specific level, providing the 
step from a general value (environmental quality is important) to a situational norm 
(I ought to engage in a specific pro-environmental act), which in turn motivates 
individuals to engage in value-congruent behavior. In other words, abstract, general 
values may influence motivation and behavior indirectly through more specific 
situational norms (e.g. De Groot et al., 2008; Jakovcevic & Steg, 2013; Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2002; 2003; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005; Stern et al., 1999), which 
implies that norms are the more proximal predictor of behavior.  
The above reasoning suggests that for biospheric values to be predictive of 
behavior, individuals need to translate them into situational norms, which in turn 
affect their motivation to act pro-environmentally. The activation of such specific 
norms should particularly increase the motivation to engage in pro-environmental 
behavior among individuals with moderate to strong biospheric values, because these 
norms provide a link between their general pro-environmental beliefs and specific 
pro-environmental behaviors. For individuals with weak biospheric values, however, 
such a situational norm activation is unlikely to increase their pro-environmental 
motivation, because they do not strongly care about the quality of the environment 
and are therefore less likely to act pro-environmentally in the first place, irrespective 
of whether specific norms that correspond to these weak biospheric values are 
situationally activated or not. Verplanken and Holland (2002) hypothesized and 
showed similarly weak effects of the activation of biospheric values on pro-
environmental intentions among individuals with weak biospheric values. 
  In Chapter 5, I tested this idea by examining whether situationally activating 
environmental norms (specifically, requesting individuals to write down 
environmental norms) resulted in increased pro-environmental motivation among 
individuals with stronger biospheric values, but not among those with weaker 
biosperic values. Moreover, I broadened the scope of this line of research by also 
testing whether the activation of broad, societal norms (that suggest ‘doing the right 
thing’, such as ‘be honest’) encourages pro-environmental motivation. While 
environmental norms are domain-specific, broad societal norms transcend specific 
behavioral domains and can therefore function as intermediaries between values and 
motivation in more than one behavioral domain. The situational activation of societal 
norms is most likely to result in an increase in pro-environmental motivation among 
individuals with strong biospheric values, because such strong values reflect a belief 
that acting pro-environmentally is ‘the right thing to do’ (De Groot & Steg, 2008; 
Maio, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002), causing individuals to translate 
situational norms calling on them to do the right thing into pro-environmental 
motivation and behavior. Put differently, this means that activating broad societal 
norms may result in increased pro-environmental motivation among individuals who 
perceive environmental issues as important (those with relatively strong biospheric 
values), while it is unlikely to do so among those who do not perceive environmental 
issues as important. In other words, I expected the activation of societal norms to 
lead to the same pattern of results as the activation of environmental norms. 
The results of Chapter 5 supported this line of thought. Indeed, the results 
revealed that both the situational activation of environmental norms and of broad, 
societal norms led to increased pro-environmental motivation (in this case intentions 
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to support an environmental NGO) among individuals with moderate to strong 
biospheric values. At the same time, both types of situational norm activation had no 
effect on intention to support the NGO for individuals with weaker biospheric values. 
These results indicate that situational norm activation can lead to increased pro-
environmental motivation, but this effect is limited to those who already endorse 
biospheric values to some extent. However, at the same time, these values need not 
be very strongly endorsed: the situational norm activation effect also occurred for 
those with moderately strong biospheric values. 
 Moving beyond previous research, this study shows that the activation of 
domain-specific environmental norms and more general societal norms yielded 
similar effects. That is, both types of situational norm activation led to a stronger 
intention to support an environmental NGO relative to a control group. This is 
important, because it suggests that it is the situational norm activation itself, rather 
than the specific environmental content of the activated norms, that led individuals to 
report a stronger intention to support an environmental NGO. Moreover, in both 
norm activation conditions the effect was driven by individuals with moderate to 
strong biospheric values. This implies that the activation of either domain-specific 
environmental norms or general societal norms can promote value-congruent pro-
environmental behavior. I will discuss the implications of these findings in greater 
detail below. 
 
Theoretical and practical implications of the situational activation of 
normative considerations 
The results of Chapter 5 show that individuals are more likely to act upon general 
normative considerations regarding the environment when situational norms are 
activated than when they are not. As such, this study provides important support for 
the balancing mechanism, because it shows that, under identical levels of behavioral 
costs, individuals are more likely to act pro-environmentally when situational norms 
are activated than when they are not. In other words, Chapter 5 shows that next to 
changing the behavioral costs of engaging in particular pro-environmental behavior, 
policy makers may also change the extent to which situational norms are activated to 
motivate individuals to engage in this behavior. 
Theoretically, the results of Chapter 5 fit the idea that general normative 
considerations, such as biospheric values, require situational activation in order to be 
translated into motivation and action (e.g. Verplanken and Holland, 2002). However, 
Chapter 5 also extends these results by showing that value-congruent actions can be 
promoted by not only activating biospheric values directly (by focusing attention on 
the importance of a specific behavioral domain), but also by focusing attention on 
situational norms. Conceptually, value-activation and situational norm activation are 
importantly different: A value activation manipulation focuses attention on the self-
importance of a specific behavioral domain (‘the environment’), while situational 
norm activation focuses attention on norms toward normative action within a specific 
domain (‘you ought to act environmentally friendly’). As such, the latter is arguably 
more proximal to motivation than the former. Despite this conceptual difference, 
however, the results reported in Chapter 5 are comparable  to the ones reported by 
Verplanken and Holland, and also in line with research conducted on the value-
belief-norm model that reveals that values are mainly indirectly predictive of 
intention and behavior through more specific beliefs and norms (e.g. . De Groot, Steg, 
& Dicke, 2008; Jakovcevic & Steg, 2013; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; 2003; Steg, 
Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). 
The novel finding that the activation of domain-specific environmental norms 
and more general societal norms result in similar increases in pro-environmental 
motivation has potentially important theoretical and practical implications. First, the 
fact that activated general societal norms and domain-specific environmental norms 
caused similar increases in value-congruent pro-environmental motivation suggests 
that it is the situational norm activation itself, rather than the specific environmental 
content of the activated norms, that caused the increased pro-environmental 
motivation. Second, the finding that general societal norms can cause an increase in 
pro-environmental motivation among individuals who endorse biospheric values 
implies that manipulations that activate such general norms can lead to an increased 
motivation to engage in normative behavior in any behavioral domain as long as 
individuals endorse corresponding values. For example, activated general societal 
norms may also lead to an increased motivation to engage in helping behavior among 
individuals who endorse altruistic values. However, because I only tested the effect of 
the situational norm activation manipulations within the environmental domain, I 
can only speculate about the effects of activation of general societal norms in other 
behavioral domains. However, it appears unlikely that activating societal norms 
would affect motivation in the environmental domain but not in other domains of 
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to support an environmental NGO) among individuals with moderate to strong 
biospheric values. At the same time, both types of situational norm activation had no 
effect on intention to support the NGO for individuals with weaker biospheric values. 
These results indicate that situational norm activation can lead to increased pro-
environmental motivation, but this effect is limited to those who already endorse 
biospheric values to some extent. However, at the same time, these values need not 
be very strongly endorsed: the situational norm activation effect also occurred for 
those with moderately strong biospheric values. 
 Moving beyond previous research, this study shows that the activation of 
domain-specific environmental norms and more general societal norms yielded 
similar effects. That is, both types of situational norm activation led to a stronger 
intention to support an environmental NGO relative to a control group. This is 
important, because it suggests that it is the situational norm activation itself, rather 
than the specific environmental content of the activated norms, that led individuals to 
report a stronger intention to support an environmental NGO. Moreover, in both 
norm activation conditions the effect was driven by individuals with moderate to 
strong biospheric values. This implies that the activation of either domain-specific 
environmental norms or general societal norms can promote value-congruent pro-
environmental behavior. I will discuss the implications of these findings in greater 
detail below. 
 
Theoretical and practical implications of the situational activation of 
normative considerations 
The results of Chapter 5 show that individuals are more likely to act upon general 
normative considerations regarding the environment when situational norms are 
activated than when they are not. As such, this study provides important support for 
the balancing mechanism, because it shows that, under identical levels of behavioral 
costs, individuals are more likely to act pro-environmentally when situational norms 
are activated than when they are not. In other words, Chapter 5 shows that next to 
changing the behavioral costs of engaging in particular pro-environmental behavior, 
policy makers may also change the extent to which situational norms are activated to 
motivate individuals to engage in this behavior. 
Theoretically, the results of Chapter 5 fit the idea that general normative 
considerations, such as biospheric values, require situational activation in order to be 
translated into motivation and action (e.g. Verplanken and Holland, 2002). However, 
Chapter 5 also extends these results by showing that value-congruent actions can be 
promoted by not only activating biospheric values directly (by focusing attention on 
the importance of a specific behavioral domain), but also by focusing attention on 
situational norms. Conceptually, value-activation and situational norm activation are 
importantly different: A value activation manipulation focuses attention on the self-
importance of a specific behavioral domain (‘the environment’), while situational 
norm activation focuses attention on norms toward normative action within a specific 
domain (‘you ought to act environmentally friendly’). As such, the latter is arguably 
more proximal to motivation than the former. Despite this conceptual difference, 
however, the results reported in Chapter 5 are comparable  to the ones reported by 
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belief-norm model that reveals that values are mainly indirectly predictive of 
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Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). 
The novel finding that the activation of domain-specific environmental norms 
and more general societal norms result in similar increases in pro-environmental 
motivation has potentially important theoretical and practical implications. First, the 
fact that activated general societal norms and domain-specific environmental norms 
caused similar increases in value-congruent pro-environmental motivation suggests 
that it is the situational norm activation itself, rather than the specific environmental 
content of the activated norms, that caused the increased pro-environmental 
motivation. Second, the finding that general societal norms can cause an increase in 
pro-environmental motivation among individuals who endorse biospheric values 
implies that manipulations that activate such general norms can lead to an increased 
motivation to engage in normative behavior in any behavioral domain as long as 
individuals endorse corresponding values. For example, activated general societal 
norms may also lead to an increased motivation to engage in helping behavior among 
individuals who endorse altruistic values. However, because I only tested the effect of 
the situational norm activation manipulations within the environmental domain, I 
can only speculate about the effects of activation of general societal norms in other 
behavioral domains. However, it appears unlikely that activating societal norms 
would affect motivation in the environmental domain but not in other domains of 
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pro-social behavior. The key point here is that because general societal norms are 
broader than environmental norms (but still overlapping, cf. Lindenberg & Steg 
2007), a focus on societal norms may have an additional advantage of being able to 
motivate a broader range of pro-social behavior. 
  The experimental design used to study the effects of situational norm 
activation in Chapter 5 differs clearly from the large-scale surveys employed in 
Chapters 2-4. Compared to these surveys, the experimental method used in Chapter 5 
has the important benefit of providing information about causality: the design 
showed that situational norm activation caused biospheric values to be more 
predictive of pro-environmental motivation relative to a control group. However, a 
drawback of the chosen method is that it does not allow for the extensive tests of the 
generalizability of the results across behaviors and countries that I was able to 
conduct in Chapters 2-4. However, because studies on value structures in different 
countries consistently report the presence of a separate, strongly-supported 
biospheric values cluster (see for example De Groot & Steg, 2007, 2008, 2010; 
Gronhoj & Thogersen 2009; Honkanen & Verplanken 2004; Nilsson, Von Borgstede, 
& Biel, 2004; Steg & De Groot, 2012), and the relationships between values, norms, 
and behavior as predicted by VBN theory have been replicated internationally as well 
(e.g. De Groot et al., 2008, Jakovcevic & Steg, 2013; Lee, 2008; Stern et al., 1999)), it 
seems at least plausible that the general pattern of results indicating that situational 
norm activation leads to increased value-congruent pro-environmental motivation 
among individuals with relatively strong biospheric values can be replicated across 
countries and continents. However, future research must be conducted to test 
whether this is indeed the case. 
Practically, the finding that situationally activating norms can lead to 
increased motivation to act pro-environmentally has clear policy implications. First, 
it shows that focusing individuals’ attention on environmental norms in a situation in 
which they are able to translate these norms into pro-environmental action may lead 
to increased pro-environmental motivation and behavior. This may suggest to 
organizers and practitioners of environmental action that one way to motivate 
individuals to engage in pro-environmental actions is to activate the relevant norms 
in situations in which individuals can translate these norms into action (e.g., norm 
statements on billboards or posters at gas stations or in shops). Second, the results 
also suggest that activating more general societal norms may lead to increased 
motivation to act pro-environmentally (e.g., billboard or poster statements that target 
"doing the right thing"). This implies that both the activation of domain-specific 
norms and norms that transcend behavioral domains may result in increased pro-
environmental behavior. It should be noted that these efforts may only be effective 
for those who already endorse biospheric values to some extent. Yet, because research 
suggests that biospheric values are endorsed by many across different cultures (See 
Steg & De Groot, 2012, for a review), this precondition is not a strong limitation to 
the potential effectiveness of the activation of such general societal norms.  
 
Limitations and future research directions 
Taken together, the research in all four chapters in this dissertation provides new and 
deeper insight into the circumstances under which individuals are likely to translate 
their normative considerations into pro-environmental motivation and behavior. 
However, a broad topic like the one tackled in this dissertation requires choices that 
limit the interpretation of the research and/or leave interesting questions 
unanswered. In the section below, I briefly describe relevant limitations and note 
some of the main avenues for future research that flow directly from the research 
reported in the previous chapters.  
One of the most difficult issues to resolve when conducting this research 
project was how to measure the perceived costs of engaging in particular behavior. 
The decision to attempt to measure individuals’ perception of costs, rather than try to 
objectively measure these costs, was based on the belief that it is this perception of 
costs that prevents individuals from engaging in particular actions. This part of the 
decision was relatively straightforward. However, the decision how to measure these 
perceived costs was more difficult. I chose to conceptualize behavioral costs as the 
inverse of individuals’ ability to engage in particular behaviors because this inverse 
(proxy) measure of behavioral costs meets the criteria of practical feasibility (ability is 
relatively easy to measure) and comprehensiveness (by encompassing the general 
perception individuals have of a behavior). However, the downside of using such a 
general measure of behavioral costs is that I may have missed out on more specific 
knowledge about what makes particular behaviors more or less costly to an 
individual. To test the low-cost hypothesis and the balancing mechanism, I did not 
require this specific knowledge, because my interest was in the extent to which 
individuals perceived a specific behavior as costly and how this affected their 
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behavior, not in the reasons why they perceived it as costly. However, in future 
research it would be interesting to find out more about the role of specific costs in this 
respect. Such research could attempt to do so by including additional, more detailed 
questions on why people perceive engaging in particular behaviors as more or less 
costly, as this knowledge may have important implications for policy makers 
attempting to make (desired) pro-environmental behaviors less costly. This might 
also enable a test of the convergent validity of broad and specific measures of 
behavioral costs, providing insight into whether broad measures, such as the ones 
included in this dissertation, and more specific measures yield similar results.  
Looking beyond the confines of this study, an interesting topic for discussion is 
the generalizability of these results into other behavioral domains. How would these 
findings correspond to domains outside the realm of pro-environmental behavior? 
With respect to the balancing mechanism, which states that individuals balance their 
desire to act normatively against the costs of doing so, the main determinants of 
whether individuals act upon their normative considerations regarding particular 
action are its perceived associated costs and benefits. The environmental behaviors 
included in this dissertation are associated with varying degrees of individual costs 
and societal benefits (e.g. reducing your car use to reduce environmental issues is 
costly to you personally, as you have to find an alternative, while the environmental 
advantages can be enjoyed by everyone). Many types of pro-social behavior (for 
example donating money to charity or volunteering for a local welfare organization) 
provide similar combinations of higher and lower individual costs and societal 
benefits (Steg & De Groot, 2010). Because of this similarity, it seems likely that the 
balancing mechanism applies to pro-social behavior as well. A different type of 
behavioral decision, where individuals face the decision whether to do ‘the right 
thing’ for themselves or not (for example going to the gym to work on your health or 
cooking a healthy meal instead of ordering take-away), might provide an interesting 
alternative direction for future research. The costs and benefits of health behaviors 
are both individual, but individuals are still weighing their desire to do the right thing 
(e.g. go to the gym) versus the costs of doing so (having to go there, changing into 
sports outfit, sweating). Based on the results of the research presented here, I would 
suggest that individuals are more likely to engage in healthy behavior when the costs 
of doing so are relatively low than when these costs are higher. However, as the 
conflict of motives that plays a role here is different from the one facing individuals 
who decide whether or not to act pro-environmentally, future research should show 
whether this is indeed the case. 
Next to the generalizability across behavioral domains, the generalizability of 
results across specific pro-environmental behaviors is also interesting. The results 
reported in Chapters 2-4 show that individuals are more likely to translate normative 
considerations into different behaviors (reducing car use, using energy from 
renewable sources, and accepting policy measures) when the perceived costs of doing 
so are relatively low than when these costs are higher or very low. However, recent 
research suggest that for certain individuals and behaviors (e.g. purchasing an 
electric vehicle) pro-environmental behavior becomes more attractive when the costs 
of engaging in it are higher because of the positive signaling function of engaging in 
relatively high-cost normative behavior (Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010; 
Noppers, Steg, Keizer, & Bolderdijk, in press). Future research could focus on 
identifying the factors that cause individuals to be inhibited or motivated by high 
perceived behavioral costs of pro-environmental behavior, because this knowledge 
could help practitioners to decide whether attempting to reduce the costs of specific 
pro-environmental behavior is likely to lead to an increase in uptake or not.  
Another open question for future study is what happens when the two types of 
external factors that are included in this dissertation are combined in a single study. 
In Chapters 2-4, I studied the effect of contextual barriers: inhibiting factors that are 
embedded in a system that affect the costliness of engaging in particular pro-
environmental behaviors. In Chapter 5, the external factors under study consisted of 
situational reminders of pro-environmental behavior: temporary, situation-specific 
factors that affect the predictive power of individuals’ biospheric values. It would be 
of great interest to combine these contextual barriers and situational reminders in 
future research to see how they interact to affect pro-environmental behavior. For 
example, will situational reminders of pro-environmental behavior be effective under 
conditions of high behavioral costs, for example by motivating individuals to switch 
to costly energy from renewable sources? Or are contextual barriers so important in 
individuals’ decision-making that situational reminders have no impact when the cost 
of engaging in behavior is high? Future research can shed more light on these 
intriguing questions.    
Taking a final step back from the results presented in this dissertation, one 
may wonder how important normative considerations actually are as predictors of 
6General discussion
129
behavior, not in the reasons why they perceived it as costly. However, in future 
research it would be interesting to find out more about the role of specific costs in this 
respect. Such research could attempt to do so by including additional, more detailed 
questions on why people perceive engaging in particular behaviors as more or less 
costly, as this knowledge may have important implications for policy makers 
attempting to make (desired) pro-environmental behaviors less costly. This might 
also enable a test of the convergent validity of broad and specific measures of 
behavioral costs, providing insight into whether broad measures, such as the ones 
included in this dissertation, and more specific measures yield similar results.  
Looking beyond the confines of this study, an interesting topic for discussion is 
the generalizability of these results into other behavioral domains. How would these 
findings correspond to domains outside the realm of pro-environmental behavior? 
With respect to the balancing mechanism, which states that individuals balance their 
desire to act normatively against the costs of doing so, the main determinants of 
whether individuals act upon their normative considerations regarding particular 
action are its perceived associated costs and benefits. The environmental behaviors 
included in this dissertation are associated with varying degrees of individual costs 
and societal benefits (e.g. reducing your car use to reduce environmental issues is 
costly to you personally, as you have to find an alternative, while the environmental 
advantages can be enjoyed by everyone). Many types of pro-social behavior (for 
example donating money to charity or volunteering for a local welfare organization) 
provide similar combinations of higher and lower individual costs and societal 
benefits (Steg & De Groot, 2010). Because of this similarity, it seems likely that the 
balancing mechanism applies to pro-social behavior as well. A different type of 
behavioral decision, where individuals face the decision whether to do ‘the right 
thing’ for themselves or not (for example going to the gym to work on your health or 
cooking a healthy meal instead of ordering take-away), might provide an interesting 
alternative direction for future research. The costs and benefits of health behaviors 
are both individual, but individuals are still weighing their desire to do the right thing 
(e.g. go to the gym) versus the costs of doing so (having to go there, changing into 
sports outfit, sweating). Based on the results of the research presented here, I would 
suggest that individuals are more likely to engage in healthy behavior when the costs 
of doing so are relatively low than when these costs are higher. However, as the 
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whether this is indeed the case. 
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results across specific pro-environmental behaviors is also interesting. The results 
reported in Chapters 2-4 show that individuals are more likely to translate normative 
considerations into different behaviors (reducing car use, using energy from 
renewable sources, and accepting policy measures) when the perceived costs of doing 
so are relatively low than when these costs are higher or very low. However, recent 
research suggest that for certain individuals and behaviors (e.g. purchasing an 
electric vehicle) pro-environmental behavior becomes more attractive when the costs 
of engaging in it are higher because of the positive signaling function of engaging in 
relatively high-cost normative behavior (Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010; 
Noppers, Steg, Keizer, & Bolderdijk, in press). Future research could focus on 
identifying the factors that cause individuals to be inhibited or motivated by high 
perceived behavioral costs of pro-environmental behavior, because this knowledge 
could help practitioners to decide whether attempting to reduce the costs of specific 
pro-environmental behavior is likely to lead to an increase in uptake or not.  
Another open question for future study is what happens when the two types of 
external factors that are included in this dissertation are combined in a single study. 
In Chapters 2-4, I studied the effect of contextual barriers: inhibiting factors that are 
embedded in a system that affect the costliness of engaging in particular pro-
environmental behaviors. In Chapter 5, the external factors under study consisted of 
situational reminders of pro-environmental behavior: temporary, situation-specific 
factors that affect the predictive power of individuals’ biospheric values. It would be 
of great interest to combine these contextual barriers and situational reminders in 
future research to see how they interact to affect pro-environmental behavior. For 
example, will situational reminders of pro-environmental behavior be effective under 
conditions of high behavioral costs, for example by motivating individuals to switch 
to costly energy from renewable sources? Or are contextual barriers so important in 
individuals’ decision-making that situational reminders have no impact when the cost 
of engaging in behavior is high? Future research can shed more light on these 
intriguing questions.    
Taking a final step back from the results presented in this dissertation, one 
may wonder how important normative considerations actually are as predictors of 
pro-environmental behaviors. In all four chapters, the percentage of variance that is 
explained by normative considerations remains below 25%. These percentages are in 
line with previous research: normative considerations are typically not the only factor 
influencing environmentally significant behavior (Stern, 2000), and the inclusion of 
other factors, such as non-environmental motives, typically increases the predictive 
power of models of pro-environmental behavior (Nordlund & Gärvill, 2003). So what 
does this tell us about the importance of normative considerations? The take-home 
message of this dissertation is that normative considerations can be important 
predictors of pro-environmental behavior, but only under particular conditions. 
Specifically, I conclude that the relationship between normative considerations 
and pro-environmental behavior is stronger when the perceived costs of engaging in 
this behavior is relatively low than when these costs are high or very low, showing 
that under these circumstances, normative considerations can be important 
predictors of pro-environmental motivation and behavior. Additionally, individuals 
are more likely to act upon their normative considerations when these considerations 
are situationally activated, which implies that the importance of normative 
considerations as predictors of pro-environmental behavior can be situationally 
enhanced. Taken together, this dissertation shows that normative considerations can 
be important predictors of pro-environmental behaviors – as long as those in control 
of external factors enable it. The fact that most individuals care about the 
environment and that they feel obliged to contribute to enhancing environmental 
quality matters, because it means that when external factors are managed well, these 
individuals may not only say they care, but act on it too.    
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Normatieve overwegingen als voorspellers van milieuvriendelijk gedrag 
 
Veel mensen maken zich zorgen om de kwaliteit van het milieu en voelen zich 
verplicht om zelf bij te dragen aan het verbeteren hiervan (EcoAmerica, 2011; 
Eurobarometer, 2011). Maar waarom vertalen mensen deze milieuvriendelijke 
overwegingen in sommige situaties wel in milieuvriendelijk gedrag, maar in andere 
niet? Welke andere overwegingen zorgen ervoor dat mensen soms milieuvriendelijk 
handelen, maar soms ook niet? Opvallend genoeg is naar deze vragen weinig 
systematisch onderzoek gedaan. Met dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd om dit gat 
deels te vullen door te onderzoeken in welke situaties en in welke mate mensen hun 
milieuvriendelijke overwegingen omzetten in de motivatie om milieuvriendelijk te 
handelen. 
 De vragen wanneer en in welke mate mensen naar hun milieuvriendelijke 
overwegingen handelen belichten slechts één kant van de medaille. Terwijl deze 
overwegingen mensen motiveren om milieuvriendelijk te handelen, kunnen 
omgevingsfactoren die milieuvriendelijk gedrag kostbaar maken dit gedrag juist 
afremmen. Dit betekent dat mensen bij de keuze om milieuvriendelijk te handelen 
vaak een conflict ervaren tussen normatieve overwegingen (die ik definieer als 
‘overwegingen waarbij het welzijn van het milieu en anderen centraal staat, niet het 
eigenbelang van het individu’), en egoïstische overwegingen zoals de motivatie om 
kostbaar gedrag te vermijden (bijv. Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Met andere woorden, 
mensen zullen in veel situaties hun motivatie om normatief te handelen afzetten 
tegen hun motivatie om hoge kosten van normatief gedrag te vermijden (Diekmann & 
Preisendörfer, 2003; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 1977). 
   In dit proefschrift verwijs ik naar deze afweging met de term balanceren; het 
gaat hier immers om de balans tussen twee overwegingen die het gedrag in 
tegengestelde richting kunnen sturen. Het uitgangspunt van mijn onderzoek is dat de 
uitkomst van deze afweging afhangt van twee factoren: de kracht en toegankelijkheid 
van normatieve overwegingen, en de mate waarin externe barrières voor het vertonen 
van milieuvriendelijk gedrag worden ervaren. Om brede en convergente steun voor 
dit balanceringsproces te vinden heb ik meerdere indicatoren van normatieve 
overwegingen en verschillende typen milieuvriendelijk gedrag opgenomen in mijn 
onderzoek. Door te toetsen in welke mate normatieve overwegingen voorspellend zijn 
voor milieuvriendelijke motivatie en gedrag in situaties waarin de kracht van 
waargenomen externe barrières verschilt (hoofdstukken 2 t/m 4) en in situaties 
waarin de toegankelijkheid van normatieve overwegingen verschilt (hoofdstuk 5) heb 
ik geprobeerd tot een antwoord te komen op de centrale vraag wanneer en in welke 
mate mensen hun normatieve overwegingen vertalen in de motivatie om 
milieuvriendelijk te handelen. De meeste studies zijn bovendien gedaan in 
verschillende landen, zodat ik ook conclusies kan trekken over de 
generaliseerbaarheid van dit antwoord. 
  
De voorspellende waarde van normatieve overwegingen als een functie 
van verschillende niveaus van kosten 
 
In hoofdstukken 2-4 heb ik via grootschalige en internationale surveys getoetst in 
welke mate gedragsspecifieke normatieve overwegingen milieuvriendelijk gedrag 
voorspellen onder verschillende niveaus van waargenomen kosten van dat gedrag. Ik 
heb deze gedragsspecifieke normatieve overweging gemeten door te  vragen in welke 
mate mensen zich moreel verplicht voelen om specifiek milieuvriendelijk gedrag te 
vertonen (de sterkte van hun persoonlijke norm om dit gedrag te vertonen; Schwartz, 
1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Op dit gedragsspecifieke niveau kunnen de kosten 
van het vertonen van specifiek gedrag (in termen van geld, tijd, of moeite) een 
belangrijke barrière zijn die mensen ervan weerhoudt om naar hun gedragsspecifieke 
normatieve overwegingen te handelen omdat het verlangen om deze hoge kosten te 
vermijden zwaarder kan wegen dan het verlangen om normatief te handelen. (zie 
bijvoorbeeld Diekmann & Preisendörfer 2003; Guagnano, Stern & Dietz, 1995; 
Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Steg, Bolderdijk, Keizer & Perlavicuite, 
2014). 
 De hypothese dat hoge kosten van gedrag normatieve overwegingen kunnen 
‘wegdrukken’ staat in de literatuur bekend als de ‘low-cost hypothesis’ (Diekmann & 
Preisendörfer, 2003). Deze hypothese stelt dat mensen hun normatieve 
overwegingen om milieuvriendelijk te handelen eerder in gedrag vertalen wanneer  
de kosten van dat gedrag relatief laag zijn dan wanneer deze kosten hoger zijn. 
Verschillende studies hebben deze hypothese getoetst, maar de resultaten zijn niet 
eenduidig (Best, 2010). Een aantal onderzoeksresultaten ondersteunt de hypothese 
(zie bijvoorbeeld Derksen & Gartrell, 1993 en Diekmann & Preisendörfer 1998; 
2003), terwijl andere studies juist geen steun laten zien (zie bijvoorbeeld Best, 2010 
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Normatieve overwegingen als voorspellers van milieuvriendelijk gedrag 
 
Veel mensen maken zich zorgen om de kwaliteit van het milieu en voelen zich 
verplicht om zelf bij te dragen aan het verbeteren hiervan (EcoAmerica, 2011; 
Eurobarometer, 2011). Maar waarom vertalen mensen deze milieuvriendelijke 
overwegingen in sommige situaties wel in milieuvriendelijk gedrag, maar in andere 
niet? Welke andere overwegingen zorgen ervoor dat mensen soms milieuvriendelijk 
handelen, maar soms ook niet? Opvallend genoeg is naar deze vragen weinig 
systematisch onderzoek gedaan. Met dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd om dit gat 
deels te vullen door te onderzoeken in welke situaties en in welke mate mensen hun 
milieuvriendelijke overwegingen omzetten in de motivatie om milieuvriendelijk te 
handelen. 
 De vragen wanneer en in welke mate mensen naar hun milieuvriendelijke 
overwegingen handelen belichten slechts één kant van de medaille. Terwijl deze 
overwegingen mensen motiveren om milieuvriendelijk te handelen, kunnen 
omgevingsfactoren die milieuvriendelijk gedrag kostbaar maken dit gedrag juist 
afremmen. Dit betekent dat mensen bij de keuze om milieuvriendelijk te handelen 
vaak een conflict ervaren tussen normatieve overwegingen (die ik definieer als 
‘overwegingen waarbij het welzijn van het milieu en anderen centraal staat, niet het 
eigenbelang van het individu’), en egoïstische overwegingen zoals de motivatie om 
kostbaar gedrag te vermijden (bijv. Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Met andere woorden, 
mensen zullen in veel situaties hun motivatie om normatief te handelen afzetten 
tegen hun motivatie om hoge kosten van normatief gedrag te vermijden (Diekmann & 
Preisendörfer, 2003; Matthies & Blöbaum, 2007; Schwartz, 1977). 
   In dit proefschrift verwijs ik naar deze afweging met de term balanceren; het 
gaat hier immers om de balans tussen twee overwegingen die het gedrag in 
tegengestelde richting kunnen sturen. Het uitgangspunt van mijn onderzoek is dat de 
uitkomst van deze afweging afhangt van twee factoren: de kracht en toegankelijkheid 
van normatieve overwegingen, en de mate waarin externe barrières voor het vertonen 
van milieuvriendelijk gedrag worden ervaren. Om brede en convergente steun voor 
dit balanceringsproces te vinden heb ik meerdere indicatoren van normatieve 
overwegingen en verschillende typen milieuvriendelijk gedrag opgenomen in mijn 
onderzoek. Door te toetsen in welke mate normatieve overwegingen voorspellend zijn 
voor milieuvriendelijke motivatie en gedrag in situaties waarin de kracht van 
waargenomen externe barrières verschilt (hoofdstukken 2 t/m 4) en in situaties 
waarin de toegankelijkheid van normatieve overwegingen verschilt (hoofdstuk 5) heb 
ik geprobeerd tot een antwoord te komen op de centrale vraag wanneer en in welke 
mate mensen hun normatieve overwegingen vertalen in de motivatie om 
milieuvriendelijk te handelen. De meeste studies zijn bovendien gedaan in 
verschillende landen, zodat ik ook conclusies kan trekken over de 
generaliseerbaarheid van dit antwoord. 
  
De voorspellende waarde van normatieve overwegingen als een functie 
van verschillende niveaus van kosten 
 
In hoofdstukken 2-4 heb ik via grootschalige en internationale surveys getoetst in 
welke mate gedragsspecifieke normatieve overwegingen milieuvriendelijk gedrag 
voorspellen onder verschillende niveaus van waargenomen kosten van dat gedrag. Ik 
heb deze gedragsspecifieke normatieve overweging gemeten door te  vragen in welke 
mate mensen zich moreel verplicht voelen om specifiek milieuvriendelijk gedrag te 
vertonen (de sterkte van hun persoonlijke norm om dit gedrag te vertonen; Schwartz, 
1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Op dit gedragsspecifieke niveau kunnen de kosten 
van het vertonen van specifiek gedrag (in termen van geld, tijd, of moeite) een 
belangrijke barrière zijn die mensen ervan weerhoudt om naar hun gedragsspecifieke 
normatieve overwegingen te handelen omdat het verlangen om deze hoge kosten te 
vermijden zwaarder kan wegen dan het verlangen om normatief te handelen. (zie 
bijvoorbeeld Diekmann & Preisendörfer 2003; Guagnano, Stern & Dietz, 1995; 
Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Steg, Bolderdijk, Keizer & Perlavicuite, 
2014). 
 De hypothese dat hoge kosten van gedrag normatieve overwegingen kunnen 
‘wegdrukken’ staat in de literatuur bekend als de ‘low-cost hypothesis’ (Diekmann & 
Preisendörfer, 2003). Deze hypothese stelt dat mensen hun normatieve 
overwegingen om milieuvriendelijk te handelen eerder in gedrag vertalen wanneer  
de kosten van dat gedrag relatief laag zijn dan wanneer deze kosten hoger zijn. 
Verschillende studies hebben deze hypothese getoetst, maar de resultaten zijn niet 
eenduidig (Best, 2010). Een aantal onderzoeksresultaten ondersteunt de hypothese 
(zie bijvoorbeeld Derksen & Gartrell, 1993 en Diekmann & Preisendörfer 1998; 
2003), terwijl andere studies juist geen steun laten zien (zie bijvoorbeeld Best, 2010 
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en Anderson & Von Borgstede, 2010; Best & Kneip, 2011; Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 
1995). Deze verschillen zijn (deels) het gevolg van verschillende metingen van de 
kosten van gedrag (Best, 2010). Ook speelt een rol dat in sommige studies gedrag is 
meegenomen dat wordt geassocieerd met zeer lage kosten. Dit type gedrag wordt 
waarschijnlijk door veel mensen vertoond, ongeacht de sterkte van hun normatieve 
overwegingen. Met andere woorden: als de waargenomen kosten van gedrag zeer laag 
zijn, worden normatieve overwegingen waarschijnlijk zwakke voorspellers van 
gedrag, en hoogstwaarschijnlijk zwakker dan wanneer gedrag met lage kosten wordt 
geassocieerd (zie ook Guagnano et al., 1995). Voor een valide test van de low-cost 
hypothesis is het dan ook zeer belangrijk dat veronderstelde verschillen in kosten 
tussen gedragingen goed worden gemeten zodat duidelijke conclusies met betrekking 
tot de geldigheid van de hypothese getrokken kunnen worden.  
 Vanwege het belang van een heldere conceptualisatie en meting van de kosten 
van gedrag heb ik ervoor gekozen om in mijn onderzoek naar de low-cost hypothesis 
een expliciete maat van de waargenomen kosten van bepaald milieuvriendelijk 
gedrag op te nemen. Ik heb voor een maat van waargenomen kosten in plaats van een 
objectieve maat van kosten gekozen omdat de perceptie van kosten, en niet de 
werkelijke kosten in termen van geld, moeite of tijd mensen ervan weerhoudt om 
bepaald gedrag te vertonen. Natuurlijk kunnen waargenomen kosten samenhangen 
met objectieve kosten, maar dit is niet vanzelfsprekend het geval. Objectieve en 
waargenomen kosten lopen bijvoorbeeld niet synchroon wanneer treinkaartjes 
duurder worden gemaakt: mensen met een hoog inkomen zullen een prijsverhoging 
over het algemeen als een minder grote barrière ervaren dan mensen met een lager 
inkomen. Vanwege deze imperfecte relatie tussen objectieve en waargenomen kosten, 
gecombineerd met de inherente complexiteit van het meten van de objectieve kosten 
van specifiek gedrag, heb ik in dit proefschrift gekozen voor een brede maat van 
waargenomen kosten als indicator van de kosten van gedrag.  
In hoofdstuk 2 t/m 4 probeer ik tot een solide test van de low-cost hypothesis 
te komen door verschillende methoden en gedragingen te gebruiken in combinatie 
met expliciete metingen van de waargenomen kosten van gedrag. Om preciezer te zijn 
vergelijk ik in hoofdstukken 2 en 4 de voorspellende waarde van normatieve 
overwegingen op gedragingen die verschillen in de mate waarin ze als kostbaar 
worden ervaren (het verminderen van autogebruik voor korte ritten versus 
autogebruik in het algemeen in hoofdstuk 2, en het accepteren van 
beleidsmaatregelen die hoge, lage of zeer lage kosten met zich meebrengen in 
hoofdstuk 4), terwijl ik in hoofdstuk 3 de voorspellende waarde van normatieve 
overwegingen op één type gedrag (het gebruik van duurzame energie) vergelijk in 
landen waar de kosten van dit gedrag verschilt. Om de generaliseerbaarheid van de 
resultaten van het onderzoek vast te kunnen stellen gebruik ik niet alleen 
verschillende milieuvriendelijke gedragingen maar vergelijk ik de resultaten ook 
steeds over meerdere Europese landen. De vraag is hierbij steeds: Is er ondanks al 
deze verschillende metingen en contexten een algemeen patroon te vinden dat de 
low-cost-hypothesis bevestigt? 
In hoofdstuk 2 testte ik de low-cost hypothesis door in zeven Europese landen 
te toetsen of normatieve overwegingen met betrekking tot vermindering van 
autogebruik sterkere voorspellers zouden zijn van autogebruik voor korte ritten (een 
type autogebruik dat tegen lage kosten verminderd kan worden) dan van autogebruik 
in het algemeen (een type autogebruik dat tegen hogere kosten verminderd kan 
worden). Dit was inderdaad het geval: normatieve overwegingen waren betere 
voorspellers van het gebruik van autogebruik voor korte ritten dan van autogebruik in 
het algemeen. Deze uitkomsten vormen een duidelijke ondersteuning van de low-cost 
hypothesis, omdat ze laten zien dat normatieve overwegingen sterkere voorspellers 
zijn van gedrag als de kosten van dit gedrag relatief laag zijn dan wanneer deze kosten 
hoger zijn. Het is belangrijk om te noemen dat ik de waargenomen kosten van het 
verminderen van de twee typen autogebruik expliciet heb gemeten; daaruit bleek dat 
de conceptualisatie van autogebruik voor korte ritten als gedrag dat tegen lage kosten 
kan worden verminderd en autogebruik in het algemeen als gedrag dat tegen hogere 
kosten kan worden verminderd juist was.  
In hoofdstuk 3 gebruikte ik een andere methode om de low-cost hypothesis te 
toetsen, namelijk door de mate waarin normatieve overwegingen één gedrag (het 
gebruik van duurzame energie) voorspellen te vergelijken in zes Europese landen die 
verschillen in de mate waarin door inwoners het gebruik van duurzame energie als 
kostbaar wordt ervaren. Op basis van de low-cost hypothesis verwachtte ik dat 
normatieve overwegingen sterker voorspellend zouden zijn voor het gebruik van 
duurzame energie naarmate de waargenomen kosten van het gebruik van duurzame 
energie in een land lager waren. De waargenomen kosten van duurzame energie heb 
ik net zoals in hoofdstuk 2 expliciet gemeten. Het patroon dat ik op basis van deze 
kostenmaat verwachtte, namelijk dat normatieve overwegingen het sterkst 
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en Anderson & Von Borgstede, 2010; Best & Kneip, 2011; Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 
1995). Deze verschillen zijn (deels) het gevolg van verschillende metingen van de 
kosten van gedrag (Best, 2010). Ook speelt een rol dat in sommige studies gedrag is 
meegenomen dat wordt geassocieerd met zeer lage kosten. Dit type gedrag wordt 
waarschijnlijk door veel mensen vertoond, ongeacht de sterkte van hun normatieve 
overwegingen. Met andere woorden: als de waargenomen kosten van gedrag zeer laag 
zijn, worden normatieve overwegingen waarschijnlijk zwakke voorspellers van 
gedrag, en hoogstwaarschijnlijk zwakker dan wanneer gedrag met lage kosten wordt 
geassocieerd (zie ook Guagnano et al., 1995). Voor een valide test van de low-cost 
hypothesis is het dan ook zeer belangrijk dat veronderstelde verschillen in kosten 
tussen gedragingen goed worden gemeten zodat duidelijke conclusies met betrekking 
tot de geldigheid van de hypothese getrokken kunnen worden.  
 Vanwege het belang van een heldere conceptualisatie en meting van de kosten 
van gedrag heb ik ervoor gekozen om in mijn onderzoek naar de low-cost hypothesis 
een expliciete maat van de waargenomen kosten van bepaald milieuvriendelijk 
gedrag op te nemen. Ik heb voor een maat van waargenomen kosten in plaats van een 
objectieve maat van kosten gekozen omdat de perceptie van kosten, en niet de 
werkelijke kosten in termen van geld, moeite of tijd mensen ervan weerhoudt om 
bepaald gedrag te vertonen. Natuurlijk kunnen waargenomen kosten samenhangen 
met objectieve kosten, maar dit is niet vanzelfsprekend het geval. Objectieve en 
waargenomen kosten lopen bijvoorbeeld niet synchroon wanneer treinkaartjes 
duurder worden gemaakt: mensen met een hoog inkomen zullen een prijsverhoging 
over het algemeen als een minder grote barrière ervaren dan mensen met een lager 
inkomen. Vanwege deze imperfecte relatie tussen objectieve en waargenomen kosten, 
gecombineerd met de inherente complexiteit van het meten van de objectieve kosten 
van specifiek gedrag, heb ik in dit proefschrift gekozen voor een brede maat van 
waargenomen kosten als indicator van de kosten van gedrag.  
In hoofdstuk 2 t/m 4 probeer ik tot een solide test van de low-cost hypothesis 
te komen door verschillende methoden en gedragingen te gebruiken in combinatie 
met expliciete metingen van de waargenomen kosten van gedrag. Om preciezer te zijn 
vergelijk ik in hoofdstukken 2 en 4 de voorspellende waarde van normatieve 
overwegingen op gedragingen die verschillen in de mate waarin ze als kostbaar 
worden ervaren (het verminderen van autogebruik voor korte ritten versus 
autogebruik in het algemeen in hoofdstuk 2, en het accepteren van 
beleidsmaatregelen die hoge, lage of zeer lage kosten met zich meebrengen in 
hoofdstuk 4), terwijl ik in hoofdstuk 3 de voorspellende waarde van normatieve 
overwegingen op één type gedrag (het gebruik van duurzame energie) vergelijk in 
landen waar de kosten van dit gedrag verschilt. Om de generaliseerbaarheid van de 
resultaten van het onderzoek vast te kunnen stellen gebruik ik niet alleen 
verschillende milieuvriendelijke gedragingen maar vergelijk ik de resultaten ook 
steeds over meerdere Europese landen. De vraag is hierbij steeds: Is er ondanks al 
deze verschillende metingen en contexten een algemeen patroon te vinden dat de 
low-cost-hypothesis bevestigt? 
In hoofdstuk 2 testte ik de low-cost hypothesis door in zeven Europese landen 
te toetsen of normatieve overwegingen met betrekking tot vermindering van 
autogebruik sterkere voorspellers zouden zijn van autogebruik voor korte ritten (een 
type autogebruik dat tegen lage kosten verminderd kan worden) dan van autogebruik 
in het algemeen (een type autogebruik dat tegen hogere kosten verminderd kan 
worden). Dit was inderdaad het geval: normatieve overwegingen waren betere 
voorspellers van het gebruik van autogebruik voor korte ritten dan van autogebruik in 
het algemeen. Deze uitkomsten vormen een duidelijke ondersteuning van de low-cost 
hypothesis, omdat ze laten zien dat normatieve overwegingen sterkere voorspellers 
zijn van gedrag als de kosten van dit gedrag relatief laag zijn dan wanneer deze kosten 
hoger zijn. Het is belangrijk om te noemen dat ik de waargenomen kosten van het 
verminderen van de twee typen autogebruik expliciet heb gemeten; daaruit bleek dat 
de conceptualisatie van autogebruik voor korte ritten als gedrag dat tegen lage kosten 
kan worden verminderd en autogebruik in het algemeen als gedrag dat tegen hogere 
kosten kan worden verminderd juist was.  
In hoofdstuk 3 gebruikte ik een andere methode om de low-cost hypothesis te 
toetsen, namelijk door de mate waarin normatieve overwegingen één gedrag (het 
gebruik van duurzame energie) voorspellen te vergelijken in zes Europese landen die 
verschillen in de mate waarin door inwoners het gebruik van duurzame energie als 
kostbaar wordt ervaren. Op basis van de low-cost hypothesis verwachtte ik dat 
normatieve overwegingen sterker voorspellend zouden zijn voor het gebruik van 
duurzame energie naarmate de waargenomen kosten van het gebruik van duurzame 
energie in een land lager waren. De waargenomen kosten van duurzame energie heb 
ik net zoals in hoofdstuk 2 expliciet gemeten. Het patroon dat ik op basis van deze 
kostenmaat verwachtte, namelijk dat normatieve overwegingen het sterkst 
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voorspellend zouden zijn in Nederland, minder voorspellend in het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk, Frankrijk en Zwitserland en het minst in Griekenland en Hongarije werd 
bijna geheel door de resultaten bevestigd. De enige uitzondering vormde 
Griekenland, maar waarschijnlijk is dat het gevolg van bepaalde antwoordtendenzen 
in de resultaten van de Griekse deelnemers (voor meer informatie en andere 
voorbeelden, zie Harzing, 2006; Van Herk, Poortinga & Verhallen, 2004). Omdat de 
Griekse patronen niet geheel betrouwbaar zijn en de resultaten in andere landen het 
verwachte patroon volgen ondersteunt ook dit hoofdstuk de low-cost hypothesis (en 
daarmee het balanceringsmechanisme). Dat wil zeggen, normatieve overwegingen 
zijn sterkere voorspellers van het gebruik van duurzame energie wanneer dit gedrag 
met relatief lage kosten geassocieerd wordt dan met hogere kosten. 
Hoofdstuk 4 verschilt van de vorige hoofdstukken door de toepassing van de 
low-cost hypothesis op een ander type gedrag (de acceptatie van beleidsmaatregelen 
ter vermindering van het autogebruik) en door de toevoeging van een extra contrast: 
ik keek in dit hoofdstuk niet alleen naar gedrag dat geassocieerd wordt met relatief 
lage of hoge kosten, maar ook naar gedrag dat geassocieerd wordt met zeer lage 
kosten. Deze toevoeging is theoretisch interessant omdat gedrag dat ervaren wordt 
als niet of nauwelijks kostbaar waarschijnlijk door veel mensen vertoond wordt, 
ongeacht de sterkte van hun normatieve overwegingen. Met andere woorden: als de 
waargenomen kosten van gedrag zeer laag zijn, worden normatieve overwegingen 
waarschijnlijk zwakke voorspellers van gedrag, en hoogstwaarschijnlijk zwakker dan 
wanneer gedrag met lage kosten wordt geassocieerd (zie ook Guagnano et al., 1995). 
De test van de voorspellende kracht van normatieve overwegingen onder zeer lage 
kosten vormt zo een interessante aanvulling op de voorgaande hoofdstukken. 
Ook de resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 ondersteunen de low-cost hypothesis: 
normatieve overwegingen waren sterkere voorspellers van acceptatie van 
beleidsmaatregelen die met relatief lage kosten werden geassocieerd dan van 
beleidsmaatregelen die als kostbaarder werden gezien. Daarnaast waren deze 
overwegingen minder voorspellend voor beleidsmaatregelen die geassocieerd werden 
met zeer lage kosten dan voor kostbaardere maatregelen; een uitkomst die het 
verwachte verschil tussen gedrag dat geassocieerd wordt met zeer lage kosten en lage 
kosten ondersteunt. Hiermee suggereert dit hoofdstuk een verdere specificatie van de 
low-cost hypothesis. Dat wil zeggen, normatieve overwegingen zijn inderdaad 
sterkere voorspellers van gedrag dat geassocieerd wordt met relatief lage kosten dan 
van kostbaarder gedrag, maar dit geldt niet wanneer deze kosten zeer laag zijn.  
Wanneer ik de resultaten van hoofdstuk 2-4 samenneem, is de opvallendste 
uitkomst de brede en convergente steun voor de low-cost hypothesis, en daarmee ook 
voor een belangrijk deel van het balanceringsmodel dat ik voorstel. Met verschillende 
methoden, gedragingen en deelnemers uit verschillende landen lieten alle drie de 
hoofdstukken zien dat gedragsspecifieke normatieve overwegingen sterkere 
voorspellers zijn van milieuvriendelijk gedrag dat geassocieerd wordt met relatief lage 
kosten dan van gedragingen die geassocieerd worden met hogere kosten of met hele 
lage kosten. Door het gebruik van onderzoeksontwerpen waarin vergelijkbare 
gedragingen, expliciete metingen van waargenomen kosten van gedrag, en replicaties 
over verschillende situaties gecombineerd werden, heb ik er vertrouwen in dat deze 
empirische hoofdstukken een valide en solide toets van de low-cost hypothesis 
vormen. Deze brede steun voor de low-cost hypothesis ondersteunt ook een deel van 
het balanceringsmodel, omdat het laat zien dat mensen hun motivatie om normatieve 
overwegingen te vertalen in milieuvriendelijk gedrag afwegen tegen de waargenomen 
kosten van dit gedrag. Dit betekent, met andere woorden, dat mensen hun 
normatieve overwegingen eerder omzetten in milieuvriendelijk gedrag wanneer de 
kosten van dit gedrag als relatief laag waargenomen worden dan wanneer deze kosten 
hoger of heel laag lijken. 
Ook vanuit een praktisch oogpunt zijn de uitkomsten van hoofdstuk 2-4 om 
verschillende redenen interessant. In de eerste plaats laten ze zien dat normatieve 
overwegingen belangrijke voorspellers van milieuvriendelijk gedrag kunnen zijn. De 
resultaten laten hiermee zien dat interventies die erop gericht zijn om 
milieuvriendelijk gedrag aan te moedigen door het versterken van normatieve 
overwegingen, zoals bijvoorbeeld ‘softe’ interventies (Pas, 1995; Kitamura, Fujii & Pas 
1997; Steg & Vlek, 2009), effectief kunnen zijn. Hierbij hoort echter wel de 
kanttekening dat ik heb gevonden dat normatieve overwegingen vooral voorspellend 
zijn voor milieuvriendelijk gedrag dat wordt geassocieerd met relatief lage kosten; 
hier moet bij het kiezen van interventiestrategieën rekening mee worden gehouden. 
Vertaalt in een suggestie voor beleidsmaker volgt hieruit het volgende. 
Interventiestrategieën die gericht zijn op het stimuleren van wenselijk 
milieuvriendelijk gedrag door normatieve overwegingen te versterken kunnen 
succesvol zijn, maar breng eerst in kaart in hoeverre mensen het gewenste gedrag als 
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voorspellend zouden zijn in Nederland, minder voorspellend in het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk, Frankrijk en Zwitserland en het minst in Griekenland en Hongarije werd 
bijna geheel door de resultaten bevestigd. De enige uitzondering vormde 
Griekenland, maar waarschijnlijk is dat het gevolg van bepaalde antwoordtendenzen 
in de resultaten van de Griekse deelnemers (voor meer informatie en andere 
voorbeelden, zie Harzing, 2006; Van Herk, Poortinga & Verhallen, 2004). Omdat de 
Griekse patronen niet geheel betrouwbaar zijn en de resultaten in andere landen het 
verwachte patroon volgen ondersteunt ook dit hoofdstuk de low-cost hypothesis (en 
daarmee het balanceringsmechanisme). Dat wil zeggen, normatieve overwegingen 
zijn sterkere voorspellers van het gebruik van duurzame energie wanneer dit gedrag 
met relatief lage kosten geassocieerd wordt dan met hogere kosten. 
Hoofdstuk 4 verschilt van de vorige hoofdstukken door de toepassing van de 
low-cost hypothesis op een ander type gedrag (de acceptatie van beleidsmaatregelen 
ter vermindering van het autogebruik) en door de toevoeging van een extra contrast: 
ik keek in dit hoofdstuk niet alleen naar gedrag dat geassocieerd wordt met relatief 
lage of hoge kosten, maar ook naar gedrag dat geassocieerd wordt met zeer lage 
kosten. Deze toevoeging is theoretisch interessant omdat gedrag dat ervaren wordt 
als niet of nauwelijks kostbaar waarschijnlijk door veel mensen vertoond wordt, 
ongeacht de sterkte van hun normatieve overwegingen. Met andere woorden: als de 
waargenomen kosten van gedrag zeer laag zijn, worden normatieve overwegingen 
waarschijnlijk zwakke voorspellers van gedrag, en hoogstwaarschijnlijk zwakker dan 
wanneer gedrag met lage kosten wordt geassocieerd (zie ook Guagnano et al., 1995). 
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kostbaar ervaren. Als het gedrag als te kostbaar wordt gezien is de kans dat de 
interventie succesvol zal zijn, redelijk klein. In dit geval moeten eerst de 
waargenomen kosten van gedrag worden verminderd voordat een interventie 
gebaseerd op het versterken van normatieve overwegingen tot een toename in 
milieuvriendelijk gedrag kan leiden.  
 
De balans verleggen: milieuvriendelijk gedrag stimuleren door 
normatieve overwegingen te activeren 
 
Hoofdstukken 2-4 laten zien hoe verschillen in de kracht van contextuele barrières de 
voorspellende waarde van normatieve overwegingen beïnvloeden. In hoofdstuk 5 
keek ik of een versterking van de normatieve kant van het balansmodel tot een 
toename van de voorspellende kracht van normatieve overwegingen kan leiden.  
 Naast de aandacht voor de normatieve kant van het balansmodel verschilt 
hoofdstuk 5 ook op een andere belangrijke manier van de voorgaande empirische 
hoofdstukken. In dit hoofdstuk heb ik mij namelijk gericht op algemene normatieve 
overwegingen in plaats van gedragsspecifieke overwegingen. Deze keuze heb ik 
gemaakt om zo bredere steun voor het balanceringsmodel te vinden. Als indicator 
voor algemene normatieve overwegingen heb ik gekozen voor biosferische waarden. 
Deze waarden geven aan in welke mate milieuoverwegingen leidend zijn in het leven 
van mensen en in hoeverre het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van het milieu een 
belangrijk doel voor hen is (De Groot & Steg, 2008). De algemene aard van deze 
waarden betekent dat ze potentieel voorspellend zijn voor allerlei milieuvriendelijk 
gedrag. Onderzoek laat echter zien dat biosferische waarden wel goede voorspellers 
zijn van specifieke overtuigingen en normen met betrekking tot milieuvriendelijk 
gedrag (Steg et al., 2011; Steg & De Groot, 2012), maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs van 
het gedrag zelf (zie bijvoorbeeld Stern & Dietz, 1994; De Groot, Steg, & Dicke, 2008). 
Dit gebrek aan bewijs voor een sterke relatie tussen biosferische waarden en 
milieuvriendelijk gedrag vormde het beginpunt van dit onderzoek. 
 Een mogelijke reden waarom biosferische waarden geen sterke voorspellers 
van gedrag zijn is dat deze waarden niet altijd onmiddellijk actief en toegankelijk zijn 
in situaties waarin mensen de kans krijgen om naar deze waarden te handelen. Dit 
gebrek aan toegankelijkheid kan ervoor zorgen dat mensen hun waarden niet vertalen 
in milieuvriendelijk gedrag (Maio, 2010; Steg et al., 2014; Verplanken & Holland, 
2002). Stel bijvoorbeeld dat iemand die veel belang hecht aan het milieu (sterke 
biosferische waarden) boodschappen gaat doen. Het kopen van biologische kaas kan 
een uitstekende manier zijn om naar deze sterke waarden te handelen, maar als deze 
waarden niet actief zijn tijdens het winkelen kan dat een reden zijn waarom deze 
persoon geen biologische kaas koopt. Met andere woorden: een gebrek aan 
situationele activatie van algemene normatieve overwegingen zoals biosferische 
waarden kan een belangrijke reden zijn die mensen ervan weerhoudt om naar deze 
algemene overwegingen te handelen. Met een experimenteel onderzoek heb ik 
onderzocht of een manipulatie die normatieve overwegingen situationeel activeert de 
motivatie om milieuvriendelijk te handelen kan versterken. 
 Verplanken en Holland (2002) lieten zien dat biosferische waarden vooral 
invloed hebben op gedrag wanneer deze waarden situationeel geactiveerd worden. In 
hoofdstuk 5 testte ik of een soortgelijke toename in milieuvriendelijk gedrag ook 
bereikt kan worden door situationeel normen te activeren. De basis voor dit idee 
vormt value-belief-norm theory (VBN theorie; Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Abel, 
Guagnano en Kalof, 1999). Deze theorie stelt dat waarden voornamelijk indirecte 
voorspellers zijn van milieuvriendelijk gedrag via specifiekere normen en 
overtuigingen. Onderzoek naar deze theorie laat inderdaad zien dat algemene 
waarden (het milieu is belangrijk) via specifiekere normen (ik hoor bepaald 
milieuvriendelijk gedrag te vertonen) invloed hebben op motivatie en gedrag 
(bijvoorbeeld De Groot et al., 2008; Jakovcevic & Steg 2013; Nordlund & Gärvill 
2002; 2003; Steg et al., 2005; Stern et al., 1999). Uit deze relatie tussen biosferische 
waarden, normen en motivatie volgt dat activatie van situationele milieunormen tot 
een toename in milieuvriendelijke motivatie kan leiden onder mensen met sterke 
biosferische waarden, omdat deze geactiveerde milieunormen de noodzakelijke 
tussenstap mogelijk maken van sterke algemene waarden naar specifieke motivatie 
en gedrag.  
 Maar is het voor de relatie tussen biosferische waarden en milieuvriendelijk 
gedrag noodzakelijk dat de geactiveerde normen specifieke milieunormen zijn? In 
hoofdstuk 5 testte ik ook een andere mogelijkheid, namelijk dat algemene pro-sociale 
normen (normen die ‘goed gedrag’ benadrukken) ook tot een toename kunnen leiden 
in milieuvriendelijk gedrag onder mensen met sterke biosferische waarden. De reden 
waarom ik een soortgelijk effect verwachtte van gerichtheid op algemene pro-sociale 
normen als op specifieke milieunormen is dat mensen met biosferische waarden 
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milieuvriendelijk gedrag zien als een manier om ‘goed gedrag’ te vertonen (zie 
bijvoorbeeld De Groot & Steg, 2008; Maio, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Dit 
betekent dat een situationele prikkel om 'goed gedrag' te vertonen bij mensen met 
sterke biosferische waarden tot een toename van milieuvriendelijk motivatie kan 
leiden, maar bij mensen met zwakke biosferische waarden niet.  
 De resultaten van hoofdstuk 5 sloten uitstekend aan bij het verwachte patroon. 
Zowel de activatie van specifieke milieunormen als de activatie van algemene pro-
sociale normen leidde tot een toename in milieuvriendelijke intenties (gemeten als 
intenties om een milieuorganisatie te helpen) onder mensen met redelijk sterke en 
sterke biosferische waarden, maar niet onder mensen met zwakke biosferische 
waarden. Deze resultaten laten zien dat situationele activatie van normen inderdaad 
tot een toename in milieuvriendelijk gedrag kan leiden, maar alleen onder mensen 
die biosferische waarden al in zekere mate onderschrijven.  
 Theoretisch is het om twee redenen van belang dat het effect van geactiveerde 
pro-sociale normen hetzelfde is als het effect van geactiveerde specifieke 
milieunormen. In de eerste plaats is dit belangrijk omdat dit resultaat laat zien dat de 
activatie van normen, en niet noodzakelijkerwijs de milieu-gerelateerde inhoud 
ervan, het effect van de activatiemanipulatie op de intentie om milieuvriendelijk te 
handelen verklaart. In de tweede plaats is het ook belangrijk omdat het laat zien dat 
geactiveerde pro-sociale normen effecten kunnen hebben  die niet direct 
samenhangen met pro-sociaal gedrag (bijv. helpen). Dit is een belangrijk verschil met 
de directe activatie van waarden zoals die door Verplanken en Holland (2002) werd 
toegepast. Dat wil zeggen, waar het effect van activatie van specifieke waarden 
beperkt blijft tot het domein waar de waarden toe behoren (bijvoorbeeld activatie van 
biosferische waarden die tot meer milieugedrag leidt), laat dit onderzoek zien dat de 
activatie van pro-sociale normen effecten kan hebben  op gedrag dat niet één-op-eén 
met de geactiveerde normen samenvalt.  
 De uitkomsten van de studie in hoofdstuk 5 bieden verschillende 
aanknopingspunten voor interventies om milieuvriendelijk gedrag te stimuleren. 
Allereerst toont dit onderzoek aan dat een manipulatie die milieuvriendelijke of pro-
sociale normen actief maakt in een situatie waarin mensen milieuvriendelijk kunnen 
handelen tot een toename van milieuvriendelijke motivatie kan leiden. Hieruit volgt 
dat interventies die pro-sociale normen actief maken (bijvoorbeeld posters met 
normatieve slogans) tot een toename van milieuvriendelijk gedrag kunnen leiden. 
Daarnaast laat het onderzoek zien dat deze normatieve slogans niet specifiek gericht 
hoeven te zijn op het doelgedrag van de interventie, maar dat de activatie van 
algemene pro-sociale normen ook tot een toename in milieuvriendelijk gedrag kan 
leiden. Hierbij moet aangetekend worden dat deze positieve milieu-effecten van 
geactiveerde normen alleen optreden bij mensen die deze biosferische waarden al tot 
in zekere mate aanhangen. 
 
Conclusie   
 
Onder welke omstandigheden en in welke mate zijn normatieve overwegingen 
voorspellend voor milieuvriendelijk gedrag? De eerste drie empirische hoofdstukken 
van dit proefschrift laten zien dat de voorspellende waarde van normatieve 
overwegingen voor milieuvriendelijk gedrag sterker zijn wanneer de waargenomen 
kosten van dit gedrag relatief laag zijn dan wanneer deze kosten zeer laag of juist 
hoog zijn. Hieruit blijkt dat normatieve overwegingen onder bepaalde 
omstandigheden, namelijk wanneer de waargenomen kosten van gedrag laag zijn, een 
belangrijke voorspeller van gedrag kunnen zijn.  Hoofdstuk 5 voegt hier aan toe dat 
mensen eerder naar normatieve overwegingen handelen wanneer deze overwegingen 
situationeel geactiveerd worden. Hiermee toont dit hoofdstuk aan dat het belang van 
normatieve overwegingen als voorspellers van milieuvriendelijk gedrag van buitenaf 
versterkt kan worden door ‘cues’ in de omgeving die mensen herinneren aan hun 
waarden. Alle hoofdstukken samen laten zien dat normatieve overwegingen 
belangrijke voorspellers van milieuvriendelijk gedrag kunnen zijn – als externe 
factoren dit maar mogelijk maken, of in elk geval niet teveel in de weg zitten. Dat veel 
mensen zeggen bij te willen dragen aan een schoner milieu is daarom wel degelijk 
belangrijk. Het betekent dat wanneer externe factoren minder gewicht in de schaal 
leggen, de balans naar motivatie voor actie doorslaat en mensen dus hun woorden 
ook om kunnen en zullen zetten in daden. 
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Ik vond het schrijven van dit dankwoord één van de leukste onderdelen van het 
afronden van het proefschrift. Dat heeft er natuurlijk mee te maken dat op dit 
moment alle belangrijke beslissingen al zijn genomen en er niets meer echt ‘fout’ kan 
gaan, maar het is ook gewoon heel leuk om eens de tijd te nemen om te bedenken wie 
er allemaal hebben meegeholpen bij de totstandkoming van dit boekje. De lijst werd 
al snel lang; het geeft me een fantastisch gevoel dat zoveel mensen op allerlei 
manieren hebben geholpen om dit proefschrift af te ronden. Dank jullie wel allemaal! 
 
Natuurlijk wil ik een aantal mensen ook graag individueel bedanken: 
 
Linda en Martijn, dank jullie wel voor jullie inzet, inzicht en geduld. Jullie 
benadrukten in onze bijeenkomsten steeds weer hoezeer jullie het met elkaar eens 
waren – bijna tot het punt dat jullie suggereerden dat ik jullie niet allebei nodig zou 
hebben. Wat mij betreft is dat onzin: ik vond onze afspraken met z’n drieën altijd leuk 
en inspirerend en heb heel veel gehad aan de manier waarop jullie elkaar aanvulden. 
Ik ben jullie heel dankbaar voor jullie positieve begeleiding: jullie hebben ervoor 
gezorgd dat het werken aan dit proefschrift altijd leuk is gebleven, ook op momenten 
dat ik twijfelde of het zou lukken en of het eigenlijk wel de moeite waard was. Dat het 
nu af is en ik me (bijna) doctor mag noemen heb ik voor een heel groot deel aan jullie 
te danken. Dank jullie wel!  
Goda, mijn favoriete kamergenote. In de eerste maanden van mijn promotie 
had ik een kamer alleen op de tweede verdieping; een enorme luxe, dacht ik toen. 
Maar al heel snel nadat we samen een kamer op de vierde kregen wist ik dat ik het 
mis had: een kamer met jou delen was veel leuker dan een kamer alleen! Ik vond het 
inspirerend om te zien hoe je je onderzoek aanpakte en ontzettend leuk om samen je 
Nederlands te oefenen (en te merken hoe veel je vooruit ging). Dat ik ook voor de 
planten moest zorgen nam ik maar op de koop toe… Dank je wel voor alle leuke 
momenten tijdens het werk! 
Jan Willem, jij bent op zoveel verschillende manieren belangrijk voor me 
geweest in de afgelopen jaren. Aan de Grote Kruisstraat was je een soort mentor voor 
me: je had altijd tijd om ideeën te bespreken en advies te geven en je eeuwige 
enthousiasme werkte aanstekelijk. Dat enthousiasme vertaalde zich ook in gedeelde 
hobbies: dankzij jouw gelobby ben ik meer gaan fietsen en ook gaan schaatsen. 
Tijdens één van onze schaatsrondjes op Kardinge bood je me de kans om in een kort 
onderzoeksproject met Incassade te stappen; zonder dat voorstel had ik nu geen 
leuke baan bij Marketing gehad.  En ook nu bij Marketing ben je een waardevolle 
mentor bij wie ik altijd terecht kan. Dank je wel! 
Mijn andere collega’s die mijn tijd bij Psychologie zo leuk maakten. Janet, 
Kees, Roos, Ebru, Berfu, Ellen, Madelijne, Ernst, Danny, Leonie, Angela, Marco: 
Dank jullie wel voor alle leuke gesprekken, de leuke pauzes, de sinterklaasfeesten en 
kerstbomen, borrels en etentjes, de inspiratie en ondersteuning… Jullie maakten een 
leuke baan nog veel leuker! En Danny, Ernst en Thijs, dank jullie wel voor de 
introductie in de wereld van het basketbal, met alle leuke gesprekken, NBA-avonden 
en vakanties die daaruit zijn voortgekomen! 
Bas: Dank je wel voor je vriendschap en de afleiding die je me bood als ik die 
nodig had. Het is al meer dan 10 jaar geleden dat we elkaar tegenkwamen (we worden 
echt oud) - op naar de volgende 10!  
Papa en mama: Dank jullie wel voor al jullie steun en wijze woorden. De 
wetenschap dat ik altijd op jullie kan rekenen maakt mijn leven gemakkelijker en 
leuker. En papa, ook bedankt voor het meedenken met allerlei verschillende delen 
van dit proefschrift, van de opzet van het onderzoek tot de titel en de stellingen – het 
is altijd fijn om met je te sparren en je komt telkens weer met goede suggesties. Dank 
je wel! 
Dorien: Kleine zus, dank je wel voor je vaak aangeboden hulp, je interesse en je 
opbeurende woorden. Ik zal je niet weer aan het huilen maken in een dankwoord, 
maar weet dat ik heel blij ben met al onze telefoongesprekken, de leuke berichtjes die 
je stuurt en de dagen waarop we samen leuke dingen doen. Het is fijn om zo’n leuke 
zus te hebben! 
Oma: Wat is het fantastisch om zo’n lieve, slimme, grappige oma te hebben! 
Iedere keer als ik u zie is een feest, en ik voel me bevoorrecht met een oma die zo 
oprecht geïnteresseerd is in wat ik doe en wat me bezig houdt.  
En Lot, natuurlijk ben ik jou niet vergeten. Als het werken aan dit proefschrift 
niet opschoot was jij de eerste die daar last van had. Het frustreerde je soms dat ik het 
niet sneller afmaakte en dat ik niet méér vertelde over waar ik eigenlijk mee bezig 
was. Daar had je gelijk in, het was gemakkelijker geweest voor ons allebei als ik je er 
meer bij betrokken had. Maar toch bleef je altijd positief en gaf je me het gevoel dat ik 
het proefschrift af kon maken en dat ik er nu trots op mag zijn dat dat gelukt is. Daar 
ben ik je heel dankbaar voor. En dat is alleen maar wat je betekende bij het schrijven 
van dit kleine boekje... Met jou in mijn leven is alles zo veel leuker, gemakkelijker, 
specialer… Dank je wel voor alles!!   
Dankwoord
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